Ralph Peters says we must save Iraqi democracy and curb Iraqi death squads by engineering a military coup. Juntas, of course, being well-known for their habit of abjuring extra-judicial violence. More than the low quality of the policy advice, however, the notable thing here is that Peters, like a surprisingly large number of enthusiasts for the cause of Arab democracy, views events in the Middle East mostly through racism-tinged glasses: “As dearly as we believe in democracy, Iraq’s Arabs are proving that they’re incapable of the political, social and moral maturity necessary to run an elected government.”

Sure, sure, they’re immature. Like children. The only thing they understand is force. Sure.

Couldn’t it possibly be the case that high levels of ethnic and sectarian pluralism are intrinsically difficult for polities to overcome? That the history of, say, Spain has been marked by a high degree of tension — including violence and even civil war around questions of secularism and the relationship of Catalonia and the Basque Country to the central government.

Here’s the slide somebody handed over to The New York Times‘s Michael Gordon, providing a graphical depiction of the US military’s view that the situation in Iraq has gone to shit — moving from a bad situation before the February shrine attack in Samarra toward a state of inc reasing chaos. In addition, “An intelligence summary at the bottom of the slide reads ‘urban areas experiencing “ethnic cleansing” campaigns to consolidate control’ and ‘violence at all-time high, spreading geographically.’”

Meanwhile, in yesterday’s editorial making the case for the GOP, National Review argued it was vital to keep the Democrats out of power, because only a Republican majority can protect the American public from accurate information about Iraq: “their victory would undoubtedly strengthen the forces who want to declare Iraq a defeat and come home. Partisan oversight hearings will politicize every military miscalculation, every dime misspent, and every abuse by our allies (real or imagined). The effect will be to sap what public support remains for seeing the job done in Iraq. The doomsday clock on our commitment in Iraq will have lurched a few minutes closer to midnight.”

Vote GOP: We’ll maintain a cocoon of denial!

A Justin Logan op-ed in the DC Examiner notes that hawks, in their endless quest to blame anyone but themselves for the problems in Iraq, have hit upon the idea that Nuri al-Maliki is just inadequate for the job of prime minister. As Justin argues, however, the objective situation simply makes it impossible for him to achieve want the hawks want him to. Iraqi leaders are destined to be actual human beings and not wizards capable of producing magical ponies: “The real problem in Iraq is not Iran or Syria, it wasn’t Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and it isn’t Nuri al-Maliki. It isn’t the case that a few external actors are undermining an otherwise sound strategy. Bush’s ideology-as-strategy model is the problem.”

Lacking anything resembling an adequate number of Arabic-speaker, the military is apparently trying to build devices reminiscent of the old Universal Translator to fill the gap. It’s rarely discussed, but you’ve got to think that the severe paucity of people who speak Arabic (to say nothing of Farsi, Pashto, etc.) is incredibly crippling to a whole range of military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement endeavors. Indeed, as best I can tell it’s a fairly serious impediment to American journalism, and therefore to the general public understanding of what’s even happening.

Clearly, it would take a long time for a massive investment in building skills in Middle Eastern languages to pay off, but all that goes to show is that we couldn’t start such an effort soon enough. Indeed, had we really done it seriously in fall 2001, it might be paying off at least a little already.