I’m not sure the point can be made forcefully enough that John McCain is, among practical politicians, perhaps the single most committed advocate of an imperial vision of American foreign policy out there. This case can (and will!) be made at great length, but one quick way of getting at the point is through Teddy Roosevelt. It’s well known that McCain is a huge Roosevelt admirer, and sees himself as a kind of TR for the 21st century. At the same time, TR is a complicated, multi-faceted figure. Among other things, however, he was an arch-imperialist at a time when imperialism was undertaken with much less of a velvet glove. Things like McCain’s March 25, 2002 speech at USC make it clear that he doesn’t see Roosevelt’s imperialism as somehow incidental to his hero’s vision:

Theodore Roosevelt is one of my greatest political heroes. The “strenuous life” was T.R.’s definition of Americanism, a celebration of America’s pioneer ethos, the virtues that had won the West and inspired our belief in ourselves as the New Jerusalem, bound by sacred duty to suffer hardship and risk danger to protect the values of our civilization and impart them to humanity. “We cannot sit huddled within our borders,” he warned, “and avow ourselves merely an assemblage of well-to-do hucksters who care nothing for what happens beyond.”

His Americanism was not fidelity to a tribal identity. Nor was it limited to a sentimental attachment to our “amber waves of grain” or “purple mountains majesty.” Roosevelt’s Americanism exalted the political values of a nation where the people were sovereign, recognizing not only the inherent justice of self-determination, not only that freedom empowered individuals to decide their destiny for themselves, but that it empowered them to choose a common destiny. And for Roosevelt that common destiny surpassed material gain and self-interest. Our freedom and our industry must aspire to more than acquisition and luxury. We must live out the true meaning of freedom, and accept “that we have duties to others and duties to ourselves; and we can shirk neither.”

Some critics, in his day and ours, saw in Roosevelt’s patriotism only flag-waving chauvinism, not all that dissimilar to Old World ancestral allegiances that incited one people to subjugate another and plunged whole continents into war. But they did not see the universality of the ideals that formed his creed.

There are a couple of things to note about this. The sentiment that American patriotism is a higher calling than some tawdry blood-and-soil nationalism is a fairly banal one in the US and serves as an umbrella under which different kinds of ideas can hide. But McCain brings it up and specifically ascribes this view to Roosevelt, apostle of empire. To McCain, a commitment to universalism requires American expansionism. Indeed, to McCain it is precisely commitment to this imperial vision that makes American patriotism superior to other brands of nationalism. Our own patriotism would become compromised by stinginess and selfishness were we to show more restraint in world affairs.

I find this new John McCain take on his remarks about staying in Iraq for 100 years pretty confusing. Formerly, we weren’t supposed to worry about his commitment to a war of indefinite duration because, you see, the 100 years was tacked on with the proviso that no Americans would be killed. How this kind of open-ended commitment was supposed to get us to that zero-casualty point was unclear. But now we learn that “the war for all intents and purposes, although the insurgency will go on for years and years and years, but it will be handled by the Iraqis, not by us, and then we decide what kind of security arrangement we want to have with the Iraqis.”

This, to me, is baffling. If the insurgency is still going on “for years and years and years” then either the insurgency is taking place but U.S. troops have left Iraq (which McCain opposes) or else the war is continuing. I guess the McCain alternative is that the insurgency keeps fighting, and our troops stay in Iraq, but the insurgents forget we’re there and generously decide not to attack us. Or something.

I was intrigued by the idea of a New Republic masthead editorial purporting to apply the lessons of Kosovo to the situation in Darfur. That, I thought, might provide a respite from the magazine’s usual bomb repeat bomb take on the issue. But no:

But the biggest, and most important, parallel is this: We asked Milosevic to stop killing. He did not. We have asked Sudan to stop killing. And still it kills. Yes, it occasionally appears willing to bargain. But, while Sudan bargains, the aircraft continue to roam over Darfur. The paltry U.N. forces on the ground can do nothing to stop them. And that is probably how things will continue to unfold, until this president or the next one remembers the example of Kosovo, puts together a credible NATO force, and finally says enough is enough.

It seems to me that any serious look at Kosovo has to carry with it the lesson that there’s nothing nearly as simple as a “say enough is enough” option. Coercive military intervention raises a lot of thorny issues. Do we really want to commit ourselves to a Kosovo-style mission in which we wind up administering Darfur for an indefinite period of time? Not that Darfur is 196,555 square miles to Kosovo’s 10,887 square miles. Similarly, what about the wider consequences for Sudan of getting into the partition business? Meanwhile, though they acknowledge that the Darfur rebel groups on whose behalf they want us to go to war are “unsavory” they don’t think through any of the implications of this.

Before a country currently engaged in two wars, plus several peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, starts a new war these are the kind of questions that need to be answered. The good news for TNR is that everyone knows their preferred policy has no chance of being implemented. Which means that there’s no need to think it through, and also that there’s every reason to adopt a maximalist posture. While efforts like the Enough Project to find constructive, practical ways to improve the situation like Darfur necessarily involve awkward compromises with reality, the maximalist gets to ignore details and practical problems and hold the moral high ground for his trouble.

Clifford Levy had a fantastic piece in yesterday’s New York Times, giving a granular, micro-level account of Vladimir Putin’s takeover of Nizhny Novgorod, formerly the political home base of Boris Nemtsov who’s now a leading figure in the anti-Putin opposition.

This was of particular interest to me because I spent the summer of 1998 living in the city in question. And here’s the one area where I feel a lot of this kind of reporting on Putin’s authoritarianism falls down. I never met anyone in 1998-vintage Nizhny Novgorod who was really excited about the state of Russian politics. The general feeling was that rather than democracy, they were suffering from a regime of chaos and corruption. People would talk openly about their yearning for a strong leader who could restore order and prosperity — Singapore, Pinochet’s Chile, postwar South Korea — those were the models on people’s lips. And this, I think, is more-or-less what most people think they’ve gotten from Putin. In reality, it’s almost certainly the case that Russian prosperity is founded on the current high price of fossile fuels (the oil crisis years were very kind to the Soviet consumer) rather than on anything Putin’s done, but that’s how it’s seen.

I think that’s the context you need for Levy’s stories. The kind of tactics Putin used to consolidate control would never have worked if Russia had featured real liberal political parties with meaningful mass support. But by the time Boris Yeltsin put him in power, the screw-ups, deprivation, and corruption of the previous years combined with the sense that Russia’s position on the world stage was slipping had badly hollowed out support for liberalism at non-elite levels.

Via Natasha Chart, the case against cluster bombs — a form of explosive that’s unusually likely to wind up killing and maiming children. Senator Dianne Feinstein authored some anti-cluster bomb legislation that attracted 30 yea votes. Obama was among those voting “yes,” Clinton among those voting “no” which I take as another sign that Obama is willing to think further outside the box than is Clinton on national security issues.