Kevin Drum cautions: “if you read a story saying, for example, that tribal leaders are ‘turning against al-Qaeda,’ this may or may not really mean anything. It might be good news, but it also might mean only that the local shaykhs are taking sides in an internal dispute — but are no less committed to fighting American forces. Something to keep in the back of your mind as you scan the news.” I would put it differently. Tribal leaders turning against al-Qaeda is definitely a good thing but only if we handle it correctly.

The correct way to handle it is to say to Sunni Arabs that we want out of Iraq. And to prove that we want out of Iraq by leaving Iraq. But then to say to them that the only thing we want less than US forces in Iraq are al-Qaeda operatives killing Americans from a base in al-Anbar province. Our troops are leaving Iraq, but they can be put back in. Get rid of al-Qaeda, we say to the local Sunni Arabs, and we’ll stay away forever — this war was a tremendous mistake. But if al-Qaeda hits us, we have to come back and hit them. As we’ve seen time and again, most Sunni Arabs have no love for either Americans or al-Qaeda. If we create a situation where we’re gone and fighting al-Qaeda is the best way to keep us gone, they’ll fight al-Qaeda. If, by contrast, we insist in staying in Iraq to fight al-Qaeda ourselves, then we’ll have a problem. We’ll risk returning to the situation we’ve had throughout the bulk fo the war, where Sunni Arabs dislike al-Qaeda but will take whichever allies the can find against the United States.

Unlike Matt Stoller, I don’t have a big problem with the plans for Iraq put forward by either Barack Obama or John Edwards. I think the notion of keeping troops in the region (also Jack Murtha’s idea, for the record) for various purposes makes sense. I also think it’s both understandable and correct that people who are hoping to be president in 2009 want to leave themselves some wiggle room in terms of what it is they’re committing themselves to in April 2007. Thus, I’m not disturbed that there’s a certain amount of vagueness in Edwards’ discussion of the possible use of force to protect a humanitarian mission in Iraq, or in Samantha Power’s vision of genocide prevention.

The issue, to me, is that flexibility is a double-edged sword. In the hands of a good president, it’s a good thing. In the hands of a bad president, it’s a bad thing. This is why one needs a good president. I’m pretty confident that Barack Obama and his team would exercise good judgment in this matter, and while I have somewhat less faith in Edwards and his team I’m open to persuasion. Fundamentally, I think it’s a mistake for progressive activists to define the “correct” position on Iraq as simply equivalent to the position that’s most dogmatically hostile to continued American involvement in regional issues. I think the idea of maintaining a semi-permanent counterterrorism force in Iraq is a very bad idea as the presence of such a force in Western Iraq will generate the need for counterterrorism activities there. An “over the horizon” counterterrorism force, by contrast, if prudently used, is a very good idea. If imprudently used, it’s a terrible idea. There’s just no verbal formula that adequately captures what the next president should do.