Mayor Fenty’s plan to replace the crazy zone fare system in DC with a normal meter one seems to be meeting with some resistance from cab drivers. The oddest thing about it, though, is the specific nature of the objection:

Wegen Tadesse said the 900 members of the Ethiopian Ethio-American United Cab Owner Association plan to strike. “It’s not just about the meters now,” he said. “There are no guarantees for any of our jobs. The big companies are going to take over the business.”

What he’s referring to is DC’s unusual system of independent-proprietor taxicabs. Most cities face sharp limits on the number of cabs allowed to roam the streets. Consequently, the licenses become very valuable, which is to say very expensive, and cab driving thus becomes a capital intensive business in which firms own multiple cabs (with the license rather than the cab itself being the valuable commodity here) and employ drivers to drive them. In DC, by contrast, it’s much cheaper and easier to get a cab up and running so they’re mostly owner-operated. Tadesse and many other cab drivers feel that letting the mayor impose the meter will somehow undue this system. But it’s not clear exactly why they think that, so it’s hard to know what kind of policies could assuage those fears while simultaneously letting us enjoy the bounty of the meter.

Apropos the post below, John Judis has a solid piece on the threat of a Rudy Administration that concludes with this great observation:

The centerpiece of Giuliani’s claim, however, is the suggestion that his approach to fighting crime provides a model for conducting foreign policy. In a recent essay for Foreign Affairs, he wrote: “I know from personal experience that when security is reliably established in a troubled part of a city, normal life rapidly reestablishes itself: shops open, people move back in, children start playing ball on the sidewalks again, and soon a decent and law-abiding community returns to life. The same is true in world affairs. Disorder in the world’s bad neighborhoods tends to spread. Tolerating bad behavior breeds more bad behavior.”

This is a foolish analogy. In policing the world, the United States cannot claim to be enforcing its own laws; we lack legitimacy to do so, as we found after invading Iraq. When the NYPD went into poor neighborhoods, it was not an occupying force; when the U.S. military took over Baghdad, it was, and it suffered the consequences. Some of the “neighborhoods” Giuliani wants to clean up, such as Iran, possess their own armies and can call on other “neighborhoods,” such as Russia and China, to deter an attempt to punish them for bad behavior. In short, the world is not New York writ large, and the trade-offs between authority and liberty look very different from the White House than from Gracie Mansion. But these distinctions seem lost on the man who aspires to be the next mayor of the United States.

Right. Trying to treat the entire world as if it were the sovereign territory of the United States is going to produce catastrophic results. The observation that the world needs forces to try to help bring order to some “bad neighborhoods” has a lot of truth to it, but insofar as that order is brought it’s going to need to be done by institutions and through mechanisms — first and foremost, the UN but also regional groups in their own back yards where appropriate — that are capable of doing so in a reasonably legitimate manner. Just having the President dictate to the rest of the world, however, isn’t going to fly.

I would strongly recommend John Judis’ American Prospect article on Iraq as Bush’s neoimperialist war. It’s an important point, not so much because we need an abusive term to throw at the policy, but because it’s important to place the failures of Bush’s policies in a broader historical context of failure. The specific questions the United States faces are new, but the broader debate about the viability of a foreign policy centered on assymetrical sovereignty and the coercive domination of smaller countries isn’t. It hasn’t worked in the past, it’s not working today, and most signs are that technological progress is making it harder and harder to act in this way even though America’s military might is unrivaled.

John developed these things at greater length in his book, The Folly of Empire which also gets into the ways in which Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson eventually came to learn from the pitfalls of the imperialist ventures they’d once supported and started grasping toward something resembling contemporary liberal internationalism, an approach to world affairs centered on international law and legitimacy with major powers working through stable, rule-governed institutions.

This post erroneously used the term “Malians” to refer to residents of Malawi when, in fact, the proper use of that term is to refer to Mali’s citizens. Apologies for the error. Citizens of Malawi should be called “Malawians.”