Jonah Goldberg — no longer journalism’s worst Goldberg! — has an open call that I think you should answer:
About a month ago, I called Ramesh in a panic because I’d forgotten that I was slated to do a Close-Up Foundation interview on the Bush legacy and I hadn’t thought too much about it. Fortunately, not only did Ramesh have some great thoughts, but I was wrong about the date — by a month (I’d entered it into my PDA wrong). Anyway, I’m doing the interview this Thursday and while I have my thoughts far better organized, I thought it’d be interesting to know what NRO readers think Bush’s legacy will be. Please send thoughts — hopefully constructive — to JonahResearch@AOL.com.
Sadly No!, which I think should be this blog’s boyfriend — its girlfriend is totally Jezebel, but it’s cheating with both Erica and Joy — remarks, brilliantly:
Why should anybody ask for your opinion on anything, dude? You have less credibility than a 9/11 Truther. Because, say what you will about the Truthers, they don’t abandon their crazy and insane delusions just because they suddenly become politically inconvenient.
Oh snap dude!
Via Julian Wan at dKos, bear witness to an Inside Edition-era Bill O’Reilly freak out over a TelePrompter crisis.
Update: The video is gone! One wonders who at Fox News roughed up Johnny YouTube. Luckily, this is why God created Crooks & Liars.
While searching for something in Peter Scoblic’s awesome new book U.S. vs. Them — see! I don’t think everything about The New Republic sucks — I came across what might be the most unfortunate language ever used to describe nuclear war. It amounts to the Soulja Boy doctrine:
The “solution” that many analysts embraced was to limit a nuclear war. The United States should not plan, per the [Single Integration Operations Plan] to launch the entirety of the nuclear arsenal in what Herman Kahn, one of RAND’s leading theorists, dubbed a “war orgasm.”
Um. Peter? Maybe you shouldn’t–
Instead, if it had to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict — say, because the Red Army invaded Western Europe, overwhelming American troops — it should first target Soviet military forces. Nuclear weapons might stop a conventional assault, and if the United States also targeted Soviet nuclear forces, they would impede Moscow’s ability to retaliate in kind. The United States could then hold Soviet cities hostage to a second U.S. strike, meaning that in the best case the Soviets might be deterred from retaliating at all. In this way, RAND analysts theorized the United States might actually be able to win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. Resorting to his own sexual metaphor, [nuclear theorist Bernard] Brodie likened the SIOP to orgasmic intercourse, whereas the RAND strategy was equivalent to withdrawal before ejaculation. More formally, this approach was known as counterforce.
In other words, by the mid-1960s, we don’t SIOP no mo’, we just counterforce that ho. Now yooooooooooooooou.