Like a lot of liberals, I find Mike Huckabee to be an intriguing figure. He seems, from his rhetoric, like an interesting politician; the kind of guy who would like to give the notion of “compassionate conservatism” a real try — very traditionalist positions on “cultural” issues, combined with a dose of pragmatism on the economic front and some effort at showing a real concern for the least among us. A kind of right-populism, perhaps, but with less of the hard-edged anger and racial demagoguery that suggests. The trouble is that, as Ed Kilgore points out, Huckabee doesn’t really bring the beef. He “likes to talk about economic inequality” but his only proposal in this area is “a highly regressive national sales tax.”

Similarly, during the debate he got a question about unions and delivered a reply about how a revival of interest in unionism was a natural response to runaway inequality. But he didn’t really say whether or not he thought that was a good thing and people should join unions. He noted that Arkansas is a right to work state, and appeared to endorse hard-right anti-union orthodoxy to the effect that it would be good to take such policies nationwide. Certainly he didn’t come out in favor of pro-unionization measures like EFCA.

I’m with Beutler and DeLong that raising CAFE standards would be better than not raising CAFE standards because it would be better to have higher gas taxes, and then not having higher gas taxes either because it’s too unpopular, but I don’t think CAFE fans should go as far as Brian does in obscuring CAFE’s limits as a policy option. It’s true that driving habits aren’t incredibly responsive to short-term changes in the price of gas, but they’re not completely inelastic and their may well be more long-term sensitivity.

CAFE, meanwhile, relies entirely on the fuel efficiency lever as a means of reducing gasoline consumption even though the total amount of driving is clearly an important determinant of how much gas gets used.

Most of all, though, gasoline taxes, apart from their impact on carbon emissions (and emissions of other things), raise revenue which is useful in a number of ways. I feel like something green types tend to overlook when citing political feasibility as the reason for preferring certain kinds of regulatory measures to tax-oriented ones is that from the point of view of progressive politics more broadly the politically difficult task of raising taxes just can’t be postponed forever. Raising the gasoline tax would be politically difficult. But so would instituting a VAT. And so would an across the board income tax rate increase. And so would everything else. Just getting the Bush tax cuts to expire will be a non-trivially difficult task, but implementing progressive priorities on health care, education, etc. will require even more revenue than their cancellation would raise.

It seems to me that there’s a case to be made for going bigger — for taking on a task that, while more politically difficult, also helps a broader coalition of people accomplish their goals.

(NB: needless to say, higher gas taxes and tighter CAFE standards aren’t mutually exclusive policy options)

Agricultural subsidy reform seems high on the list of things that aren’t going to happen, but this is a pretty cool ad from Oxfam America:

One doubt’s it’ll make a difference, but here’s hoping.

On the anniversary of the vote to authorize the use of force in Iraq, John Edwards releases a statement laying out some of what he thinks he’s learned from his mistake and going after Hillary Clinton on Iraq and Iran on someone who hasn’t learned the right things. Statement below the fold:

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Paul Schroeder’s article on why we need to leave Iraq takes an annoying detrour through Habsburg policy in Italy in the mid-nineteenth century before returning to its extremely valuable point:

Why should retreat, indirection, and self-restraint help the U.S. concretely in the Middle East now? First, basic conditions favor it. It is clear that the potential dangers from the spread of war, ethnic-religious conflict, and terrorism beyond Iraq menace its neighbors and adjacent regions more directly and dangerously than they do the United States. While Iran now enjoys more security from and influence in Iraq than before, thanks to the American invasion, it would be seriously endangered by all-out civil war in Iraq, with the Shi’ites appealing to Iran for help and the Sunnis calling on other Sunni states and the U.S. to help stop them. Turkey has a similar problem with regard to the Kurds, shared to a degree by Iran and Syria. The immediate dangers of wider unrest and Islamic radicalism for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the U.A.E., Lebanon, and Jordan need no discussion. Even Israel and Egypt are menaced, along with the wider Arab and Muslim worlds and Europe. The very dangers that Bush and Co. claim require the U.S. to stay in Iraq could, if used wisely, pave the way for getting out and inducing others to help fight them.

Why should one suppose that they will? Because it is in their interest to do so and because, unlike Americans, they possess both the cultural links, ties, and skills to be effective at it and legitimate standing and authorization for intervening. A major reason that America’s appeals to other states in the region to do more to help fight terrorism and pacify Iraq have been ineffective is that the overwhelmingly unpopular American military presence in Iraq negates them. Any actions taken under U.S. control automatically become illegitimate in the eyes of the Arab street and many governments.

Right. As you can see from the fact that the United States invaded Iraq, it’s certainly possible for countries to decide to act in an utterly atavistic way that’s completely contrary to their national interests. Nevertheless, it’s noteworthy that the more dire gloom-and-doom scenarios for an American departure from Iraq seem to assume that this is what will happen — even though every single one of Iraq’s neighbors has an interest in Iraq being stable and, failing that, has an interest in containing the chaos, we’re supposed to believe that they would all act incredibly irresponsibly and disaster would strike. But while that could happen (anything’s possible) there’s no reason to regard it as likely.

For a lot of the proponents (and yes this includes Democrats, too) of perpetual military engagement in Iraq, I think the real risk isn’t that there will be a regional conflagration but that there won’t be one, and that this will damage their notions of America as the “indispensable nation.” Meanwhile, neither Syria nor Iran can very well afford to play a constructive role in Iraq as long as US policy continues to be to try to use Iraq as a lever for toppling the regimes in Damascus and Iran.