On Sept, 24, 2002, then-British Prime Minster Tony Blair presented MPs with a government dossier claiming that Saddam Hussein was capable of launching an attack using biological or chemical weapons within 45 minutes — a claim that became one of Britain’s main justifications for joining the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The BBC reported shortly after the invasion that a source, now known to be Dr. David Kelly (who also subsequently committed suicide), had said the 45-minute claim was the “classic example” of how the dossier was “sexed up” to make the case to the British public.

While the British government officially withdrew the 45-minute claim in October 2004, new e-mails and memos just released by the British government provide further evidence that the September dossier Blair used to make the case for war was indeed “sexed up.”

Desmond Bowen, head of the Cabinet Office defense secretariat — in a memo sent and copied to 10 Downing Street 13 days before Blair’s presentation to parliament — expressed “grave reservations over the threat”:

“The question we have to have in the back of our mind is: ‘Why now?’ I think we have moved away from promoting the ideas that we are in imminent danger of attack and…intend to act in pre-emptive self-defence.”

Another memo dated a few days later, Sept. 16, showed an unnamed official mocking claims that Saddam was developing nuclear weapons, calling them “iffy drafting”:

“[Iraq] has assembled specialists to work on its nuclear programme’ – Dr Frankenstein I presume? Sorry. It’s getting late… We have suggested moderating the same language in much the same way on drafts from the dim and distant past without success. Feel free to try again!… Lots of ‘ranges’ close together – iffy drafting.”

An e-mail sent by then-Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s private assistant argued that the report should be made simple enough for the media to digest. “We need a very simple table somewhere… This should be brief enough to get on to the Sky wall – ie no more than five bullets,” it read.

Ed Davey, the Liberal Democrat’s spokesman on foreign affairs, said the new memos “confirm” suspicions that the Blair government “deliberately tweak[ed]…the intelligence to bolster the case for war on Iraq. “The jigsaw of how the public and some MPs were duped nears completion with this crucial revelation,” he said, adding that it “further strengthens the case for a full public inquiry.”

In what I’m going to interpret as clear evidence that President Obama reads this blog, the Wall Street Journal reports that the administration is “looking at ways to develop a direct line of communication to [Iranian] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.”

American and European officials say Mr. Khamenei is the only Iranian leader who can make the ultimate decision to suspend or freeze Iran’s nuclear program.

“The key issue is now to find a channel to Khamenei,” said a senior Western diplomat briefed on the Obama administration’s policy review in recent days. “If the supreme leader moves, he’s going to do it in a very prudent and incremental way.”

The discussions are part of a larger Iran-policy review that the Obama administration is aiming to complete this month, according to U.S. officials. [...]

The Obama administration’s first direct contact with Iranian officials is expected to come later this month at a U.N.-sanctioned conference on Afghanistan in the Netherlands. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other U.S. officials say Washington and Tehran could collaborate in countering the Afghan narcotics trade and weakening the Taliban.

Interestingly, the story notes a “growing consensus is that the U.S. should seek to begin a dialogue with Iran before June elections there, despite concerns that such recognition could strengthen the position of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.” Back in November, the Carnegie Endowment’s Karim Sadjadpour advised U.S. policymakers to “refrain from making any grand overtures to Tehran that could redeem Ahmadinejad’s leadership and increase his popularity ahead of the country’s June 2009 presidential elections.” I’m not sure that seeking a channel to the supreme leader necessarily qualifies as a “grand overture,” though, as much as a simple acknowledgment of who the decider is.

In any case, now would be a great time for everyone to go and read Sadjadpour’s excellent review of Khamenei’s writings and speeches, which Sadjadpour suggests “present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions over the last two decades.”