Couldn’t happen, you think? Then consider the situation with Iran. Following the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., the Bush Administration has threatened that Iran might be next, yet it is questionable if China and Russia would allow such an invasion, or if they might instead choose to go to war to protect their access to Arab oil. They also have a “way of life” to protect and, particularly in the case of China, a rapidly growing need for more and more oil. Should China and Russia decide to protect Iran from invasion, nuclear war might occur, particularly if the U.S., following its latest stated policy of using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear nation in a preemptive strike, attacks Iran. This could then lead to retaliatory attacks by Iran against the oil fields and shipping terminals of Saudi Arabia – possibly with nuclear weapons. World War III would have begun.

Another scenario is that, if attacked, the OPEC nations might destroy their oil fields and seed them with radioactive materials to keep the West from controlling the oil. This possibility is described in the book “Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection” by Gerald Posner. He claims that the oil facilities in Saudi Arabia are already mined with nuclear material that will retard rebuilding if activated.

Michael T. Klare is the defense correspondent of The Nation and a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. His latest book is Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependence on Imported Petroleum. This piece first appeared in The Nation.

Reports that Iran and Russia have reached an agreement on a plan for the joint enrichment of Iran’s uranium in Russia have eased fears of a major international confrontation over Iran’s nuclear plans. But this danger has by no means been eliminated. Without a permanent resolution of the dispute agreeable to both the United States and Iran, the prospect of an armed clash will grow increasingly severe. Such a clash might not entail full-scale war, but it could trigger an uncontrollable explosion of sectarian and religious strife throughout the Middle East. Preventing such a clash is among the most pressing tasks facing the international community today.

At heart this dispute revolves around Iranian efforts to enrich natural uranium (i.e., increase its content of fissionable U-235) in its own facilities—either for use as a fuel in civilian power plants, as claimed by Tehran, or as the core of nuclear bombs, as claimed by Washington. Enrichment activities of this sort aren’t prohibited by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Iran signed in 1968, but would constitute a breach if the highly enriched uranium was used for military purposes.

The problem for international regulators is that the enrichment technology used to make civilian reactor fuel—in this case, uranium gas centrifuges—can also be used to make highly enriched uranium, and it’s not possible to determine the objective of such an operation until it’s well under way. Accordingly, those who fear that Iran is intent on obtaining nuclear weapons seek to prevent any enrichment from taking place there; the Iranians, for their part, insist that they have every right under the NPT to conduct such activities for peaceful uses and that interference with that right would constitute an intolerable assault on their sovereignty.

Under pressure from Britain, France and Germany, Iran agreed in 2004 to suspend enrichment activities at its pilot plant in Natanz while negotiating a permanent solution to the dispute. However, when the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency voted on February 4 to communicate its suspicions concerning Iran’s nuclear objectives to the United Nations Security Council—a step that could lead to economic sanctions against Iran—Tehran announced that it would terminate its voluntary freeze on enrichment. Since then, Iran has resumed small-scale enrichment at Natanz, thereby upping the ante.

If the plan for a joint Iranian-Russian enrichment enterprise proceeds, and Iran ceases activities at Natanz, the ground will be cleared for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. However, if the Russian plan fails or if the Iranians continue operations, the risk of a crisis will grow. Should the Security Council vote to impose sanctions, Tehran might decide to withdraw from the NPT altogether (as some officials have threatened) and commence an even more ambitious enrichment effort. And should UN sanctions fail to prevent this, pressure from right-wing hawks in Washington for a military solution could prove irresistible in light of George W. Bush’s pledge to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran.

A unilateral U.S. military strike on Iran would be illegal and imprudent. It would boost domestic support for the hard-line regime of President Ahmadinejad and invite harsh Iranian reprisals, such as a violent escalation of sectarian strife in Iraq (where Iran enjoys strong support among Shiite clerics) and attacks on Persian Gulf oil facilities. It is essential, then, to find a compromise.

Fortunately, a solution—the permanent, verifiable cessation of all military-related nuclear activities in Iran under terms acceptable to Tehran—is entirely conceivable. Presumably, such a solution would entail some form of continued Iranian enrichment research (whether in Russia or under tightly controlled conditions in Natanz) along with a U.S. nonaggression pledge and trade concessions. This, in turn, could set the stage for a much-needed overhaul of the NPT and for talks leading to a nuclear-free Middle East and eventually the elimination of all nuclear munitions.

Standing in the way of such a solution are powerful political and emotional impulses on both sides. This is not just a dispute over interpreting the NPT (which could be resolved through technical and legal means); it is also a microcosm of the larger clash between the West and the Islamic world. Suspicion of and hostility toward Muslim countries appears to be growing in Washington—note the reaction in Congress to the idea of a Dubai-based company managing some U.S. ports—and there is scant political will for a resolution of the crisis that might leave Tehran with a sense of vindication. Likewise, any U.S.-dictated solution would be viewed in Iran as a humiliating defeat at the hands of “the Great Satan” and would enjoy little support. Finding a way to defuse the emotional and ideological fervor on both sides of the divide is, therefore, essential for resolving the crisis peacefully.

On the U.S. side, this means accepting Iran as a legitimate negotiating partner and approaching the issues in a professional manner. Negotiating with Tehran doesn’t mean endorsing the clerical regime; it simply means being prepared to reach a compromise that’s in everyone’s best interest. It requires shunning all talk of “regime change” and any inclination to use force. Washington has already adopted such a stance toward North Korea; it must now approach Iran in the same manner. At the same time, Iran’s leaders have to hear from their friends in the international community, including Russia and China, that they must cease anti-Israel and anti-Jewish comments that justly provoke international outrage.

A peaceful resolution of the nuclear dispute with Iran is still possible—but only if leaders and citizen groups around the world work much harder to eliminate the obstacles to intelligent compromise.

MOSCOW (Agencies) – On Wednesday, Iranian nuclear negotiators, headed by Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, were in a hotel in central Moscow for a third round of talks on Moscow’s proposal to carry out uranium enrichment for the Islamic Republic on Russian soil. Larijani held talks with Igor Ivanov, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council.

Tehran stuck to its line, saying that even if a deal is struck with the Russians it will not bow to the key demand from its critics — to drop all efforts to enrich uranium at home.

Iran has already resumed small-scale enrichment at the Natanz facility under the strict supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

On arrival at Moscow’s airport, Larijani said Tehran sees no need to stop work on enrichment.

“A moratorium is necessary when there is something dangerous. But all our activities are transparent,” Larijani said as quoted by the Associated Press.

Larijani also said Tehran agrees to all inspections by the IAEA, the UN nuclear watchdog agency, if they are conducted in line with international law. “We are not making any extraordinary demands, (but) we insist on those rights that are Iran’s due in the IAEA framework,” he said, speaking through a Russian translator.

“We agree to IAEA inspections and those international inspections that are lawful.”

There is less than a week until a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors which will discuss its latest report on Iran’s nuclear program.

According to Reuters, oil prices rose on Wednesday, partly on traders’ concerns the nuclear row could affect Iranian crude supplies.

The previous two rounds involved less senior officials and the higher footing raised hopes Iran was taking the Russian proposal seriously.

“We are optimistic we can agree with our Iranian partners… we think we can come to an agreement that a joint venture on the soil of the Russian Federation will be able to meet Iran’s needs fully,” Russian President Vladimir Putin told a news conference during a visit to Hungary.

Moscow, Washington and the EU 3 have said Iran returning to a moratorium on enrichment is a non-negotiable precondition of any deal.

Larijani told reporters that a moratorium is unnecessary since “all our activity is transparent and directed towards peaceful nuclear power”.

U.S. President George W. Bush, on a visit to Iran’s neighbor Afghanistan, said he backed Russia’s efforts to find a compromise deal with Tehran.

“And so we’ve joined with Russia as part of a diplomatic effort to solve this problem,” Bush said.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki said there was still room for compromise.

“We are in a position to cooperate, reach a comprehensive compromise with all the parties… We are flexible,” he told reporters in Tokyo.

Iran nuclear compromise possible: Lavrov

Russia’s foreign minister told Russia Today television Wednesday that a compromise on Iran’s nuclear program was possible.

“I am convinced that a compromise that complies with the non-proliferation regime is possible,” Lavrov said in an interview with the 24-hour English-language channel.

“Iran should reimpose its moratorium (on nuclear research) and accept Russia’s proposal to open a joint venture to enrich uranium on Russian territory,” Lavrov said.

“We should do everything it takes to resume the efforts of UN inspectors in Iran,” Lavrov said.

“We will also try to explain that Iran’s current nuclear fuel needs could be covered by the joint venture,” Lavrov said.

Anyway, my two contributions for the Rapture Nuts’ Battle Plan for war with Iran. Ugh.

1) Small tactical “neutron bombs” could be used to take out the Iranian Republican Guard units protecting the Khuzestan oil facilities. Delivered by stealth fighters at night, the Iranians would never know what hit them. And the oil facilities would be left relatively intact. I know, I know, another war crime to go with the rest. But what would stop them? And besides, Rumsfeld likes all those military “labor-saving” gadgets. And small tactical “neutron bombs” could be used to repel any attempt by the Iranians to retake Khuzestan province.

2) To secure the oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz in case of war with Iran, the Bush administration needs a “beachhead” on the Iranian side of the strait. For this, they need a “staging area” on the opposite side of the strait, but close to it…kind of like D-Day. Thus, the vital, strategic importance of the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Of course, the UAE and Oman would want something in return from the Bush administration…let’s say, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and/or a “port deal.” So, Fall 2004, Bush administration starts ball rolling for FTAs with both countries. The UAE FTA is still pending (but they still got a “port deal” apparently), while Omani FTA signed by Bush on Jan. 19, 2006. BTW, two days before the Omani FTA signing, the secret review board approved the UAE port deal. Coincidence? Yeah, right.

All the signs point to Bush starting another war, but this time with Iran. And it will probably be in a month or so…maybe even weeks. And it will spiral out of control, just like in Iraq. Furthermore, I figure that within a short time (weeks? several months?) after Bush starts the war in Iran, a Hezbollah terrorist attack will occur within the United States…and possibly England. Also, suicide bombings will dramatically increase inside Iraq, especially targetting coalition forces. Israel, of course, will be targetted as well.

It will be a bloody mess that “no one could have possibly foreseen.” And by mid-year, both Bush and Blair will be forced to resign. Both U.S. and British citizens will have finally decided that enough is enough. But the damage will have already been done.

And Jesus won’t return. Hey, he wasn’t crazy, unlike many of the ones who claim they are followers of his today, especially the ones who support the Bush administration…through hell or high water. Ugh.