ThinkProgress Logo

Security

McCain Says Troops Need ‘Significant Educational Benefits,’ But Still Won’t Sign Onto New GI Bill

On ABC’s The View this morning, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) was asked about the great strain placed on U.S. troops due to the Iraq war. McCain recognized the strain and said that in order to motivate Americans to join the military, the government should provide stronger “educational benefits”:

There a certain number who will join out of patriotism, thank God. And then there’s those who turn 18 or 19 or 20 or 21, and they look at their options. And one of the thing we ought to do is provide them significant educational benefits in return for serving. Americans will always serve their country. Americans will, if they’re motivated to do so.

Watch it:

[flv http://video.thinkprogress.org/2008/04/mccainviewjoy.320.240.flv]

McCain’s support of “significant educational benefits” is ironic, considering that he is still “hedging on whether he will support a ‘GI Bill for the 21st Century,’” as Jon Soltz and Gen. Wesley Clark note in today’s LA Times. That bill, sponsored by Sens. Jim Webb (D-VA) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE), would help fund higher education for service members who had served in active duty since 9/11.

“As de facto leader of the party, McCain could signal to other Republicans to sign on to the bill and assure passage,” Soltz and Clark note. VoteVets and BraveNewFilms has released a video on the new GI Bill and McCain. Watch it:

On the View, McCain said, “that’s what I believe I can do as President,” referring to implementing the benefits for troops. Curiously, he won’t do it now.

Update

The Washington Independent notes that a McCain spokeswoman said Wednesday he has “not yet made a determination.” The bill, however, is a year old.

Yglesias

McCain for Boycott

John McCain calls (conditionally) for a boycott of the opening ceremonies. Key line: ” I believe President Bush should evaluate his participation in the ceremonies surrounding the Olympics and, based on Chinese actions, decide whether it is appropriate to attend. If Chinese policies and practices do not change, I would not attend the opening ceremonies.”

It’s interesting that all the presidential candidates seem to believe this is good politics. Threatening to boycott the ceremonies per se seems unlikely to accomplish anything, but if the Chinese leadership sees that Western politicians come under intense pressure to have nothing to do with the PRC when the PRC cracks down, that should be food for thought in Beijing.

Yglesias

The Trouble With Proxies

sheep%201.jpg

Joe Klein wonders why American blood and treasure is being expended over which Shiite group controls which town in Iraq: “Perhaps it is that Sadr’s Mahdi Army is the most potent force opposed to long-term U.S. bases in Iraq—and that a permanent presence has been the Bush Administration’s true goal in this war. I suspect the central question in Iraq now is not whether things will get better but whether the drive for a long-term, neocolonialist presence will make the situation irretrievably worse.”

One shouldn’t, however, underplay the extent to which the Bush administration may have no real motive at all. When you’re establishing an indirect rule relationship with a local proxy like Maliki and his regime, you risk circumstances in which the tail wags the dog. We like Maliki because we have “influence” over him. To retain that influence, we need to be useful to him. He wanted to fight Sadr, but couldn’t take him down alone, so our troops had to fight, too. His fights are now our fights, even if his fights don’t really have anything to do with our interests.

DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Samuel Bendet, U.S. Air Force

McCain: Afghanistan’s Troubles Are Unrelated To ‘Our Diversion To Iraq’

Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) appeared on ABC’s The View this morning. He discussed his “mistake” of opposing a national holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr., and said, “If we are wrong on a position, we then should admit it.” But when Joy Behar asked whether he would admit that the Iraq invasion was a mistake, McCain answered flatly, “No”:

BEHAR: Do you admit now that it was a mistake to go into Iraq?

MCCAIN: No. … The problem was not the fact that we went in, to be honest with you. The problem was the mishandling of it for nearly four years. If we had done the right thing from the beginning –

WHOOPI GOLDBERG: We would have been in Afghanistan.

MCCAIN: But Afghanistan is not in trouble because of our diversion to Iraq.

BARBARA WALERS: Why do people think it is, that we don’t have the troops there that we need?

MCCAIN: I know a lot of people think that and we do need more troops there.

Watch it:

[flv http://video.thinkprogress.org/2008/04/McC-View-Afgh.320.240.flv]

In fact, the U.S. commitment to Iraq has continually drained resources from the fight in Afghanistan. Appearing on PBS’ Newshour in January, former CentCom Commander William Fallon pointed to Iraq to explain the resurgence of the Taliban in 2007 — the deadliest year for U.S. soldiers there:

Well, back in 2001, early 2002, the Taliban were pretty much vanquished. And I wasn’t over there during the intervening years. But my sense of looking back is that we moved focus to Iraq, which was the priority from 2003 on, and the attention and the resources focused on a different place. There’s been some resurgence in the Taliban. This is a country — Afghanistan needs a lot of work in the business of rebuilding itself.

The strain on the troops created by the war in Iraq has clearly left fewer resources for the fight in Afghanistan. Last week, Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Richard Cody insisted that the “Army is out of balance” and that the “current demand for our forces… exceeds the sustainable supply.”

Before leaving, McCain assured the women of The View that, as president, he would “get” Osama bin Laden “and bring him to justice.” Apparently McCain is overlooking the fact that the reason bin Laden is still on the loose is because the fight in Iraq diverted attention from perusing the terrorist leader in Afghanistan.

Update

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services this afternoon, Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen said he was “deeply concerned” about Afghanistan:

With the bulk of our ground forces deployed to Iraq, we’ve been unable to prepare for or deploy for other contingencies in other places. We are not training to full spectrum capabilities. We are not engaging sufficiently with partner militaries. And we cannot now meet extra force requirements in places like Afghanistan.

Yglesias

Posts About the Book Will Continue Until Every American Owns a Copy

My initial plan had been to say no more about James Kirchick’s review of Heads in the Sand, thinking that it might be too petty. But it’s been suggested to me that a response would be a good way to explain a little bit more to you, the reader, what Heads in the Sand is all about, rather than merely hectoring you about your deep moral obligation to buy a copy so here goes.

Read more

McCain Refuses To Reject Bush Doctrine Of Preventive War: I Can’t Make A ‘Blanket Statement’

mccainhands.jpg Yesterday in a town-hall style meeting, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) left the door open to launching preventive wars against other countries, similar to the U.S. invasion of Iraq:

Q: My question is, if you are elected president, will you reject the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war?

McCAIN: I don’t think you could make a blanket statement about pre-emptive war, because obviously, it depends on the threat that the United States of America faces.

If someone is about to launch a weapon that would devastate America, or have the capability to do so, obviously, you would have to act immediately in defense of this nation’s national security interests.

Listen here:

[flv http://video.thinkprogress.org/2008/04/47fe68251c83.320.40.flv]

The Bush administration and its conservative allies have often used the terms “pre-emptive” and “preventive” war interchangeably, confusing the American public. But as Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA) noted on the Senate floor in 2002, the Bush doctrine of preventive war has dangerous consequences for U.S. security:

Traditionally, “pre-emptive” action refers to times when states react to an imminent threat of attack. For example, when Egyptian and Syrian forces mobilized on Israel’s borders in 1967, the threat was obvious and immediate, and Israel felt justified in pre-emptively attacking those forces. The global community is generally tolerant of such actions, since no nation should have to suffer a certain first strike before it has the legitimacy to respond.

By contrast, “preventive” military action refers to strikes that target a country before it has developed a capability that could someday become threatening. Preventive attacks have generally been condemned. For example, the 1941 sneak attack on Pearl Harbor was regarded as a preventive strike by Japan, because the Japanese were seeking to block a planned military buildup by the United States in the Pacific.

The war in Iraq was a preventive war. There was no imminent danger. In his response yesterday, McCain responds to a question about “pre-emptive” war, but clearly leaves the door open to the Bush doctrine of “preventive” war. He stated that he would consider attacking countries who even have the “capability” to launch a dangerous weapon — whether or not there is an imminent threat.

In January, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) said, “There’s going to be other wars.” After yesterday’s comments, it looks those wars may be preventive wars — like Iraq.

Digg It!

McCain — The Neocon Candidate (Part 1): Firmly In The Interventionist Camp

mccainhands.jpg An article in this morning’s New York Times examines the “competition” between realists and neoconservatives in John McCain’s foreign policy:

Senator John McCain has long made his decades of experience in foreign policy and national security the centerpiece of his political identity, and suggests he would bring to the White House a fully formed view of the world.

But now one component of the fractious Republican Party foreign policy establishment — the so-called pragmatists, some of whom have come to view the Iraq war or its execution as a mistake — is expressing concern that Mr. McCain might be coming under increased influence from a competing camp, the neoconservatives, whose thinking dominated President Bush’s first term and played a pivotal role in building the case for war.

This article is trying to set up tension where none really exists: The competition for McCain’s foreign policy soul is over. The neocons cleaned up, took the trophy, and went for beers (or maybe wine spritzers.) Of course McCain is still going to seek and take advice from a gallery of venerated foreign policy wise men, but the idea that there’s actually a conflict between the neocon and realist camps for John McCain’s attention is nonsense. Not only has John McCain long pitched his tent in the neoconservative camp, he advocates a view of American power diametrically opposed to the realism of people like Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, whose pragmatic approach the neocons have derided in the past as an ideology of “managed decline.”

In a 2006 article tracking McCain’s foreign policy views, John Judis wrote that, starting in 1998, McCain began to “place his new interventionist instincts within a larger ideological framework. That ideological framework was neoconservatism.”

McCain began reading the Weekly Standard and conferring with its editors, particularly Bill Kristol…When McCain wanted to hire a new legislative aide, his chief of staff, Mark Salter–himself a former aide to neoconservative Jeanne Kirkpatrick, consulted with Kristol, who recommended a young protege named Daniel McKivergan…Randy Scheunemann, who had drafted the Iraq Liberation Act and was on the board of Kristol’s Project for a New American Century, became McCain’s foreign policy adviser. One person who has worked closely with Kristol says of Kristol and McCain, “They are exceptionally, exceptionally close.

McCain espoused a realist point of view in the 1980s and early 90s, supporting the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon even before the Marine barracks bombing sparked Ronald Reagan’s quick retreat, and later opposing the U.S. mission in Somalia (even introducing an amendment to cut off funds for the troops there, a move he later said he regretted). After the quick U.S. victory of the first Gulf War, however, his views began to move in a more interventionist direction, and by the late 1990′s he was firmly in the interventionist camp.

Unlike Bush, who came into office without having really thought much about foreign policy (apart from having derided “nation-building” during the campaign) and then landed upon neoconservatism after casting about for a suitable ideological framework for his post-9/11 vengeance policy, McCain derives his strong views on the vigorous and unconstrained exercise of American power from a righteous belief in American “national greatness.”

The bottom line is that John McCain has been tied to the neocons, both personally and ideologically, for nearly a decade. Jacob Heilbrunn, author of They Knew They Were Right, a history of the noeconservatives (and a self-described former neocon himself) described the relationship this way: “McCain represents for the neocons the ultimate synthesis of war hero and politician.”

And McCain, in turn, has been increasingly drawn to the neocons’ militaristic vision of the U.S. as an empire that can set wrong aright around the globe.[...] If McCain becomes president, the neocons will be in charge.

Yglesias

The Paralysis Strategy

Fred Kaplan remarks on the paradoxical logic of Iraq: “Their unwavering stance amounted to this: Further pullouts might trigger defeat; the costs of defeat are too horrible to ponder; therefore, we shouldn’t ponder further pullouts.”

One way of looking at this is to say that it doesn’t make any sense. Another way of looking at it is to say that so many people hold to this view that it must make sense from some perspective. Taking that latter approach, I think you need to postulate a person who doesn’t care at all about the interests of Americans, Iraqis, or anyone else but does care a great deal about his reputation, a reputation that’s been tarnished by years-worth of advocacy for the war in Iraq. This person’s basic insight would be that it’s unlikely that Iraq will stay in a state of chaos forever. If we leave Iraq, then some stuff will happen in Iraq, then eventually Iraq will become stable and the reputation of the war supporters will be permanently stained.

By contrast, if we just commit to hanging around in Iraq indefinitely, then the odds are that sooner or later stability will emerge in Iraq. At this point, the war supporter can claim vindication of his views and begin a campaign to celebrate the heroic steadfastness of himself and his fellows in the face of the liars, smears, and cowardice of the anti-war faction. That’s not Petraeus or Crocker, who basically are just in a position right now where their job is to carry water and help Bush run out the clock, but I do think it’s a decent model of the incentives (I’m not a mind-reader, I don’t know what lurks in these people’s hearts) facing a John McCain or a Mike O’Hanlon or a Fred Hiatt at this point.

Yglesias

McCain’s Divided Loyalties?

The New York Times would like us to believe that though John McCain thought we should mount a land invasion of Serbia in 1999, argued for a policy of rogue-state rollback in 2000, chaperoned Ahmed Chalabi around town for years, began beating the drums for an invasion of Iraq in 2002, and has threatened war with North Korea and Iran that he’s really torn between two factions of advisorshawkish neocons and more sensible realists.

One problem with this theory is McCain’s record. As McCain likes to note, he has a lot of experience national security issues — he’s not some obscure governor being tutored by some eminences grises — and his record shows that sometime in the 1990s he swung to become the most consistently aggressive hawk in the U.S. Senate. Another problem is that, as Justin Logan points out, all the “realists” and “pragmatists” the Times can find are Iraq War supporters just like their neocon antagonists.

I would add that a further problem is that, again, when you’re talking about a guy like McCain who’s been engaged with these issues a while it’s worth looking beyond the circle of foreign policy dudes who’ve given McCain an official endorsement to seeing who he’s actually hired. If you’ll look, you’ll find that McCain Senate and campaign staffs both contain a ton of people whose resumes include stints at The Weekly Standard and/or the Project for a New American Century — that’s the network he’s tied into.

Maliki Disagrees With Petraeus’s ‘Pause,’ Says ‘U.S. Troops Should Be Pulled Out’

bush-malikiweb3.jpgGen. David Petraeus, top U.S. commander in Iraq, told Congress this week that he is recommending to President Bush that the United States “pause” the draw down of troops in Iraq this July for at least 45 days in order to assess the security situation there.

Bush has now accepted Petraeus’s recommendation, “leaving open the possibility that about 140,000 U.S. servicemen and women will still be in the war zone when the next president takes office.”

But there is one important decision-maker that Petraeus and Bush don’t seem to be listening to: Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The AP reports that Maliki told Bush yesterday that he “disagrees” with Petraeus’s recommendation “citing the growing capabilities of Iraq’s own security forces”:

The prime minister told Bush during a 20-minute telephone conversation on Wednesday that Iraqi security forces are capable of carrying out their duties and U.S. troops should be pulled out as the situation permits, according to a senior government adviser who sat in on the phone conversation. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to disclose the confidential details.

Bush actually agrees with Maliki. Last month, Bush said the Iraqi government’s offensive against Shi’ite militias in the southern city of Basra “shows the progress the Iraqi security forces have made during the surge.”

Moreover, Bush has also said that if Maliki wants U.S. troops to leave Iraq, then “we would leave“:

BUSH: We are there at the invitation of the Iraqi government. This is a sovereign nation. Twelve million people went to the polls to approve a constitution. It’s their government’s choice. If they were to say, leave, we would leave. [...] We are there at their request. […] but if they were to make the request, we wouldn’t be there.

Bush has consistently expressed confidence in Maliki’s leadership and judgement saying he had seen “the strength of his character,” that he is a “strong leader,” and a “good guy” with “deep determination.”

If Bush has so much confidence in Maliki’s character and leadership abilities, then perhaps he should take his advice.

  • Comment Icon

Yglesias

People Hate Iraq

countriesii_030308Graph1%201.png

According to Gallup, Americans don’t just dislike the Iraq War, they downright dislike Iraq. Not as much as they dislike Iran, but they’re pretty unenthusiastic about the place. What’s more, though Americans have distaste for the Palestinian Authority, they don’t fear it. But when asked to name America’s top enemy in the world Iraq took second place (have people not heard that Saddam’s been deposed) behind Iran but ahead of China and North Korea. No real point to make about this, just thought it was an interesting glimpse at the public mood.

  • Comment Icon

Yglesias

In Defense of Tancredo

Tom Tancredo’s a bit of a loon, so I sympathize with the desire to mock him over the fact that he wanted to ask General Petraeus about whether or not members of the Central American MS-13 gang were operating in the US military in Iraq. That said, by the time House Armed Services got to ask questions, all the main Iran topics had been discussed to death, and the problem of gangs (including MS-13) in the military is a real one.

  • Comment Icon

Yglesias

War Crimes

I’m pretty sure you call the activities described in this ABC News blockbuster “war crimes” and the people who committed them — “the most senior Bush administration officials . . . members of the National Security Council’s Principals Committee” — are war criminals.

I once upon a time thought that Bushite detestation of the International Criminal Court was some kind of principled defense of war crimes and war criminals. It’s become clear, however, that the concerns are all too practical and personal — it’s vital for the Bush administration that the guilty go free and the laws go unenforced, because otherwise they’d be looking at cells in the Hague. One doubts this crew ever will face legal sanction, but I can at least hope that the threat of prosecution crimps their travel plans in retirement.

  • Comment Icon

Yglesias

If At First You Don’t Succeed, Try Again With Bigger Countries

ships.jpg

Todd Gitlin alerts us to a new Robert Kagan book excerpt in The New Republic. Kagan’s idea, it seems, is that since neoconservatism has proven such a complete and utter failure as an approach to the challenge of transnational terrorism and WMD proliferation, we ought to use use it as a guide for dealing with Russia and China instead. If you’re a sociopath like Kagan, a renewal of Cold War-style conflict with other great powers is good news because, as Todd says, it serves the goal of “conjuring a proper target for unilateralist belligerence.”

A decent, humane person begins looking at this question by recognizing that a renewal of great power competition would be an enormous disaster. Arms races are a large waste of resources that could otherwise be invested productively. China’s integration into the global economy has brought some benefits to rich world consumers and enormous benefits to Chinese people. What’s more, though China has been in many ways a bad actor with regards to human rights issues in the developing world, it’s also true that the end of the Cold War has had enormous humanitarian benefits for the developing world in the form of a drastic reduction in the level of proxy conflicts.

To make a long story short, nobody can say for sure that a hostile US-China relationship can be avoided. But the costs of a cycle of hostility would be enormous. The sensible thing to do is not, in the first instance, to begin “preparing” for a cycle in ways that would likely make such a cycle inevitable. Rather, the sensible thing to do is to try to avoid entering the downward spiral through what, in Heads in the Sand, I call an effort to keep up the work of constructing a rule-governed world order oriented around cooperation.

At the end of the day, though the American and Chinese government are animated by different kinds of values, our interests are largely compatible. Both of us have a lot to gain through cooperation on security problems like climate change, transnational terrorism, and WMD proliferation as well as through continued trade and investment. What we need to work on, in the first instance, is devising rules of the road that secure our main interests but that are also compatible with a reasonable conception of Chinese interests. This doesn’t serve the neoconservative craving for the dubious glories of advocating that others engage in combat, but it will help us build a more prosperous, safer, and ultimately freer world.

U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Denver Applehans

  • Comment Icon

Switch to Mobile
ThinkProgress Signup Overlay Skip and Continue to ThinkProgress Skip and Continue to ThinkProgress

Sign Up