“why do we insist that our intervention is the only thing that will quell the violence when, after 5 long years, it seems quite the opposite.”

Comment by DanCaveman — February 12, 2008 @ 5:09 pm

Exactly! I believe that it’s referred to as “congnitive dissonance”, if I’m not mistaken…

Comment by J — February 12, 2008 @ 5:19 pm

I don’t deny that we wouldn’t be in this position had we not intervened. But we cannot reverse history, and we have to look to the future. That being said, I would note that the civil war really was sparked by a mosque bombing in February 2006, which was a Sunni attack against Shiites.

I don’t think intervention is the only thing that can quell violence, but it must be a factor. As we’ve discussed, a security vacuum would be really bad and would lead to a loss of prior gains. What we’ve done this year, in part due to the “surge” and other tactical changes, is testament to the ability of military power to make a difference.

There is no reason or precedence to say that civil wars “need a third party”.

Comment by DanCaveman — February 12, 2008 @ 5:07 pm

Dan, I’m taking a course right now on ending warfare. We just read a paper by a woman named Barbara Walter, titled “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” published in the Summer 1997 edition of International Organization (Vol. 51, No. 3). I’m not sure if you can access it online where you are, but let me provide an excerpt of what she says:

Overall, the single most successful explanation for why civil war negotiations failed was the credible-commitment argument. Once adversaries agreed to negotiate, every case where a third-party stepped in to guarantee a treaty resulted in a successful settlement. Outside powers guaranteed Lebanon’s agreement in 1958, the Dominican Republic’s “Act of Dominican Reconciliation,” the Riyadh Agreement in Lebanon (1976), the Addis Ababa Agreement in Sudan (1972), the Lancasater House Agreement in Zimbabwe (1979), and the Tela Agreement in Nicaragua (1989), and all brought peace. Only two civil wars reached a successful settlement without an outside guarantee (Colombia in 1958 and Yemen in 1970), and the details of these two exceptions tend to confirm the rule.

Another interesting observation she made was that:

An early withdrawal was viewed as potentially costly to the guarantor since it could severely damage “credibility with friends and allies,” as President Clinton himself admitted when pressured to withdraw from Somalia.

Republicans campaigning for president in South Carolina are routinely called upon to take a position against the Palmetto State’s flying of the Confederate battle flag near the Capitol in Columbia. Imagine what would happen if reporters found the stars and bars flying in a GOP candidate’s campaign office. Some campaign worker would be out of a job, and the candidate himself would have great difficulty living it down.

Not surprisingly, this is a story about media double standards. The Little Green Footballs blog notes that cameras from Houston’s KRIV-TV caught a glimpse of a different invidious flag hanging on the wall of what the narrator describes as a new Barack Obama campaign office in Texas’ largest city. During a report on the run-up to the March 4 Texas primary, the KRIV camera pans past a Cuban flag with an image of Che Guevara, an ally of communist dictator Fidel Castro. Guevara presided over show trials and executions of Castro enemies after the communist takeover of Cuba in 1959 before leaving Cuba in 1965 to foment terror and revolution elsewhere in the Third World.

Does Che Guevara symbolize the kind of “change” Barack Obama wants to bring to America?

Obama’s Web site announces that the office is funded by volunteers of the Barack Obama Campaign and is not an official headquarters for his campaign.” But it is yet another indication of how creepy his supporters tend to be. And, if this were a Republican and a Confederate flag, the calls for him to denounce it would be deafening by now.

I appreciate your civil discourse; however, you are using Biddle’s opinion to prove his conclusion. The only thing we know is that the Mahdi Army instituted a ceasefire. Biddle is filling in the blank with arguments stated as fact (albeit eloquently). There is no reason that the small increase in troops (that is hardly noticeable on the ground), all the sudden earned the trust of Sunnis after 5 years of growing distrust by most Iraqis.

How long would you expect US citizens to be under marshal law before law abiding citizens fought back against an occupying force? There is no reason or precedence to say that civil wars “need a third party”.

Comment by DanCaveman — February 12, 2008 @ 5:07 pm

Dan, Biddle isn’t just pulling this out of his backside. He was there, he knows the situation, and his word is credible. But you can find other impartial sources who have been to Iraqi and who talk and listen to the Sunnis there, and they get the same impression. It’s false to say that all we know is about the Mahdi Army ceasefire; we also know that we are funding and arming Sunni CLCs, who cooperate with us. And 4,000 additional troops in Anbar actually is noticeable, believe it or not. What’s more noticeable is how we revised counterinsurgency strategy, with steps such as moving off forward operating bases and emphasizing protection of Iraqi civilians. These things matter – they aren’t insignificant as you insist.

“I think most reasonable people would disagree with you – it is a big accomplishment.”

It is in a sense, but it is only temporary and can only be sustained if we keep our troop levels at an unsustainable level. That’s why I believe that it is a complete farce to claim any kind of “victory”.

We haven’t tried leaving. Why not at least give it a shot. Violence in Basra decreased by 90% when the British left.

I understand the need to feel some type of “responsibility” for what happens, and surely there will be a temporary increase in violence once we leave and create yet another power-vacuum, but the power needs to be in the hands of the Iraqis. It is their country, not ours. If the Iraqis truely invite us to stay, that is one thing, but I don’t believe that they have or will… beyond members of the corrupt government that we have been propping up, that is.

Comment by J — February 12, 2008 @ 2:14 pm

The longer these ceasefire agreements last, the more institutionalized these CLC groups become. We may not need to maintain this troop level to ensure that things remain stable, because gradually the Iraqis will be able to do more work. Right now things aren’t great with the security forces, but, as you point to in Basra, the Iraqis took over. So, it’s not as though there isn’t a light at the end of the tunnel; I’m just suggesting that we aren’t there yet.

The reason why we shouldn’t give “leaving” a shot is because it’s not trial and error. There are serious consequences to leaving, and I worry that the security vacuum it would created would simply erase all of the gains of the past year, and then some, possibly leading to widespread genocide. As I told you before, and maybe you glossed over it, but Basra is a bad example because it is homogeneous and the Shi’a militias are a big reason why it’s secure. In places like Anbar, there are still extremist elements that are trying to undermine the peace. Furthermore, the US troops are working with Sunni Iraqis there in security, economic and political missions.

I’ll point once again to this article. According to the NY Times, “For all their distaste for the American occupation, many of them [Iraqis] fear that a pullback any time soon would lead to a violent chain reaction that would jeopardize the fitful attempts at political dialogue and risk the collapse of the Iraqi government.” That’s why it should be up to the Iraqis, I agree, but we haven’t seen any sign yet that they’re ready to get rid of us. There’s an understanding that security is crucial, and the US is keeping that security together.

Comment by DanCaveman — February 12, 2008 @ 5:09 pm

Exactly! I believe that it’s referred to as “congnitive dissonance”, if I’m not mistaken…

The US troop increase is not exclusive from the ceasefires and reduction in violence. As Biddle rightly says, our troop surge helped along these ceasefires because it gave the Sunnis someone to trust.

Thirdparty,

I appreciate your civil discourse; however, you are using Biddle’s opinion to prove his conclusion. The only thing we know is that the Mahdi Army instituted a ceasefire. Biddle is filling in the blank with arguments stated as fact (albeit eloquently). There is no reason that the small increase in troops (that is hardly noticeable on the ground), all the sudden earned the trust of Sunnis after 5 years of growing distrust by most Iraqis.

How long would you expect US citizens to be under marshal law before law abiding citizens fought back against an occupying force? There is no reason or precedence to say that civil wars “need a third party”.

Comment by thirdparty — February 12, 2008 @ 1:25 pm

And, by all accounts, our military is crippled because of it.

“I think most reasonable people would disagree with you – it is a big accomplishment.”

It is in a sense, but it is only temporary and can only be sustained if we keep our troop levels at an unsustainable level. That’s why I believe that it is a complete farce to claim any kind of “victory”.

We haven’t tried leaving. Why not at least give it a shot. Violence in Basra decreased by 90% when the British left.

I understand the need to feel some type of “responsibility” for what happens, and surely there will be a temporary increase in violence once we leave and create yet another power-vacuum, but the power needs to be in the hands of the Iraqis. It is their country, not ours. If the Iraqis truely invite us to stay, that is one thing, but I don’t believe that they have or will… beyond members of the corrupt government that we have been propping up, that is.

Based on what evidence? The Coalition going into invade was “International”. Why didn’t that affect their perception and minimize violence? You don’t address how this would be any different, other than promising that it will be.

“One last thing I’d note on this: views can change, and Biddle reports that Sunni views of Americans have improved in the past year.”

Because we bought them off… nothing more.

Comment by J — February 12, 2008 @ 1:26 pm

Are you so naive to think that improved security has nothing to do with improved impressions? It’s just about the money, really? Things aren’t so black and white.

As to your first point, I would emphasize “peacekeeping” more than international. Both are relevant, but the idea of assuming a peacekeeping role is much more palatable politically.

Dan, everything you say about the surge, violence, etc. is strange because, on the one hand you obviously read the report, but on the other hand you apparently glossed over something important. The US troop increase is not exclusive from the ceasefires and reduction in violence. As Biddle rightly says, our troop surge helped along these ceasefires because it gave the Sunnis someone to trust. You know, in a civil war you need a third party that you can count on to guarantee security; right now, for many Iraqis, especially those in the Awakening, we are that third party. Also, don’t ignore the role we still play in pressuring the government and helping along economic and infrastructural rebuilding.

I agree on your point that the government should be asking for more of a sacrifice. A draft probably isn’t the right call – it could demoralize not just civilians but also the volunteer army – but a gas tax makes a lot of sense.

“A peacekeeping force, especially if it is internationalized, would be welcome in Iraq;”

Based on what evidence? The Coalition going into invade was “International”. Why didn’t that affect their perception and minimize violence? You don’t address how this would be any different, other than promising that it will be.

“One last thing I’d note on this: views can change, and Biddle reports that Sunni views of Americans have improved in the past year.”

Because we bought them off… nothing more.

“I am against funding both sides of a civil war. al-Qaeda is responsible for a mere 2% of the violence in Iraq. Sorry if I really don’t think it’s that big of an accomplishment. “Defeating” them in Iraq is like polishing the hand rails on the titanic at this point.”

J, there are varying reports as to what portion of the insurgency AQI is, and studies of their presence are often flawed because they don’t account for attacks that AQI doesn’t take credit for. That said, we all know they have been a substantial part of the insurgency, probably committing more acts of violence on the Sunni side than any other group. And, let’s just deal with reality here, we all know that AQI was the prominent power in Anbar, and was pushed out by the Awakening. That’s history. So, if you don’t think recovering Anbar, securing 75% of Baghdad (up from 8% a year ago), etc. is “that big of an accomplishment,” that’s your prerogative. I think most reasonable people would disagree with you – it is a big accomplishment.

We can debate the reasons for war all we want. I personally think it was a mistake. But now that we’re there, we can’t wish the problem away or pretend we don’t have any responsibility. We also can’t pretend there won’t be consequences for us leaving, and I credit you for acknowledging that much. Now, you say I’d be blind to follow Biddle’s recommendation, and perhaps you’re right. But I’m not sure that 100,000 troops is unsustainable, because we have been operating at higher levels than that throughout the war. Plus, as Biddle mentions, the peacekeeping could potentially be internationalized if the country is stable. Even if it’s not, I know why 175,000 troops is unsustainable, but 75k less is a different story.

Read the article I posted above so you can understand what role we have in Iraq, beyond our occupation that, in your telling of it, is the only reason there’s violence against us and the Iraqi civilians.

“are you opposed to funding the CLCs, which have broken from al Qaeda?”

I am against funding both sides of a civil war. al-Qaeda is responsible for a mere 2% of the violence in Iraq. Sorry if I really don’t think it’s that big of an accomplishment. “Defeating” them in Iraq is like polishing the hand rails on the titanic at this point.

“We all know there are no good choices in Iraq.”

Agreed.

“you’d be blind to suggest withdrawal will make things better.”

Our invasion started all of this. You’d be blind to follow Biddle in suggesting that 100,000 troops staying in Iraq for 20 more years as a “long shot gamble” was the most viable option, especially when it comes to our own National Security. I don’t care what kind of troops they are, “peace keeping”, or whatever. It is unsustainable.

This war wasn’t supposed to last 6 months!

The troops have done their job. They are not police men. They deserve to come home and we deserve to have them home protecting us from real threats to our National Security.

The problem is that you guys can always come up with some BS reason for us to stay when you can’t even agree on the reason we are there in the first place. The majority of violence towards us has been out of fear and anger that we were attempting to create a permanent military presense in Iraq and Bush spent a lot of energy trying to assuage those fears by telling the Iraqis that we had no intention of staying and you are now suggesting otherwise.

To some this could appear as if we have had the intention to stay the entire time just like they thought. What impact do you think that will have on violence against our troops?

This will not end until we leave.

The thought of McCain at the helm give me goosebumps… I saw a trailer for a new independent movie that’s coming to DVD where a guy moves to Canada in response to Kerry’s defeat in ‘04. Any takers if the GOP takes capital hill again?

For more who knows, maybe the movie will inspire a whole new breed of border jumpers if the country goes red again…

You can check out the trailer at http://www.bluestatemovie.com

Would the pullback of American forces unleash an even bloodier round of civil conflict that would lead to the implosion of the Iraqi government? Or would it put pressure on Iraqi politicians to finally reconcile their differences? More bluntly: how bad would things get? Those questions loom as the administration debates how and when to wind down its troop increase in Iraq, as Iraqis weigh the trade-offs between autonomy and security, and as Congressional Democrats, frustrated by this week’s compromise with the White House, vow to hold a tougher line on future war financing.

To address the issue, The New York Times interviewed more than 40 Iraqi politicians and citizens and consulted recent surveys of public opinion in Iraq. The views of a broad range of senior military officials, American intelligence experts, politicians and independent analysts who have recently returned from Iraq were also solicited.

The somewhat surprising verdict of most Iraqis was clear. For all their distaste for the American occupation, many of them fear that a pullback any time soon would lead to a violent chain reaction that would jeopardize the fitful attempts at political dialogue and risk the collapse of the Iraqi government.

[...]that Iraqis are both anti-occupation but worried about genocide if the US leaves. They’re torn, and there aren’t simple answers to these questions of public opinion.[...]

Comment by thirdparty — February 12, 2008 @ 2:57 am

First, the last poll I saw as well as what I am hearing from friends over there – they are not torn. I understand this poll is old; however, given that the year following the poll was the worst year yet, and we have only had a few months of reduced violence (which is great), I have no reason to think that they want us there. From all accounts I hear, they want us out – they would rather take their chances with internal strife.

As for the “surge” having such a profound effect, first of all, the report basically says “The violence reduction was not, by contrast, caused by our killing the enemy or driving them out of Iraq.”. In addition, the number of troops in the “surge” was like pouring a glass of water in the gulf during Katrina and claiming that was what broke the levees. The “surge” was not all deployed to Baghdad.

Even if the “surge” did have an effect (6 months after it was supposed to be over), the fact still remains that the Iraqis want us out of their country. The violence is from “voluntary ceasefires” which shows Iraqs future is more up to the Iraqis than the US and we should leave it that way.

Also, I don’t see any evidence that our staying will keep the peace. We have 5 years of anecdotal evidence that tells us otherwise and it certainly is a picnic there even now. What I can tell you, is that scores (if not hundreds) of Iraqis and 20-40 OR MORE US Service members WILL DIE and hundreds more WILL UNDOUBTEDLY be wounded EACH MONTH until we leave. In the mean time, we are forced to mortgage away what this country stands for, our overall security is dwindling, and we are unable to act against any other threats or injustice while we are tied up in Iraq.

The fact is that we did not have a right to invade, and at every turn where we may have made a difference, the Administration (not the “generals on the ground”) made the decision to walk down the wrong path. They continued to fire, demote, and marginalize any military leaders that did not give the answers they wanted. These shinanigans need to end and we need to start repairing the damage we have done to this country and in turn the world.

On a side note, I will mention one of the other things I often say. If this occupation is so important, and the military is shorthanded (noone is arguing otherwise), why don’t we have a draft? Why have we not raised taxes to give the veterans what they need? Why are we sacrificing and using less oil? Why is our government telling the rest of the people in this country to “move along, nothing to see here”?

I will tell you why, because there would be zero support for it if the country was asked to sacrifice in any way. Since this government is supposed to be “of the people, and for the people”, this is unacceptable. The country does not feel it is worth sacrificing, and those that support it think it is worth it only if others sacrifice.

Thirdparty:

I will give a little credit to the report you linked to. Although you confuse much of the interpretation and conclusions drawn in the paper as “just the facts, ma’am”, at least the paper does credit the Mahdi Army’s voluntary cease fire as a major factor in the reduction of violence.

Even with the admission that the drop in violence had little (if anything) to do with the “surge” near the beginning of the paper, the whole tone reads as a justification with the intent of only justifying our occupation. It does a good job of hiding the one-sided nature by glossing over the growing Iraqi dissatisfaction with the US troops by implying that they somehow trust us in some perverse way.

It also exaggerates the role of “AQI”. This report does not mention the results that the British experienced in Basrah when they moved most of their forces outside of the city proper and saw a dramatic decrease in violence – IMMEDIATELY. Since most of the violence was directed at the “coalition” forces, when they were removed from the equation, the violence dropped.

Finally, the paper freely admits that the reduction in violence has nothing to do with the US Occupation, and all to do with actions of the Iraqis; however, it then continues on a long winded explanation trying to fit how (even though the reduction didn’t have anything to do with the US), the US is needed to maintain the peace.

This report was well written, but from my perspective it was written with an agenda: to justify staying in Iraq. The fact is that we had no right to go into Iraq in the first place and there is no evidence to suggest that staying there would reduce violence or speed up reconciliation. In fact, most of the anecdotal evidence is to the contrary. Let’s not forget that the disdain for American forces is not only increasing in Iraq, but everywhere around the world. Our presence in Iraq is not only creating more enemies in Iraq, but all around the world.

Basically, this report did not even examine the possibility that leaving Iraq could be more beneficial to the US as well as Iraq. It’s sole focus was to sell the “surge” in a way that looks neutral, but in fact was anything but.

To summarize, the drop in violence had nothing to do with the US “surge” and little, if anything, to do with the US in general. Biddle makes the argument (very eloquently) that this ceasefire is fragile and needs the US to hold it up, but never mentions the possibility that this very fragile ceasefire could also be fractured and destroyed by continued US presence and increased disdain for the US occupation.

I apologize in advance if I miss anything you think is important. I’ll gladly come back to it later if you want.

I think you don’t give the surge enough credit, and you paint Biddle as saying the violence reduction has “nothing to do” with US troops. He clearly states that it has been important in allowing Sunnis to combat al Qaeda in Iraq. Furthermore, US presence was effective, in my judgment, in rooting out insurgents in Baghadad as well as Anbar – no doubt an important step in securing the country. As you know, the surge partly hinged on stabilizing Baghdad, which is said to be 75% “secure,” rather than 8% like a year ago.

I don’t think he ignores Iraqi dissatisfaction. He addresses it head on. He also states how Sunni views have improved in the past year; still, he accepts that Iraqis are both anti-occupation but worried about genocide if the US leaves. They’re torn, and there aren’t simple answers to these questions of public opinion.

The Basra example you give is a bad one. Not only was violence on the way down there (again, largely because of the Sadr ceasefire), but it’s a homogeneous area, almost entirely Shi’ia. There’s a reason the troop surge occurred in predominately Sunni Anbar Province and mixed Baghdad Province. So, your “anecdotal evidence” is flawed.

You talk of creating enemies in Iraq. We’re creating Sunni friends with the CLCs…I’m not sure you want to withdraw and undermine that relationship.

What’s more likely – the ceasefire is destroyed by continued US presence, as you say, or by a US withdrawal? I don’t think you provide enough evidence for the former.

Steven Biddle does not confront the issue of our own National Security if our troop levels in Iraq are maintained for that long.

He also glosses over the fact that the majority of Iraqis and Americans want us to leave and that our presence has and continues to fuel the civil war.

He appears to advocate the continued funding of each side of the civil war while hoping that the ceasefires continue.

He addresses that the surge was a failure in the context of its goal of political cover and that the new reduction in violence could be more attributed to the funding of Sunni’s to not fight Americans and that the current Shia led government benefits from continued war and violence.

Am I missing something?

Comment by J — February 11, 2008 @ 4:21 pm

I think you are missing something. First, you gloss over his vision for a peacekeeping role by a third party, most likely the US, which is completely different from the kind of occupying and fighting force we have presently. So what he suggests is far different from what you perceive. A peacekeeping force, especially if it is internationalized, would be welcome in Iraq; what upsets the Iraqis is a sense of being occupied by a sole superpower, and what upsets Americans are high casualties and costs. Biddle believes we can reduce both, making casualties unnecessary while lowering costs. Fundamentally, this is peacekeeping with the option of being called on to assist Iraqis against extremist threats. And just keep in mind that while Iraqis are almost uniformly against the occupation, they are torn too because they see American troops as a buffer against genocide. One last thing I’d note on this: views can change, and Biddle reports that Sunni views of Americans have improved in the past year.

Also, I reject the idea of calling the surge a “failure” when it is still ongoing. Yes, we have the troops there, and we’re in the midst of the surge, but the policies that went along with it -such as moving US troops off forward-operating bases and closer to the counterinsurgency – are lasting changes that are helping to uphold the security necessary for reconciliation. As Biddle says:

As defeat in Baghdad became clearer, however, it also became clear that AQI could not deliver real protection. By late 2006 AQI’s inability to prevent defeat in Baghdad and the costs it imposed on coreligionists had thus convinced many Sunnis that they needed to look for new allies. And the only possible choice was the United States.
At the same time, the surge made this realignment with the United States much easier and safer.

He goes on to describe how US firepower has been crucial to crippling al Qaeda in Iraq. That’s part of the progress narrative that so many people want to ignore. Meanwhile, as you know from reading Biddle and elsewhere, there has been some political progress, at times in a de facto fashion (e.g., distribution of oil revenues without a law to codify it).

Finally, are you opposed to funding the CLCs, which have broken from al Qaeda?

We all know there are no good choices in Iraq. I’d be blind to say it’s a good situation now, and you’d be blind to suggest withdrawal will make things better. The truth is security has been enhanced in the past year in a way it wouldn’t be without American troops in Iraq.