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Timeline of a Failed Policy

Early 2004: CIA Warns Bush About the Potential of a Civil War in Iraq

“CIA officers in Iraq are warning that the country may be on a path to civil war, current and former U.S. officials said Wednesday, starkly contradicting the upbeat assessment that President Bush gave in his State of the Union address.”

Mid-September 2004: Leaked National Intelligence Council Report Warns of Possible Civil War In Iraq

“A classified National Intelligence Estimate prepared for President Bush in late July spells out a dark assessment of prospects for Iraq, government officials said Wednesday. The estimate outlines three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005, with the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war, the officials said. The most favorable outcome described is an Iraq whose stability would remain tenuous in political, economic and security terms.”

Mid-September 2004: Bush, White House Downplay Significance of Civil War Possibility in Iraq

Bush: “The CIA laid out a — several scenarios that said, life could be lousy, like could be okay, life could be better. And they were just guessing as to what the conditions might be like.”

McClellan’s response: White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the intelligence assessment “states the obvious,” and he dismissed skeptics of the Iraq policy as “pessimists and naysayers.”

Late-September 2004: CIA Reacts With Indignation at Bush’s Resistance to Change Course

“People at the CIA ‘are mad at the policy in Iraq because it’s a disaster, and they’re digging the hole deeper and deeper and deeper,’ said one former intelligence officer who maintains contact with CIA officials.”

Now: Bush Administration Desperately Seeking Help In Confronting Threat of Iraq Civil War

“The Bush administration, seeking to close the continuing rift between Shiite and dissident Sunni Arab leaders in Iraq, is enlisting Europe, the Arab world and the United Nations to pressure the Baghdad government to include minorities in the political process, administration and other diplomats say.”

Security

Rep. Hunter’s Denial Diet

Tales of abuse, torture and humiliation at the prison at Guantanamo Bay are well-known. Last year, internal FBI memos showed methods used at the camp included leaving prisoners “in their own feces,” chaining them “in ice-cold or super-hot cells” and exposing them to sensory deprivation, beatings and terrifying dogs.

In its recent issue, Time Magazine obtained a log kept at Guantanamo Bay detailing the treatment of Detainee 063, Mohammed al-Qahtani. One military official described it as the “kind of document that was never meant to leave Gitmo.” It describes various forms of humiliation and abuse:

“They strip-search him and briefly make him stand nude. They tell him to bark like a dog and growl at pictures of terrorists. They hang pictures of scantily clad women around his neck.” In another instance, “a dog was used ‘in an aggressive manner to intimidate Detainee #63.” By the end of his “interrogation” period, “al-Qahtani had been ‘subjected to intense isolation for over three months’ and ‘was evidencing behavior consistent with extreme psychological trauma (talking to non existent people, reporting hearing voices, crouching in a cell covered with a sheet for hours on end).”

So how did Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) respond to the ongoing tales of serious abuse at Guantanamo Bay?

Now, how do we treat these people? I sent down yesterday for the menu from Guantanamo, so that the average American could understand how we’re brutalizing people in Guantanamo, and I’ve got it right here. For Sunday they’re going to be having — let me see — orange-glazed chicken, fresh fruit groupe, steamed peas and mushrooms, rice pilaf, another form of torture for the hijackers. We treat them very well.

Warning to Rep. Hunter: Denial leaves a bitter aftertaste.

Media

Kinsley’s Sloppy Downing Street Whitewash

On the Washington Post Op-Ed page this morning, Michael Kinsley — an editor at the LA Times — dismisses the controversy over the Downing Street Minutes as the product of an “overhang of extremists” in “the blogosphere.”

Kinsley discounts the Minutes because they were based on meetings by the head of British foreign intelligence (known as C) “in Washington.” As a result, the Minutes recount the conclusions of “people other than Bush” and aren’t worth our attention. But even Kinsley admits that C may have been meeting with “actual administration decision makers.” (Why would the head of British foreign intelligence brief Tony Blair — as Kinsley suggests is likely — about meetings with “freelance chatterboxes”?)

If “actual administration decision makers” were telling the head of British intelligence in July 2002 that war in Iraq was inevitable and the “intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” isn’t that an important story? Shouldn’t the media and Congress investigate?

Stay tuned for Kinsley’s “debunking” of the latest evidence.

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