Rich Lowry lists six reasons why Americans should die fighting Muqtada al-Sadr:

1. That Maliki represents the lawfully constituted and internationally recognized government of Iraq and Sadr represents an outlaw militia;
2. That the fighters Maliki controls—i.e., the security forces of the state of Iraq—work alongside American troops instead of blowing them up with Iranian-supplied munitions;
3. That Maliki is working to create a stable Iraqi government that will be an (imperfect) ally of the United States, while Sadr is a sworn enemy of the United States;
4. That Sadr’s forces participated in the wanton killing of Sunnis that was a key accelerant of the civil war;
5. That the Sunnis support what Maliki is doing, and to the extent they see him moving against Shia thugs, national reconciliation becomes more likely;
6. That we have long been urging Maliki to take this sort of action against deadly Shia sectarians, even if we didn’t like the particulars of how he went about it here.

Item six is absurd — we should tilt against Sadr because we’ve urged such a tilt in the past? Better to stick to a five-point plan. On point four, yes Sadrist forces participated in sectarian killing of Sunnis, but so did Badr Brigade forces so this seems like an un-compelling reason to take sides in a JAM-ISCI throwdown. Point five seems extremely dubious — reconciliation is the effort to get the different Iraqi factions to work out an agreement amongst themselves rather than fighting, having some factions engage in pitched battles with the Sadrist faction isn’t a step toward reconciliation, it’s evidence of the absence of reconciliation.

Point one is accurate, but pretty lacking in context. It’s not as if Maliki is running some kind of even-handed drive against partisan militias — he’s turning the state security forces over to militias aligned with his government while cracking down on the party militia of one party. Meanwhile, that party was part of his government until the United States helped engineer their departure. Our beef with Sadr antedates the Maliki government and has no particular relationship to the parliamentary coalitions of the day.

Points two and three get to the heart of the matter. We oppose Sadr because Sadr opposes the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Indeed, at times he opposes it through violent means that lead to the death of our troops. But “killing people who oppose the U.S. military presence in Iraq” isn’t a reasonable rationale for the U.S. military presence in Iraq. This is what’s led Joe Klein to speculate that the anti-Sadr tilt is driven by our quest for permanent military bases. Sadr is an opponent of what we’re doing in Iraq, but he doesn’t have some larger conflict with the United States — he’s not plotting an invasion of Delaware, he’s willing to sell oil on an open market, etc. — and while his credentials as a liberal democrat are highly suspect, so are those of the people we work with in Iraq (and Saudi Arab, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, etc.) all the time. That’s not to say we should partner-up with Sadr or wish him particularly well in his adventures, but it’s just to reiterate the point that we could easily afford to adopt a posture of indifference to Iraq’s internal political disputes and just go home.

Andrew quotes from Arthur Schlesinger’s 1974 Atlantic piece on the evils of the Vice Presidency:

It is a doomed office. No President and Vice President have trusted each other since Jackson and Van Buren. Mistrust is inherent in the relationship. The Vice President has only one serious thing to do: that is, to wait around for the President to die. This is hardly the basis for cordial and enduring friendships. Presidents see Vice Presidents as death’s-heads at the feast, intolerable reminders of their own mortality. Vice Presidents, when they are men of ambition, suffer, consciously or unconsciously, the obverse emotion. Elbridge Gerry spoke with concern in the Constitutional Convention of the “close intimacy that must subsist between the President & vice-president.” Gouverneur Morris commented acidly, “The vice president then will be the first heir apparent that ever loved his father.”

It’s interesting to me how conceptions of the Vice Presidency have changed over time. As we saw on John Adams last week, the first Vice President was not deeply involved in the counsels of George Washington’s administration. He did, however, succeed Washington and become the second president. Then Jefferson and his party took power, and for a while succession ran to the Secretary of State with Madison succeeding Jefferson, Monroe succeeding Madison, and John Quincy Adams succeeding Monroe. This makes a certain kind of sense, since the SecState needed to be someone in whose abilities the president had a lot of confidence whereas the Vice President could be an expendable ticket-balancer.

But then in the second-half of the twentieth century we wound up with a lot of Vice Presidents who either became President or at least secured their party’s presidential nomination — Richard Nixon, Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Gerald Ford, Walter Mondale, George H.W. Bush, Al Gore — which creates demand to try to pick a plausible president, and in the case of both Gore and Dick Cheney saw the Vice President emerge as an important member of the administration. But of course everyone hates Cheney now, so maybe we’ll see a move back away from that. Certainly, I think most indications are that John Kerry picked John Edwards for VP despite a lack of personal rapport betweent hem.

James Fallows has a fantastic post on the contrast between the outsider’s view of China as a rapidly-rising superpower and the view from inside of China as a very poor country wracked with enormous problems and challenges.

I’m increasingly seeing arguments that the real importance of the Colombia trade deal is political, rather than economic. Colombia has made important strides over the past several years, and the Colombian government is our proxy of choice in South America enmeshed in conflict with guerillas backed by Hugo Chavez.

But there are two ways to read the security/trade linkage here. One would be that this deal is a favor to the Colombian government that we should do to bolster them. Another would be that this deal is a favor to the U.S. business enterprises who run the Bush administration that the Colombian government has agreed to in order to retain the support of the American security apparatus for their counterinsurgency. Interpretation one is getting all the press, but if you read the agreement the Colombians seems to be making almost all the policy changes, suggesting interpretation two. What’s more, though interpretation one is certainly the more high-minded argument to make in your magazine, blog post, or congressional speech argument two seems, if true, more convincing on the merits.

One thing I like about Barack Obama is that when he hands himself lemons, he tries to make lemonade as you see in his response to those who criticized his characterization of the public mood in Pennsylvania. Recall that the whole meetings with the political leadership of rogue states started as a gaffe, but eventually became a synecdoche for willingness to move beyond the conventional wisdom of a broken establishment.

I have no idea whether this particular response to this particular controversy will “work” but it’s still the correct approach and one that shows, I think, a more sophisticated grasp of media dynamics than we’ve seen from most Democrats over the past few years.