Climate policy in Tokyo, Seoul, Brussels, and Washington
America sold the rest of the world on capping carbon and trading emissions. But just as it is being embraced worldwide, the very phrase is an “anathema” here — an ironic turn of events that economist Robert Stavins discusses in this repost from Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Relations Blog.
As I write this, I’m on board a flight from Seoul, South Korea, to San Francisco, California, on my way home to Boston, having spent the week of Harvard spring break meeting with senior government officials, academics, and leaders of civil society in Tokyo and Seoul on behalf of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements. Reflecting on these meetings in Asia and recalling meetings I’ve previously had in Brussels and Washington, some important opportunities and ironies about national and international climate policy come to mind.
The 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which met in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December, 2009, produced two significant outcomes. The key substantive outcome, of course, was the Copenhagen Accord, about which I’ve written in detail in a previous blog post. The key institutional outcome was speculation that the UNFCCC may not be the best venue going forward for productive negotiations on climate change. (This is also a topic about which I’ve recently written at this blog.)
These dual outcomes of the Copenhagen conference point to the special importance of two key nations in international climate policy developments this year. I’m not referring to China and the United States (despite the fact that they are, of course, the world’s two leading emitters of carbon dioxide). Rather, I am referring to Korea and Mexico. Why?
First, these two nations are unique in being both long-time members (Korea since 1996, Mexico since 1994) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and members of the group of non-Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol, which have no direct commitments under that international agreement. The OECD comes as close as anything to defining the set of industrialized nations of the developed world. Thus, Korea and Mexico have their feet planted firmly both in the developed world and the developing world (a fact that is readily apparent on even brief visits to these nations). This gives Korea and Mexico remarkable credibility with the two key blocks in international climate negotiations. That, on its own, would be of considerable importance, but there is another reality that makes this of even greater significance (and opportunity) in this year of 2010.
Coming out of Copenhagen, many participants in the international climate negotiations (as well as informed observers), noted that the UNFCCC has real limitations as the sole venue for future climate negotiations: too many countries – 192, excessively stringent requirements for agreement – unanimity, and a distinct tendency to polarize debates between developed and developing countries. Two other, potentially supplementary venues stand out as promising: the Major Economies Forum (MEF) and the G20.
The MEF, which has hosted productive discussions among 17 key countries and regions that together account for nearly 90 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, may be somewhat limited by the fact that is was created by and is chaired by the United States, a nation with constrained credibility on climate issues among some countries, particularly in the developing world. The G20, which brings together twenty of the world’s largest economies, focuses on economic as well as other global issues and consists of almost the same set of nations as the MEF, likewise accounting for about 90 percent of global emissions. The G20 could thus be an exceptionally promising supplementary venue for meaningful and realistic climate discussions. And in November of this year, the G20 will be hosted by Korea, when it convenes in Seoul. This gives the Korean government a special role in setting the agenda for the discussions and presiding at the sessions.
The G20 meetings in Seoul will come just two weeks before the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC, which will take place in Cancºn, Mexico. Thus, the Mexican government is also in a key position this year, because it will hold the Presidency of COP-16.
Add to this the fact that both Korea and Mexico have been particularly creative in their domestic climate policy initiatives and international proposals over the past year.
Together, Korea and Mexico, share credibility in the developing and developed worlds, and likewise share unique international legitimacy as the hosts and presidents of the G20 and COP-16 in 2010. This is why these two countries have a remarkable opportunity this year to provide leadership of the international community, and make real progress on negotiations to address the threat of global climate change. Those are the opportunities. Now, let me turn to the ironies that have come to the fore.
More than a decade ago, it was the United States, as the leader of the so-called “Umbrella Group,” that successfully fought for the inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol – over the objections of the European Union – of three “flexibility mechanisms” to bring down the costs of meeting the Protocol’s objectives: joint implementation (Article 4), a global emissions reduction credit system, the Clean Development Mechanism (the CDM, Article 12), and emissions trading among countries (Article 17). Ironically, once the George W. Bush administration officially pulled the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol process, it was the European Union that implemented the world’s first CO2 emissions trading program, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Beyond this, the United States was a pioneer with the use of national cap-and-trade systems, including lead trading in the 1980s and the SO2 allowance trading program beginning in 1995 under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. In addition, despite its lack of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. government very early on began to give serious consideration to the development of an economy-wide cap-and-trade system for CO2 with the McCain-Lieberman legislation in the U.S. Senate (followed later by the Lieberman-Warner bill). More recently, of course, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Waxman-Markey bill in June of 2009, including a significant economy-wide cap-and-trade system.
Over the past nine months, however, the very phrase, “cap-and-trade,” has evolved from being politically correct in Washington to nothing less than politically anathema. (How and why this happened is a topic for a future essay at this blog.) The great irony is that just when cap-and-trade has been under such vociferous attack in Washington, countries throughout the world are embracing this instrument, recognizing its great potential to address climate change cost-effectively and equitably.
In addition to the EU ETS, already in force, Australia is primed to put its cap-and-trade system in place, as is New Zealand. And just a few days before I arrived in Tokyo, the Japanese cabinet announced that the government will move forward with a cap-and-trade system (in contrast with Japan’s previously proposed sectoral approach). And, not to be outdone, Korea is considering the use of cap-and-trade as an element of its own domestic climate policy.
This irony is striking. Of course, it could be reduced or eliminated if Senators Kerry, Graham, and Lieberman can use their much-anticipated new climate proposal to pull victory from the jaws of anticipated defeat. Only time will tell.
— Robert Stavins
- Robert Stavins: “The appropriate characterization of the Waxman-Markey allocation is that more than 80% of the value of allowances go to consumers and public purposes, and less than 20% to private industry.”
- What Hath Copenhagen Wrought?