Vengeance, From The Grave, Kills The People He Once Saved»

As promised! The long-awaited Iron Man Doctrine piece, fresh from The American Prospect. It’s a meditation on Iron Man and imperialism. I know, I know, I’m so f*cking cliche.

The second way Marvel subtly readjusted Iron Man for America’s post-Vietnam sensibilities was to reveal that the reason Stark could control neither his company nor his relationships was that he couldn’t control himself. Stark’s booze-soaked, womanizing lifestyle was cleverly reinterpreted as rampant alcoholism and self-loathing. His drive to save the world was nothing more than a martyr complex born of a callow solipsism. It was a brilliant maneuver by the writers. Iron Man began to ask America: Would you trust such unfettered, unaccountable power to someone this messed up? The introduction of War Machine took the critique a step further, showing that the very act of donning the armor makes you messed up. Some exercises of power are too dangerous to be left in the hands of one man. The writers never turned Iron Man into a villain — that would have been the easy way out. Instead they presented a fascinating character study, a compelling Cold War critique, a subtle plea for liberal internationalism, and a defense of a series of theses presented to the world in America’s founding documents. It helps that Iron Man also blows stuff up.

Other recent updates to the Stark/Iron Man story have jettisoned the Cold War element but deepened the dynamic established in the 1970s. In Extremis, a reboot of the franchise during the current Bush era, Warren Ellis, one of the most talented comic-book writers currently working, has Stark unable to answer the question “What is the Iron Man armor for, Tony?” A left-wing filmmaker, dismissive of Stark’s protestations that he’s more than a weapons merchant, asks, “Do you think they have your painkilling drug pumps in Iraq? Do you think an Afghan kid with his arms blown off by a landmine is remotely impressed by an Iron Man suit?” Tony Stark is meant to be read as a tragic figure. He is one of the smartest men alive, yet he cannot think his way out of the traps his genius constructs for him. And so he blunders, again and again, into a hell of unintended consequences.

God can I not wait for the Ultimates/Avengers movie.

Update: Welcome, Metafilterers.

Roll With The Winners»

I haven’t read Matt Bai’s new McCain piece yet, but I think when the New York Times Magazine starts playing off the Ackerglesias American Prospect Ultimate Flophouse Team-Up “doctrine” package, it means the world has spun off its axis.

We All Need Somebody To Lean On»

Did these guys hold it down or what? Eric, Ilan, Cernig and Fester: thank you guys. Everyone’s reading their blogs, right?

In other, more-self promotional news, my latest Windy piece is the sixth installment of my “Rise of the Counterinsurgents” series. It’s about why the civilian component of the government has faced a steeper COIN learning curve than the military has:

As the structure of the nation’s wars changes, so, too, must the organization of the U.S. government, argues the new generation of counterinsurgency theorists. They say that diplomats, reconstruction experts, governance advisers, economists, lawyers and even agronomists must be as easily inserted into a theater of battle as troops are — and must work with the warfighters in the effort to convince a population not to ally with insurgents.

This capability is now largely missing. So some counterinsurgents are trying innovative methods to solve the problem. But it is still unclear if they will be sufficient — let alone timely enough to reverse the fortunes of both current wars.

There are many reasons why American civilians working for the government have stayed on the sidelines of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. For one thing, the United States still lacks a corps of civilians ready to deploy into conflict zones. That is unlikely to change. “We’ll never match boots on the ground with wingtips on the ground,” said Eliot A. Cohen, counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, using a shorthand term for diplomats that is common among the counterinsurgency community.

The World Is A Vampire»

You know what’s really an amazing record? Particularly for a long bus trip during a torrential downpour en route to a friend’s father’s memorial service? Mellon Collie And The Infinite Sadness.

I never heard this album until 2003. Now it can be told! My punk-snob snottiness in 1995 prevented me from even giving it a chance when it came out, and took me years before I had the mixture of interest and opportunity to realize just how great it is. Now, God — I could talk to you about Smashing Pumpkins forever. Sue and I even improv’d a bunch of skits about D’Arcy Wretzky subsisting on a diet of water, gum and crack. One featured a sullen James Iha confessing his love for her. D’Arcy: “James you’re so silly!”

Radio Radio Radio Radio Radio Radio Radio»

I’ll be on Warren Olney’s To The Point radio show today — check local listings, or listen through the miracle of the internet — to talk about the Obama and McCain doctrines. Matthew Yglesias, I drink your milkshake.

Seriously, it should be fun. Bob Kagan is going to be on the show, though I think I’ll be opposite Nile Gardner from Heritage.

A Big Thank You To All My Haters»

What did you do with this afternoon, Ackerman? Well, I had chicken teriyaki for the first time. (Not bad!) I enjoyed a few goofy IMs with friends. I learned that D.C. is still persecuting my house.

Oh yeah. And I interviewed David Fricking Petraeus. Welcome to Part Five of The Rise of The Counterinsurgents, just out from The Washington Independent.

While commanding the 101st Airborne Division during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, David H. Petraeus famously mused to journalist Rick Atkinson, “Tell me how this ends.” Asked today by The Washington Independent how he would answer that if one of his own division commanders posed it, Petraeus replied by phone from Baghdad’s Camp Victory, “I would just reiterate what our objectives are, and that is what we’re trying to help the Iraqis achieve. And that is: an Iraq that is at peace with itself and with its neighbors; and can defend itself; that is a democracy in Iraqi fashion — I would also say a government that is represent of and responsive to all its citizens.”

But would that answer have satisfied Maj. Gen. Petraeus in 2003? “What I was asking was ‘How?’ in a couple respects,” he said. “What that was about was, I think, very early on a recognition of how complex and challenging this was going be.” He mentioned Amb. Ryan Crocker’s comment to the Senate, that Iraq was “just plain hard,” adding, “I think that’s a very clear-eyed and, in a sense, coldly realistic appraisal of where we are, and how difficult it is.”

If I do say so myself, read the whole thing. There might have been some discussion of an exercise rematch, but if so, it didn’t make it into the piece.

I Could Never Be A Thug, They Don’t Dress This Well»

Over at Abu Muqawama, there’s some speculation that I’m the blogger going by the handle Dr. iRack. Despite a shared affection for Doug Feith and Fred Kagan, I regret to inform the blogosphere that I’m not the good doctor. Proof positive: I could never be this judicious. Here’s Dr. iRack’s considered, delicate-as-a-velveteen-rabbit-in-a-porcelain-shop take on Ray Odierno. (The headline, however, is appropriately juvenile, so I suppose the speculation won’t die.) Everyone agrees that Odierno c. 2006-7 isn’t Odierno c.2003-4, the doctor writes, but:

1. It isn’t clear how much credit Odierno should get for the operational plan implemented in 2007. The operational plan for population security in Baghdad was largely 1st Cav’s. And although MG Fil was the division commander, the culture of the division was still very much Pete Chiarelli’s culture, which meshed much better with Petraeus’ worldview. (Chiarelli was the previous 1st Cav commander in Baghdad in 2004-2005, and was MNC-I commander immediately prior to Odierno.)

2. The overall strategic vision throughout the surge period was very much a Petraeus thing, although Odierno faithfully carried out his “commander’s intent.”

3. Odierno put a much greater emphasis on traditional COIN during his time with MNC-I, be he was still very kinetic and offensive in his operational mindset. Evidence for this includes the extensive kinetic operations in the “belts” and the six-fold increase in airstrikes in 2007. Indeed, Odierno sent only two of the five surge brigades to provide additional population security in Baghdad. The rest were sent to the “belts.” Odierno created a new AOR, MND-Central, splitting Baghdad, and created a new division headquarters (headed by the like-minded MG Rick Lynch of the 3rd ID). This was done, in part, because MND-Baghdad had grown too big, and in part to gain more control for the Corps over operations. Odierno also assigned one of the surge brigades, the Stryker brigade, to roam around and kick butt. In other words, Odierno cleaved off an area of operations that “softer” 1st Cav didn’t have control over, and this was a much more kinetic environment than the standard narrative embraces.

I’m going to come to Odierno’s defense here. This reads too much like Dr. iRack believes the fallacy that COIN isn’t kinetic. (”Kinetic” = breaking things and killing people.) I know Dr. iRack knows otherwise. At least one smart counterinsurgent that everyone in the community enjoys making fun of likes to say that Petraeus and Odierno needed each other to see through each others’ blindspots. Sounds sensible.

But let’s not treat Petraeus like Bruce Banner and Odierno like the Hulk. Maybe they’re like Peter David’s version of the Hulk, where Banner’s consciousness took over the Hulk’s Gamma Ray-jacked body. (Oh screw it. In comments, nominate which comic book best captures the Petraeus-Odierno relationship.) And yes, I recognize the irony of invoking the Banner/Hulk dichotomy to argue with my alleged alter ego. But I’m not Dr. iRack.

We Made It»

Did you know that there’s like a shaving station in the business-class bathroom of the Acela Express? They’ve got an outlet for your electric razor. Or, if you’re really fancy, hairdryer.

I’m The Biggest Boss That You’ve Seen Thus Far»

My first job in journalism was opening mail at New York Press when I was a 19-year old whelp. (If you want my very purple reminiscences about how great the Press used to be, click here.) The man who ran the paper at the time was a guy named Russ Smith, an alt-weekly veteran who wasn’t afraid to turn his paper into a weird melange of cultural libertinism — debauchery, really — reactionary politics and experimental, unconventional writing. Soon I graduated to fetching Russ copies of Esquire and The Weekly Standard from the comprehensive newsstand in Greenwich Village. What else was I going to be doing on my weekend, anyway? Anyway, Russ descended into madness and the paper started to suck and eventually he sold it and moved back to Baltimore.

Now he runs a website called SpliceToday, and, clearly desperate for content, my old boss and buddy Russ interviewed me. Like a good interviewer, he provoked me into indulging all my worst tendencies, particularly those concerning Ryan Lizza.

Buy Buy Buy From Circle A, Like Hula Hoops It’s The Latest Craze»

Washingtonian asked a bunch of people for their thoughts on record stores. I’m one of them. So now The Surge is mentioned in the same piece as, like, Georgie James and Jukebox The Ghost! Dudes, can we play with you sometime? Holler at supportthesurge-at-gmail-dot-com.