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A ‘Thaw In Arab Diplomatic Recognition Of Iraq’

Our guest blogger is Peter Juul, a national security consultant at the Center for American Progress Action Fund.

Yesterday, Kuwait named Ali Momen its first ambassador to Iraq since Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion. In doing so, Kuwait becomes the third Arab state (after the United Arab Emirates and Jordan) to name an ambassador to Baghdad in the last month. The small island kingdom of Bahrain, which headquarters the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, is also set to name an ambassador to Iraq. These appointments represent an important if small step toward cementing the regional legitimacy of Iraq’s post-Saddam political system.

While welcome, this thaw in Arab diplomatic recognition of Iraq can only go so far in re-integrating Iraq into the region. For one, the truly big fish of the Arab diplomatic scene remain on the sidelines. Egypt, traditionally a diplomatic heavy-hitter, is preoccupied with matters close to home – namely the Hamas-Israel cease-fire in the Gaza Strip – and no doubt remembers the kidnapping and killing of its first ambassador to Baghdad in 2005. Saudi Arabia continues to view the Maliki government as an Iranian pawn bent on oppressing Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, and treats it accordingly.

What’s more, diplomatic recognition in and of itself doesn’t solve Iraq’s outstanding problems with its neighbors. While the UAE agreed to cancel $7 billion in Saddam-era debt when it appointed its ambassador, Kuwait has put off the question Iraq’s billions of debt and war reparations. Nor are improved relations with Jordan likely to improve the status of Iraqi refugees residing there. In short, while better bilateral relations with Iraq’s neighbors are important, they alone will not provide panaceas to Iraq’s pressing international problems.

What’s needed diplomatically is an effort to coordinate Iraq’s reintegration into the region. As a recent Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report on regional diplomacy noted, “every country bordering Iraq has its own policies… on how to deal with the problem on its doorstep.” Meanwhile, American diplomacy has either been adrift or lacked follow through – even though the United States is the only country with the ability to overcome the regional collective action problem when it comes to Iraq.

But the United States won’t be able to spur its allies neighboring Iraq into action as long as it keeps 150,000 troops in Iraq indefinitely or according to some vague time horizon. This sort of policy fosters moral hazard among the neighbors, in which they pursue their own policies without regard to the consequences, knowing that if things go awry the United States will be there to bail them out.

Serious regional diplomacy can only begin with a credible American threat to withdraw from Iraq in an orderly fashion.

White House Announces ‘General Time Horizon’ For Iraq Withdrawal; Is It ‘Conceding Too Much To The Enemy?’

aleqm5is6a6t3hbukvubwttysuzuvhdava.jpgWhen Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki first requested a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, the Bush administration swiftly shot down his proposal. “Timelines tend to be artificial in nature,” a Pentagon spokesperson remarked. “[W]e’re looking at conditions, not calendars here,” the State Department remarked.

But today, the White House has seemingly embraced a “general time horizon” for the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Iraq. The AP reports:

Iraqi officials, in a sign of growing confidence as violence decreases, have been pressuring the United States to agree to a specific timeline to withdraw U.S. forces. President Bush has adamantly opposed a timeline, and the White House said Friday that the timeframe being discussed would not be ”an arbitrary date for withdrawal.” […]

The White House says the two leaders, in a conversation on Thursday, agreed that the accord should include ”a general time horizon for meeting aspirational goals, such as the resumption of Iraqi security control in their cities and provinces and the further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq.”

The White House’s concession today comes after years of resistance to even considering the prospect of a timetable for withdrawing troops, particularly when it came from Congress. Some lowlights of the administration’s stubborn rhetoric:

“Why would you say to the enemy, you know, here’s a timetable, just go ahead and wait us out? It doesn’t make any sense to have a timetable. You know, if you give a timetable, you’re — you’re conceding too much to the enemy.” [Bush, 6/24/05]

“Premature and public discussion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq reinforces enemy propaganda that the United States will abandon its allies in Iraq.” [Undersecretary of Defense Eric Edelman, 7/16/07]

“I believe artificial timetables of withdrawal would be a mistake. … I will strongly reject an artificial timetable withdrawal and/or Washington politicians trying to tell those who wear the uniform how to do their job.” [Bush, 4/23/07]

“The…attempt to micromanage our commanders is an unwise and perilous endeavor. It is impossible to argue that an unconditional timetable for retreat could serve the security interests of the United States or our friends in the region.” [Vice President Cheney, 4/13/07]

The White House maintains that agreement “doesn’t reflect a shift in the U.S. position.” An Iraqi government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, reiterated that an agreement should have the goal of “decreas[ing] the number of American forces in Iraq and later withdraw them.”

Yglesias

The Rise (and perhaps fall) of Pragmatism

Michael Slackman notes that across the Middle East, European countries, Israel, and even the Bush administration are looking to engagement and diplomacy to try to resolve outstanding issues, rather than counting on futile policies of “isolation” and coercion.

Which is, in my view, all to the good. But it’s also a reminder of an important extent in which John McCain would not be merely an extension of the Bush administration. Bush, never one to admit an error, hasn’t made a big deal about it but since at least Israel’s failed invasion of Lebanon in 2006 the administration has substantially crawled back from its previous lunatic policies in favor of something more resembling a pragmatic approach to the Middle East (and of course North Korea). McCain, however, gives every indications of wanting to go back to an earlier, purer phase of Bushism when neocons were riding high and Robert Gates was nowhere to be seen in the halls of power.

Plausibly, the weird combination of McCain’s traditional dislike of and contempt for Bush, combined with their objectively similar opinions on policy matters, is making things worse here. On some level, the Bush administration has gotten less crazy because they’ve seen the results of their earlier blunders. But McCain seems to think poorly enough of Bush as a man and as a leader to believe that Bush rather than Bush’s ideas are to blame for these problems. Thus, in his view, if only we’d had John “I know how to win wars” McCain in the White House earlier, everything might have been fine. So if he’s president, we might go and try the whole thing over again, reliving the policies of 2002-2005 until McCain can prove to himself that, no, even the legendary Awesomeness of John McCain can’t make unworkable policies work.

Meanwhile, I’d say Sean-Paul Kelly is probably too optimistic that recent Iran-related developments mean there’s really going to be a Bush-era breakthough, but I hope he’s right.

Yglesias

Iran in Iraq

I’m glad that armor piercing attacks against US forces in Iraq have declined but attributing this to the success of the Basra offensive which was supposed to have somehow — and nobody in the article explains any causal mechanism — to have crippled Iranian capabilities is a bit bizarre. It’s not clear how much of these attacks ever had anything to do with Iran, but insofar as Iran is playing a role the obvious cause of a decline in the tempo of attacks is efforts at “appeasement” like the Bush administration’s somewhat renewed interest in diplomacy with Teheran and so forth.

Yglesias

The 300

Interesting Elisabeth Bumiller look at the sprawling group of 300 people who are in some sense “foreign policy advisers” to the Obama campaign. Marc Ambinder remarks:

The McCain response to all this — John doesn’t need daily talking points — is a reflection on Obama’s learning curve, although McCain is also very clearly learning as he is going, too.

I think that’s a pretty revelatory passage. It’s true that, in some sense, McCain doesn’t need daily talking points. But the reason he doesn’t need daily talking points isn’t that he can talk about national security issues with fluency and skill without them. Lacking daily talking points, he’s repeatedly confused Sunni and Shiite, repeatedly forgotten that Czechoslovakia doesn’t exist, changed his position on Afghanistan twice in 24 hours, etc. In short, he’s made a ton of gaffes just as you would expect from an underprepared candidate. But he’s allowed to get away with a lack of adequate preparation because, in the mind of the press, his years in captivity decades ago are adequate demonstration that he understands national security issues even though there’s no real basis for that view.

So far so bad, but what’s doubly frustrating about this is that not only does McCain get kid gloves treatment about his national security gaffes, but his campaign then gets away with bragging about it as if it’s proof that he’s some kind of tough guy. “John doesn’t need daily talking points,” they say. And he doesn’t — because the press lets him get away with egregious errors.

Yglesias

Comfort Capsules

The Air Force has really been a service adrift in the “war on terror” era, getting into all kinds of fights with other players and generally having difficulty endearing itself to the rest of the security establishment as a useful tool. I suspect the news that top Air Force generals have been wasting not only money but an absurd amount of time on installing “comfort capsules” on “military planes that ferry senior officers and civilian leaders around the world” with an eye to making sure “that leaders can talk, work and rest comfortably in the air.”

In partial defense of the Air Force, I suppose, I would say that semi-abusive use of military planes as private jets in circumstances when commercial vehicles would work fine seems to have become one of the most cherished perks of civilian officials in both the executive branch and the congress. Under the circumstances, one can sort of understand how the Air Force came to feel that it’s air taxi mission required this kind of high-level attention. Long story short, in addition to cutting this specific BS out, we really ought to reform the whole way the use of military transportation works. See here for some examples of dubious practices that cost taxpayers a remarkable amount of dough.

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