The AP reports that Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has been issuing religious edicts, known as fatwas, “declaring that armed resistance against U.S.-led foreign troops is permissible — a potentially significant shift by a key supporter of the Washington-backed government in Baghdad”:

A senior aide to the prime minister, al-Maliki, said he was not aware of the fatwas, but added that the “rejection of the occupation is a legal and religious principle” and that top Shiite clerics were free to make their own decisions. The aide also spoke on condition of anonymity.

It’s difficult to overstate how essential Sistani’s support has been for the task of rebuilding Iraq, or how quickly the U.S. would lose what little legitimacy it still has there if Sistani were to indicate that U.S. forces were no longer welcome. If this report is accurate, it would indicate that he is leaning in that direction.

This could also represent the final nail in the coffin of the neoconservative fantasy of establishing an enduring military presence in Iraq, from which to project U.S. power throughout the region. The article notes that the shift in Sistani’s position “underlines possible opposition to any agreement by Baghdad to allow a long-term U.S. military foothold in Iraq — part of a deal that is currently under negotiation and could be signed as early as July”:

Al-Sistani’s distaste for the U.S. presence is no secret. In his public fatwas on his Web site, he blames Washington for many of Iraq’s woes.[...]

“(Al-Sistani) rejects the American presence,” [a Sistani representative] told the AP, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment to media. “He believes they (the Americans) will at the end pay a heavy price for the damage they inflicted on Iraq.”

I think it’s possible that Sistani is responding to pressure from Sadrists who condemned him for his silence during the U.S. and Iraqi army siege of Sadr City. It’s also striking (and perhaps suspicious) how closely the language of these edicts appears to accord with what Muqtada al-Sadr himself has advocated and prohibited in terms of resistance to foreign occupiers. Contrary to some reports, Sistani did not advocate the disbanding of the Mahdi Army, but rather simply did not rule on the question, effectively leaving the Mahdi Army intact. While Sistani may regard Sadr as an unruly upstart, Sistani also recognizes that Sadr represents a massive constituency that cannot be ignored.

Cernig has more.

UPDATE: IraqSlogger reports that sources close to Sistani have strongly disputed the AP report.

In today’s confirmation hearing, Sen. Jim Webb (D-VA) asked Gen. Raymond Odierno what the “end point” of U.S. military involvement in Iraq would be. “In military terms, what do you see as the end point in our strategic direction here with respect to our involvement in Iraq?” Webb asked.

Odierno responded that the “end point” would be when Iraq has a “self-reliant government,” a “professionalized security” force, and major political reconciliation. Webb asked what the U.S. presence should be if those conditions are met:

WEBB: Well, what — what is the end point of the United States’ involvement in Iraq? Let’s say that Iraq meets the conditions you just talked about. Should there be a United States military presence in Iraq?

ODIERNO: I think that’s a discussion we would have along several levels. Not only from the MNF-I command or the Central Command level and obviously our civilian leadership to decide what their policy would be in the future toward Iraq.

WEBB: Do you believe that if those conditions are met, there would be a need for the United States military in Iraq?

ODIERNO: I do not. I believe what we would want, though, is to maintain obviously military contacts as we do with many countries over the world.

Watch it:

Odierno’s statement pours cold water on Sen. John McCain’s (R-AZ) infamous claim that the U.S. should “maintain a presence” in Iraq, for as much as 100 or 10,000 years. “Fine with me,” McCain says, “as long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed.”

But as Odierno said today, in the case that those conditions are met (a “big if,” as Max Bergmann notes), the U.S. military does not “need” to keep troops in the country. “That’s a very important clarification,” Webb concluded.

Email correspondence from the Pentagon document dump reveals Gen. David Petraeus was “happy to” participate in its “puppet” TV military analyst program in 2005. The “talented” military officer was promoted by President Bush to lieutenant general in 2004, with the public mission of training Iraqi military forces. At the behest of Larry Di Rita, Rumsfeld’s “right-hand man” in the Pentagon, Petraeus took on another, secret mission that year, shaping the public perception of the Iraq War and the key question of whether American troops would be able to come home.

PETRAEUS’S PUBLIC RELATIONS MISSION

Larry Di Rita

The August 28, 2005 episode of Meet the Press — as Cindy Sheehan was asking to meet with the President in Crawford, Texas — was focused on Iraq, with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad and a panel of retired generals. The generals were Wesley Clark, Wayne Downing, Barry McCaffrey, and Montgomery Meigs. As the New York Times revealed in its exposé, Downing, McCaffrey, and Meigs all participated in the secret briefing program managed by the Pentagon Public Affairs Office.

Documents released by the Pentagon (pp. 22-30) reveal that Pentagon spokesman Larry Di Rita wanted to make sure the Meet the Press appearance went as well as possible. Friday afternoon, Di Rita thought of using Petraeus. Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, agreed — “Not a bad idea. That is a tough group and as you know have not been very supportive before.” Whitman sent the “thought downrange” in a message to “Dave,” who immediately went into action, calling and emailing the retired generals from Iraq.

Di Rita complained to Petraeus that “some of these retired military analysts are trying to have it both ways” — supporting generals like Petraeus but criticizing the “secdef,” Donald Rumsfeld, and “his supposed bad plans”:

Petraeus told Di Rita that he was concerned his conversation with McCaffrey didn’t go terribly well:

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

Petraeus’s calls on behalf of the Pentagon convinced the analysts on Meet the Press to paint a rosy picture of the training of Iraqi forces — which they believed meant American troops would soon start coming home. McCaffrey said:

Well, Tim, to be honest, I’m reasonably optimistic about this. I talked to General George Casey in country and Dave Petraeus, the guy who’s actually in charge of trying to build the Iraqi security forces.

Meigs told Russert:

And when I ask senior Army officials who are longtime friends who aren’t going to give me a BS answer how we’re doing, “Are we winning or losing?” they’re saying, “We’re winning.”

McCaffrey believed that by August 2006:

You’ll have a huge Iraqi security force out in the field. And you’ll see a drawdown of a third or so of U.S. military forces starting in about another year.

Gen. Downing was even more enthusiastic:

I do think that in another year or 15 months, we’re going to be able to start taking the U.S. forces down somewhat, because I think the Iraqi forces are going to be in strength of about 150,000 of both police and army. So I’m very, very positive. And I’m giving you this without any political motive.

Petraeus failed to train a “huge Iraqi security force” independent of US support, and American forces were not drawn down. Rather, in 2007, President Bush promoted Petraeus to a four-star general in command of the Iraq occupation, directing him to oversee the “surge” — raising troop numbers by more than 20,000. One of Petraeus’s first acts as commander was to meet with the Pentagon’s cadre of military analysts.