Martin Peretz, back from vacation, and ready to tell it like it is:

By the way, I think the conflict between the Arabs of Palestine and the Jewish state is of less import than the one between India and Pakistan, which like Palestine, is also not a country and the Pakistanis, also like the Palestinians, are not a nation. Oh, yes: why is this of such valence? Because Pakistan has the bomb.

The claim that Pakistan is not a country is simply bizarre, since it pretty clearly is. The idea that there is no “Pakistani nation” is perhaps comprehensible (though, I think, mistaken) as an argument about Pakistan’s large degree of ethnic diversity, with the plurality Punjabi group compromising only 44 percent of the population, with the remainder deeply fragmented.

The claim that there is not Palestinian nation, however, both puts yesterday’s TNR editorial on Hamas (why should Peretz’ views be any more reputable than Palestinian rejectionism) in perspective and also recapitulates the most tragic of Zionist self-deceptions. The idea of creating a Jewish state has a certain logic to it. And the idea of creating this Jewish state in Palestine has an obvious appeal. Under the circumstances, it became convenient to believe that Palestine was not only the location of the historical Jewish state but actually “a land without people for a people without a land.” The main problem with this theory was that it was, obviously, false — Palestine wasn’t very densely populated at the time, but there were certainly people there.

This deception eventually became untenable and transformed itself into the one Peretz is offering — sure, there are people on that land, but they aren’t a people, a nation. When I was young, I recall a Hebrew School teacher speaking of “15 Arab countries and only one Israel” (I think this is an underestimate of the number of Arab countries) the better to make the fate of the Palestinians a trivial matter. Again, this is a convenient thing for people with certain other commitments to believe, but it’s just not true.

Young Ezra Klein makes a good point:

What I want is not a foreign policy vision that builds from a foundation of values, but from one of consequences. Whether a policy is concordant with America’s view of itself is less important than its likely outcomes. The Paul Wolfowitzes of the world had thought plenty about values and were perfectly capable of discussing their vision of Iraq as a shining city on a Mesopotamian hill. What they hadn’t thought about were outcomes — constraints on our action and capabilities, the likely effects on others’ actions of our use of force, etc. Good thing they weren’t really pressed on the subject, lest they’d have had to conjure up a postwar plan for a reception that didn’t include candy and flowers — a plan they didn’t have. But they weren’t questioned, because they were effectively able to keep the conversation focused on values — do you care about liberty? hate tyranny? believe Arabs can be democratic? — rather than consequences.

I believe, however, that it is strictly forbidden to make this point without citing Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation”. What Ezra is complaining about is the need for US foreign policy to be guided by an ethic of responsibility focused on whether or not our actions will, say, lead to massive chaos and bloodshed rather than a focus on “moral clarity” or whether or not our policy proposals are, in some sense, grounded in high ideals.

I’d known for a long time that Iran, despite its large crude oil resources, was actually close to implementing a rationing scheme for gasoline. Well, now the rationing’s begun and with it the anti-rationing protests. What I hadn’t realized until today was the precise dynamics of the situation. The issue is that gas is preposterously cheap — “After a 25 percent hike in prices imposed May 21, gas sells at the equivalent of 38 cents a gallon.” To make a long story short, the Iranian government is earning money selling crude oil then spending a hefty chunk of that cash purchasing refined gasoline and then selling it back to Iran’s citizens at wildly sub-market prices.

If they were smart, they would just try to decontrol prices gently since rationing when gas is this cheap is just begging for a black market.

Siftung Leo Strauss has a question:

As a random thought experiment, which of you, Dear Readers, could offer a coherent paragraph summation about the foreign policy (note, not just Iraq) vision of the oh, top three candidates of either party? Without cheating and clipping and pasting some crap a 24 year old intern posted on the web page from a think tanker angling to be the new Dep.Asst.Sec. of something. We mean, in real time, an off the top of your head kind of thing.

Just as he suggests, one can’t really do it. “Just bits and pieces of AgitProp and gibberish. Maybe you, Dear Reader, might have more luck.” One thing it’s worth pointing out is that there’s nothing unusual about this. Presidential candidates tend to be vague and somewhat contradictory in describing their thinking about foreign policy. The true significance of what they were saying on the campaign trail is usually only clear in retrospect. Looking backwards, one can see Bush laying the groundwork for his post-9/11 nationalist binge back in the campaign talk of 2000 but very few people saw it at the time.