I think the question of whether or not to send more U.S. forces to Afghanistan has perhaps gotten more attention than it deserves relative to other questions in play regarding our conduct in that region. One such question is what appears to be a trend toward more and more airstrikes in Pakistan, even as everyone acknowledges that this is not a sustainable solution. Another is this business about trying to give Afghanistan a 400,000-strong army.

Andrew Exum notes that “a massive security apparatus of 400,000 men might be more than the Afghan economy can sustain over the long term.” And indeed it might. Our Army has about 540,000 active duty soldiers for a much richer country with many more people and worldwide ambitions. Admittedly, we also have reservists and an Air Force and Marines and Navy and other branches. But still, a 400,000-strong army would be enormous army for a country like Afghanistan and the budget being proposed to train and equip it is larger than the entire budget budget of the Afghan government.

It’s hard to know how this ends. You demobilize and they become warlord bands? You keep them in place, by far the most powerful institution in Afghanistan and dependent on the U.S. taxpayer for their budget, thus securing us a little colony in the central Asian mountains?

Branches of the bank formerly known as IndyMac, the largest bank nationalized by the FDIC during the current crisis, reopened today under new management and new ownership. As Pat Garofalo observes, “Even though it cost more than originally estimated, the successful nationalization and re-privatization of IndyMac — the fourth largest bank ever seized by federal regulators — shows that taking over troubled financial institutions, clearing them of their troubled assets, and selling them back to the private sector can be done.”

Nobody should kid themselves about the costs involved. Nationalizing larger institutions wouldn’t be an alternative to the federal government spending a ton of money. But at the same time, avoiding nationalization while keeping zombie institutions afloat isn’t a low-cost alternative to nationalization. And as we’re seeing with the furor over the AIG bonuses, keeping public officials at arm’s length from managing an institution that depends on government support to stay in business hardly succeeds in keeping the institution out of political controversy. All it does is muddy the lines of authority and responsibility, making it difficult to maintain consistent and politically sustainable policies.

Working with very large institutions would not be the same as working with IndyMac. In all likelihood looking at new legislation is a good idea as some kind of new process would need to be set up. Still, this solution remains the best approach. If the administration’s in need of political cover, they can bring nationalization support Doug Holtz-Eakin on board.

Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke says something’s amiss with Wall Street’s pay structure:

“Poorly designed compensation policies can create perverse incentives that can ultimately jeopardize the health of the banking organization,” Mr. Bernanke said during a speech in Phoenix to the Independent Community Bankers of America. “Management compensation policies should be aligned with the long-term prudential interests of the institution.”

There are two kinds of issues here. One is what should the government do (or have done) with “normal” financial institutions. In this case, I don’t think it would be appropriate for government to step in and try to tell firms how to pay their traders. But Ben Bernanke and other regulators, charged as they are with prudential oversight of the financial system, could certainly make known to the public their view that certain firms have a compensation structure that does not seem consistent with the long-term prudential interests of the institution.

At the moment, however, there’s the more direct issue of what to do with government-controlled or government-dependent enterprises. Here the case for forthright action is pretty clear. It’s our money, so we should insist that it be given to managers who are compensated in a way that’s aligned with long-term prudential interests. That would mean relatively low salaries and long-term equity in the firm so that you can strike it rich if and only if your work actually pays off well over time.

It’s important to think about this somewhat systematically. Right now there’s populist outrage about bonuses, but we don’t want to just shift to a system of low bonuses and giant fixed salaries. We need comprehensive reform, a la Brad DeLong’s suggestion.

Via Jonathan Zasloff, some accusations of serious war crimes from within IDF ranks:

When asked why that elderly woman was killed, a squad commander was quoted as saying: “What’s great about Gaza — you see a person on a path, he doesn’t have to be armed, you can simply shoot him. In our case it was an old woman on whom I did not see any weapon when I looked. The order was to take down the person, this woman, the minute you see her. There are always warnings, there is always the saying, ‘Maybe he’s a terrorist.’ What I felt was, there was a lot of thirst for blood.” [...]

Amir Marmor, a 33-year-old history graduate student in Jerusalem and a military reservist, said in an interview with The New York Times that he was stunned to discover the way civilian casualties were discussed in training discussions before his tank unit entered Gaza in January. “Shoot and don’t worry about the consequences,” was the message from the top commanders, he said. Speaking of a lieutenant colonel who briefed the troops, Mr. Marmor said, “His whole demeanor was extremely gung ho. This is very, very different from my usual experience. I have been doing reserve duty for 12 years, and it was always an issue how to avoid causing civilian injuries. He said in this operation we are not taking any chances. Morality aside, we have to do our job. We will cry about it later.”

One doesn’t know the extent of these things, but both of the people speaking here are describing orders that were given to groups of people, not just individual instances of bad conduct. Needless to say, there are atrocities and war crimes associated with every war, so there’s no indication that this was any worse than any other military’s conduct. But by the same token, there are atrocities and war crimes associated with every war. A lot of the stateside supporters of this Israeli action seemed completely blind to that reality, as they imagined the IDF somehow stepping pristinely through the most densely populated place on earth and perfectly plucking out Hamas villains rather than, say, gunning down old ladies. That, however, is not the way of the world. And the result is a military operation that’s responsible for orders of magnitude more civilians deaths than were the rocket attacks it was supposedly going to put a stop to.

Next up, we’ll see if the new Netanyahu/Lieberman era of Israeli politics leads to any serious inquiries into these allegations with accountability for the culpable. I wouldn’t say I’m optimistic about that, but it could happen.