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Escalation Architect Fred Kagan Doubles Down On His Claim That Sectarian Cleansing In Baghdad Is A ‘Myth’

In a presentation yesterday at the American Enterprise Institute, escalation architect Frederick Kagan repeated his claim that sectarian cleansing has not affected the drop in violence in Iraq. Kagan called it a “myth”:

The bad news from this perspective is that the sectarian areas of Iraq is still mixed. The good news is that the sectarian areas of Iraq are still mixed. And there is a myth out there that the violence has fallen because all of the cleansing is done. That is absolutely not the case.

Watch it:

[flv http://video.thinkprogress.org/2008/03/KaganCleansingMyth.320.240.flv]

Kagan makes the same claim in his new report, “Iraq: The Way Ahead“:

One of the persistent myths about the reasons for the success of coalition efforts in 2007 is that the killing stopped because the sectarian cleansing was completed. This myth is absolutely false. Baghdad remains a mixed city. The traditionally Sunni neighborhoods of Adhamiya, Mansour, and Rashid remain predominantly Sunni, and Shiite enclaves in East Rashid remain Shiite. Shia have moved into some parts of the Sunni neighborhoods, and many sub-districts within neighborhoods that had been mixed are now much more homogeneous. But the key components of a mixed Baghdad remain.

Kagan’s claim is contested by major news organizations and the U.S. military’s own data. In December 2007, the Washington Post published the maps below, comparing the sectarian make-up of Baghdad’s neighborhoods in April 2006 and November 2007, and revealing the transformation of the city resulting from sectarian cleansing:

baghdad.gif

The Post’s distribution of sectarian enclaves corresponds closely with these graphs, provided by Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), that chart sectarian violence in Baghdad between July 2006 and July 2007, which is the period in which the U.S. military escalation, also known as the Baghdad Security Plan, took place.

The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq also rebuts Kagan’s mythmaking. One of the NIE’s judgements was that where some “conflict levels have diminished,” it was due to sectarian “separation.”

Kagan’s view is also challenged by Joe Christoff of the Government Accountability Office, who stated in congressional testimony in October 2007 that sectarian cleansing was “an important consideration in even assessing the overall security situation in Iraq”:

We look at the attack data going down, but it’s not taking into consideration that there might be fewer attacks because you have ethnically cleansed neighborhoods, particularly in the Baghdad area. [...]

It’s produced 2.2. million refugees that have left, it’s produced two million internally displaced persons within the country as well.

In August 2007, the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization indicated that “the total number of internally displaced Iraqis [had] more than doubled, to 1.1 million from 499,000″ since the surge started in February. Center for American Progress Iraq analyst Brian Katulis estimated that Baghdad, which once used to be a 65 percent Sunni majority city, “is now 75 percent Shia.”

Kagan’s claim that Baghdad “remains a mixed city,” severely understates both the drastic transformation of the city’s sectarian make-up and the suffering that attended that transformation. It also casually ignores the fact that one of the most intense and violent periods of sectarian cleansing took place under the aegis of the military escalation Kagan now claims credit for.

Yglesias

Up Is Down

I suppose nothing should surprise me anymore, but it seems that conservatives are using the recently-released Pentagon report showing (yet again) that there’s no Saddam/al-Qaeda connection to prove the existence of such a connection. What’s more, they’re even telling the truth about the media not paying much attention to the report. Indeed, they’re taking advantage of the fact that the media hasn’t paid attention to the report to just mislead people about what it says.

McCain Now Claims He ‘Had No Confidence’ In Bush Before The Surge

bushmacc.jpgSen. John McCain (R-AZ) has long held that he was the “greatest critic” of Donald Rumsfeld’s strategy in Iraq. Now, as he moves into the general election, he is also trying to distance himself from the unpopular president.

When asked yesterday how he is offering a different path forward in Iraq than Bush, McCain dodged the question, instead saying he had “no confidence” in Bush until the President implemented the surge in 2007:

I’m offering them the record of having objected strenuously to a failed strategy for nearly four years. That I argued against and fought against and said that the secretary of defense of my own party, and my own president, I had no confidence in. That’s how far I went in advocating the new strategy that is succeeding.

McCain’s statement stretches the truth. As late as August 2006, McCain declared that he did have “confidence” in Bush’s leadership in Iraq:

Q: Do you, do you have confidence in the president and his national security team to lead the war at this stage?
McCAIN: I do. I do. I have confidence in the President and I believe that he is well aware of the severity of the situation. [Meet The Press, 8/20/06]

McCain told reporters yesterday he “objected strenuously to a failed strategy for nearly four years.” If this were the case, why would he also praise Bush’s “stay the course” message over that time?

– “I was heartened to hear the President say that we cannot cut and run in Iraq.” [Press Release, 11/5/03]

– “I’m confident we’re on the right course.” [ABC News, 3/7/04]

– “And what the president did tonight is the most important thing. He laid out an articulate vision for victory in Iraq and why we need to stay the course.” [Fox, 6/28/05]

McCain can try as much as he wants to distance himself from Bush on Iraq, but as the President observed just weeks ago, “he’s not going to change when it comes to taking on the enemy.”

Yglesias

Lieven on McCain

Anatol Lieven’s departure from our fair shores to return to England was a huge blow for the DC think tank universe, but I’m glad to see he hasn’t completely given up writing on our issues. Thus, I’ve been distracted from my efforts to write a long piece about how absolutely terrifying John McCain is on foreign policy by Lieven’s brief piece on how terrifying McCain is. If we’re lucky, McCain will only start wars with North Korea and Iran. If we’re unlucky, we may need to add China or (more likely) Russia to that list.

Yglesias

“Bush’s War”

On Spencer Ackerman’s recommendation, I checked out Frontline’s “Bush’s War” last night. It was, to me, physically difficult to watch. The idea of seriously sitting down to interview Richard Perle about Iraq — your interviewer here, your cameraman there, etc. — is, to me, vaguely repulsive. How could you listen to him when you ought to be punching him? I dunno. Do I want to watch him talk on my television? Or John Yoo? Even in the context of a documentary that makes it clear that they’re repulsive sociopaths? Not really.

The die-hards, though, at least stand by their war. It’s puzzling to think about the rest of them. John McLaughlin, Deputy Director of the CIA throughout the pre-war period, has a ton of reasonable things to say about Iraq and the decision-making process. You’re sitting there thinking, this is a smart, knowledgeable, insightful guy if only he’d been a high-ranking government official of some kind maybe he could have stopped this! He could have quite and said “holy shit! the government’s being run by crazy people, don’t let these psychos invade Iraq!” Of course Richard Clarke and Rand Beers did resign and no good came of it. Maybe there was no stopping the madness.

Yglesias

Success in Falluja

dogs.jpg

Sudarsan Raghavan did a great piece looking at American success in Fallujah in yesterday’s Washington Post. As he lays it out, the successes are very real — the city was once held by the insurgency, and now it’s basically under control. Specifically, it’s under the control of Col. Faisal Ismail al-Zobaie who served in the Republican Guard, then served as a commander in the insurgency, and then got fed up with AQI’s antics, and now serves, with American approval, as police chief of Fallujah.

He still doesn’t like Americans, still doesn’t like the Shiite government of Iraq, and still doesn’t like democracy. But he is happy to take American weapons and money and to cooperate with the American military. It’s not clear if his cooperation would continue if we asked him to cooperate by, say, running the town along liberal principles or submitting to the authority of the central government, but the local troops are trying to get along and he’s willing to get along. And so there you have your success. It’s real enough. It’s also obviously not what we invaded Iraq to accomplish (after all, the Republican Guard was running the country already before we invaded) and it’s not at all clear where it leads you.

If we leave, it seems to me that Colonel Zobaie will either govern wisely, or else he won’t. He may use a reasonable mix of firmness and good government to maintain control over his town, or he might screw up and tip things back to the insurgency. He may reach a reasonable accommodation with the central government or else he might not. And if we stay, all those same factors stay true.

U.S. Air Force Photo by Staff Sgt. Samuel Bendet

Yglesias

Iraq Unprogressing

I was on an email list yesterday where there was some talk of whether or not the mortar attacks on the Green Zone coming from Sadr-controlled territory indicated that Sadr’s cease-fire days were done. The consensus was: No. But today it looks like that line of thinking may be overtaken by events, as this BBC report and this McClatchy report certainly make it seem like it’s “fire away” time. Spencer Ackerman says:

At least one theory worth entertaining is that the Sadrists waited out the surge. I don’t have remotely the evidence necessary to support it, but it’s something to consider when Petraeus testifies before Congress early next month.

It could be or it could be something else. In an intriguing development it looks like someSadrists are calling for civil disobedience. Meanwhile, let me say that while it’s definitely been U.S. policy to ally with the Iranian-backed Badr Brigades in order to try to fight the Iranian-backed Muqtada al-Sadr, it’s never been clear that that’s wise policy. So whether what we’ve been doing is a successful effort to crush Sadr or whether it’s about to blow up in our faces in the form of a big increase in violence, I think it’s all questionable policy — a United States that wasn’t determined to maintain a permanent presence in Iraq would have nothing in particular to fear from a populist nationalist like Sadr.

Yglesias

The Hand-Wringing Gap

I’ve read it twice, and I don’t really understand what George Packer’s problem with Barack Obama’s Iraq policy is:

Obama offers Iraq as the bad war that we have to end if we want to win the good war in Afghanistan and turn around the economy at home. There’s more than a little truth to this, but I can’t help wishing that his speech on Iraq in Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Wednesday, had anything close to the level of complexity and depth shown in his historic speech on race the day before, in Philadelphia. There was no deep consideration of the fate of more than four million displaced Iraqis, the specter of growing Iranian influence in Iraq, the likelihood of a return to terrible levels of violence as American combat brigades are withdrawn, the border tensions between Iraq and Turkey, the future of Kirkuk, or a strategy for preserving the very fragile improvements of the past six months. Instead, the speech presented what sounded like a fairly cost-free, win-win plan.

Obama’s key contention, as underscored by Packer, is that Iraq is “the bad war that we have to end if we want to win the good war in Afghanistan and turn around the economy at home.” Now obviously if you don’t buy that analysis, you’re not going to like Obama’s Iraq policy. But Packer doesn’t seem to disagree with it. Instead, he says “there’s more than a little truth to” what Obama is saying. But so if Obama’s right, then he right. Packer doesn’t see it that way. He seems to think that Obama should have gone in for some more showy hand-wringing. But why should he do that? Packer’s upset that Obama doesn’t have a viable plan for Kirkuk, but that’s just the point; Obama recognizes that nobody has a viable plan to solve Iraq’s problems so he wants to put our resources where they can do more good.

A policy that puts over 100,000 American soldiers in Iraq in order to not solve Iraq’s problems isn’t a close substitute for solving Iraq’s problems. On the other hand, maybe Packer just liked Obama’s race speech a lot more than I did.

Yglesias

American Decline

Looks like Mexico is en route to surpassing the United States as the world’s fattest nation. Note that Mexico has an impressive life expectancy at birth of 75.6 years despite being a pretty poor country without first class health care services and a diet that’s not generally regarded as particularly healthy.

This is perhaps related to the so-called “Hispanic Paradox” in US health care outcomes, wherein inside the United States “which most Hispanic groups are characterized by low socioeconomic status, but better than expected health and mortality outcomes.”

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