Elana Schor has a helpful roundup of a recent Brookings event on improving federal support for Metropolitan Planning Organizations and, even more important, improving the extent to which the federal relationship with MPOs actually supports good planning. This is an important element of dealing with the climate issue. The built environment evolves slowly over time so it’s difficult to get large short-term emissions reductions through better land use, but by the same token it’s absolutely essential to meeting long-term targets in an economically viable way.

Michael McKeever, executive director of the SACOG, and Peter McLaughlin, a commissioner of Minnesota’s Hennepin County, agreed that the upcoming congressional climate change bill is essential to achieving land use reform.

If the climate bill “does some fairly simple things and requires … high quality [MPO planning] to be done as a pre-condition of getting federal funds,” local development can become a more transparent and rational process, McKeever said.

Legislators, recognizing this, included language to that effect in the original Waxman-Markey bill. But it wound up getting stripped out. Now it’s back in the Kerry-Boxer draft, but the U.S. Senate is generally less friendly than the House to sound urban planning and land use policy so one should be nervous that it will be removed again. However, with these kind of relatively low-profile issues things like preference intensity make a great deal of difference. If Senators get word that their offices are being contacted by people who are interested in something as obscure as MPO planning, that would get noticed. Of course as a DC resident I’m not allowed to be represented in the governing bodies of the United States of America so I can’t contact anyone.

I’ve seen a fair amount of commentary on the part of Ryan Lizza’s profile of the Obama economic team where Christina Romer recommends a $1.2 trillion stimulus proposal and they wind up with just a bit more than half of that out of deference to the tender sensibilities of the United States Senate. I’ve seen less commentary on this other part, where basically the same thing happen on financial system policy:

Romer believed that the banks wouldn’t lend again until they were well capitalized. For banks in severe stress, she favored creating a government-backed “bad bank” to take the toxic assets off the banks’ books and then recapitalize them with government funds—essentially a version of nationalization, and what the Swedish government had done during that nation’s financial crisis of the early nineties. This argument was quickly rendered moot because of the cost. There wasn’t much money left in the TARP kitty, and any chance of getting more from Congress had ended with that morning’s news: A.I.G., which had received a hundred and seventy billion dollars in federal money, had handed out multimillion-dollar bonuses to the executives responsible for the company’s demise. Axelrod said, “The one thing that was absolutely clear was, we were not in a position to go back to Congress.”

Axelrod’s argument seems absolutely sound. And Rahm Emannuel’s argument on the stimulus that congress wouldn’t appropriate $1.2 trillion also seems absolutely sound. But of course Romer’s arguments weren’t arguments about feasible legislative strategies. Of all the senior members of the Obama administration, Romer has by far the least experience with practical legislative politics and also has the job that’s the least concerned with practical legislative politics. And I think that it was in a lot of ways a masterstroke to appoint a very policy-focused academic with no practical legislative experience to the CEA job. When people work too long in Washington, their notions of what would be good policy in principle tend to become unduly corrupted by their knowledge of what’s possible in practice.

But what Lizza is telling us is that on the two biggest pieces of macroeconomic management, the Obama administration is pursuing policies that its in-house expert on macroeconomic crisis management believed were far too timid. He’s also telling us that this was done primarily not because people disagreed with her analysis, but because they felt it wasn’t possible, legislatively speaking, to do what was objectively necessary. It’s a bit of a scary situation.

New Daily Beast column from yours truly takes a look at health care in Sweden and Denmark to put the Obama proposals in perspective and remind the interest groups looking to block reform that they’re actually turning down a very generous offer:

Whether reform passes this year or not, the status quo really is untenable. Something will have to change someday. And what Obama and Baucus are proposing is close to the minimum amount of change conceivable. If insurance-industry groups succeed in killing the bill, the lesson will be that appeasement hasn’t worked. And that may mean that next time around, reformers will start thinking big and try to put health care under democratic control and financed on the basis of solidarity. Industry may vehemently oppose even modest reforms, maybe trying to kill it off entirely. That would be an ugly fight that would mean years of delay in providing help to people who urgently need it. But unless insurers can recognize how much the powers that be are bending over backward to be nice to them, it might be the only way forward in the long run.

Here’s my earlier post on health care in Denmark and here’s health care in Sweden. The systems are similar, though I’d say Sweden’s is marginally better. The Swedish government’s English-language description of their system also includes my new favorite health policy catchphrase: “Swedish health and medical care is based on the principles that care should be provided on equal terms and according to need, that is should be under democratic control and financed on the basis of solidarity.”