Our guest blogger is Farha Faisal, a national security intern at the Center for American Progress.

Last week, Afghan President Hamid Karzai agreed to implement coalition commander General David Petraeus’ new plan to develop local police forces as a “temporary solution” for securing remote areas against the Taliban. However, this poses serious concerns for long-term stability, peace, and reconciliation in Afghanistan. While the idea of “partnering with tribes” to protect neighborhoods (as advocated by Maj. Jim Gant) seems enticing given the slow-paced training efforts of the formal Afghan security forces, we must not forget recent history. Training local militias has been tried in the past in Afghanistan—and failed.

In the 1980s, Afghanistan’s communist government spent thousands of dollars on Russian-recruited local militias, since its own security forces were unable to suppress an Afghan uprising beginning in 1979. After the Soviet withdrawal, these militias grew into powerful private armies controlled by brutal warlords, who terrorized the population as they fought each other in a devastating civil war in the 1990s, until the Taliban seized power in 1996.

Our current efforts could produce a similar outcome. By multiplying arms in local communities, coalition forces may well promote, rather than quell, the conflict. U.S. military officials and the Karzai administration retain hopes that the incorporation of these forces under the Interior Ministry, as “government formed, government paid, and government uniformed” units, will prevent such disaster. Their hope is founded on Petraeus’ earlier success in implementing such militias in Iraq in 2006 by hiring large numbers of Sunnis as local protection fighters against the insurgency. This rosy picture of local security, however, has fundamental problems.

First, the use of such local police units has been tested in the past year in Afghanistan with the creation of the Afghan Public Protection Program (2008) and the Local Defense Initiative groups (2009), but they have not yielded promising results. The efforts stumbled upon several obstacles, including units demanding bribes and imposing taxes, as well as major vulnerability in the face of insurgent attacks. NATO even disbanded their local police programs due to legitimate concerns about sedition, which still remains a worry amongst Afghan officials and even Ambassador Eikenberry. They fear individuals who will change their allegiance to the Taliban.

Second, the ethnic and political make-up in Afghanistan is vastly different from that of Iraq—the “tribal” understandings of Afghanistan do not accurately depict the social landscape, in which there are numerous forms of social organization. Yet, such tribal assumptions could actually heighten ethnic cleavages, and possibly lead to civil war. This seems even more plausible with Karzai’s current reintegration efforts. By moving the Taliban, who are mostly Pashtun, back into the political process, this could easily anger other minorities -– the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras — who could then mobilize their local police forces on ethnic lines.

The creation of these local police forces could present a serious issue for the central government over the long term. Such units could participate in the corruption and bribery that plagues the government structure. And the attention and resources directed at these units will inevitably undermine the training efforts of the Afghan National Security Forces, which is more integral to securing our long term security objectives in the country, particularly if we hold to Obama’s July 2011 call for initial withdrawal of combat forces. Afghans themselves have expressed concern over the use of local militia in recent polls. A BBC poll from December 2009 found that 68 percent were either “not very” or “not at all” confident in the ability of local militias to provide security in their neighborhoods, and a survey by the 2004 Afghan Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium found that 88 percent wanted to reduce the power of former warlords.

Regardless of the name, arming local groups in Afghanistan for short-term security is a risky bet. History illustrates the potential for powerbrokers to attract the unpredictable loyalty of local armed units. With the region’s stability and long-term U.S. security objectives at stake, failure could be costly.

The debate over the new START treaty is essentially over. Today all but one former commander of the US Strategic Command – the Generals and Admirals in charge of our nuclear weapons – came out in support of the New START treaty. In a letter these Generals write:

As former commanders of Strategic Air Command and U.S. Strategic Command, we collectively spent many years providing oversight, direction and maintenance of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and advising presidents from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush on strategic nuclear policy. We are writing to express our support for ratification of the New START Treaty… We will understand Russian strategic forces much better with the treaty than would be the case without it.

The letter was signed by Generals Larry Welch, John Chain, Eugene Habiger, Bennie Davies, Lee Butler and Admirals Henry Chiles and James Ellis. We can now add them to the endless and constantly growing list of military leaders and former senior Republican officials and defense experts that support that treaty.

The debate over START has essentially reached its end. No matter what evidence is shown, the far-right consisting of Senators Jim DeMint and James Inhofe, as well as the Heritage Foundation, will oppose the treaty. After months of back and forth it is clear they do so not because of the specifics of the treaty, but because it is both a treaty and it is arms-control. They are extreme ideologues that oppose arms-control, want to build new nuclear weapons, and want to restart a new Cold War with Russia by developing and then targeting a mythical missile defense system specifically at Russia. While this is entirely nuts, their opposition is at least because they are ideologically and substantively opposed to the treaty.

But fortunately for America, they are also really in the minority. Besides DeMint and Inhofe, and perhaps a sign of declining influence, few Republicans in the Senate are publicly taking Heritage’s stance on the treaty.

In fact, having made little headway on the merits of the treaty, many Republicans, such as Senators Bob Bennett, Lamar Alexander, and Bob Corker, are now signaling that they may support the treaty. But of course there is a but – and that brings us to the leadership of the Senate GOP, specifically Senator Kyl. While Heritage at least openly oppose the treaty on ideological grounds, Senator Kyl has chosen to make this not about START but about shaking down the Administration to put even more funds into the nuclear weapons complex.

In other words, Kyl and the Senate GOP aren’t talking about the START treaty anymore – they know they have lost the factual debate – and they aren’t even really talking about how the Senate is “rushing” the treaty, since the debate is now going in repetitious circles – they are now talking about what they can extract from the Administration in exchange for passing the treaty. After all their complaints about backroom health care deals, they are now threatening to kill a treaty they now concede is vital to our nuclear security just for some more wasteful nuclear pork.

When Arizona legislators enacted SB-1070, they argued that it would compel police to uniformly enforce immigration law, rather than relying on discretion or local community policing policies. However, the Arizona Republic reports that “there is anything but a uniform approach.” Although all Arizona officers have reviewed a training video, according to a survey of local law enforcement agencies, many “have supplemented that training with their own policies.” The Arizona Republic summarizes the distinct approaches that five different law enforcement entities plan on taking if and when they are required to check immigration status:

• Arizona Department of Public Safety officers will work through the agency’s dispatch centers, which will determine whether officers should contact U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection or federally trained local agents to verify the immigration status of a suspect.

• Flagstaff has instructed officers to enforce the statute as written, although Lt. Ken Koch said the statute isn’t entirely clear. “That statute is subject to interpretation,” he said. “It’s a very fluid and dynamic situation.”

• In Yuma County, where sheriff’s deputies patrol an area that includes a shared border with Mexico, deputies will continue to work with Border Patrol agents when there are questions about a suspect’s immigration status, sheriff’s Capt. Eben Bratcher said.

• Phoenix police officers will be required to contact federal authorities to verify the immigration status of everyone they arrest, regardless of whether the suspects have one of the “presumptive IDs” such as an Arizona driver’s license that the statewide training outlined.

• Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s department, the most fervent agency in the state when it comes to rooting out illegal immigrants, won’t be attempting to determine anyone’s immigration status unless deputies are taking that suspect into custody for another crime.

Reporter Jeffrey Kaye notes in the Huffington Post that the training process itself has been inconsistent across Arizona. “Some agencies require officers to attend sessions of three hours or more and distribute manuals; others simply oblige their officers to watch a 94-minute video,” writes Kaye. Meanwhile, the 287(g) program which was established by Congress and allows police to cooperate with federal immigration agents in enforcing immigration law provides a four-week training program. Despite the fact that 287(g) participating officers receive significantly more training than Arizona police will, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspector general released a stinging critique of the 287(g) program last year.

The Obama administration has argued that it is suing the state of Arizona in part because the U.S. cannot have a “patchwork” of immigration laws. The vague provisions of SB-1070 have only added to the confusion within the state of Arizona. The law requires police officers to verify the immigration status of individuals, when “practicable,” during a lawful lawful stop or detention if they establish “reasonable suspicion” that they are undocumented. However, SB-1070 doesn’t define “practicable” or “reasonable suspicion.” And though a federal judge enjoined several of the most problematic provisions of SB-1070, including the provision requiring police to check immigration status, Judge Susan Bolton still has to issue final rulings on the multiple lawsuits challenging the law. All of her decisions will likely be repealed all the way up to the Supreme Court, regardless of how she rules.