Why Bush’s Case On Iraq Was Different From Clinton’s

The Bush administration’s talking point these days in defending its use of false pre-war intelligence is to blame Clinton. Scott McClellan said last week that critics “might want to start with looking at the previous administration.” Sen. George Allen (R-VA) repeated the mantra on CNN this Sunday: “[R]ecognize that even the Clinton administration thought Saddam posed a threat.” And Bill Kristol writes in the Weekly Standard that the White House should “fight back” by pointing out that Clinton administration officials “believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.”

To justify the war against Iraq, the Bush administration made a number of exaggerated and misleading claims about the Iraqi threat that went far beyond the public statements issued by the Clinton administration. Going beyond the argument that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration made a unique case on two specific fronts to justify the war: the supposed connections to al Qaeda and the Iraqi nuclear threat.

The administration argued that the evidence in these two areas amounted to a “grave and gathering threat” in a “post-September 11th world.” On the eve of the Iraq war, Bush said:

The danger is clear: Using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.

The imagery was clear: terrorists, such as those that attacked on 9/11, could do far greater damage with nuclear weapons, and the Iraqi regime was helping to make that scenario a reality. In fact, the evidence behind the supposed Iraq/al Qaeda connection and the evidence on the nuclear threat have turned out to be the weakest links in the case for war. See the evidence below:

LIES ABOUT IRAQ/AL QAEDA LINKS

What Bush Said: “Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.” [10/7/02]

What They Knew: The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported in February 2002 that the source of the claim – a detained al Qaeda terrorist — “could not name any Iraqis involved, any chemical or biological material used or where the training occurred. As a result, ‘it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers.’” [WP, 11/6/05]

What Bush Said: Saddam is “a man who loves to link up with al Qaeda.” [9/28/02]

What They Knew: “One week after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, White House counterterrorism director Paul Kurtz wrote in a memo to national security adviser Condoleezza Rice that no ‘compelling case’ existed for Iraq’s involvement in the attacks and that links between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s government were weak.” [WP, 7/22/04]

What Bush Said: Saddam is “a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda.” [11/7/02]

What They Knew: “Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled ‘Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.’ Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no ‘compelling case’ that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks.” [9-11 Commission]

LIES ABOUT NUCLEAR THREAT

What Bush Said: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” [2003 State of the Union]

What They Knew: The administration was warned at least three times not to make the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. Also, the CIA said the “Brits have exaggerated this issue.” [Guardian, 7/10/04]

What Bush Said: Iraq “has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.” [2003 State of the Union]

What They Knew: “Ms. Rice’s staff had been told that the government’s foremost nuclear experts seriously doubted that the tubes were for nuclear weapons, according to four officials at the Central Intelligence Agency and two senior administration officials.” The day before Bush’s State of the Union address, the IAEA told the Security Council that it had found no evidence of a revived nuclear weapons program in Iraq. “‘From our analysis to date,’ the agency reported, ‘it appears that the aluminum tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges.’” [NYT, 10/3/04]