As has probably been the case since the beginning of human existence, groups under threat tend to impute all manner of strange and frightening characteristics to their enemies. The Greeks told scary, fantastic stories about the vile Persians, as did the Ottomans about the hated, unwashed European barbarians. Allied soldiers and citizens during the First World War were taught to fear the uniquely barbarous German Hun. During the Cold War, Americans were raised to believe that, in the immortal words of Gen. Jack D. Ripper, “your Commie has no regard for human life, not even his own.”

Similar sorts of exceptionalist arguments have been a standard part of America’s post-9/11 political discourse, running the gamut from Michael Rubin’s theologically questionable presentation of the Iranian regime as “religiously sanctioned” liars to Marty Peretz’s outright racist assertion that the mass atrocities taking place in Iraq are “routine in their [Arab] cultures.”

One such example that has cropped up recently in relation to the torture debate is the idea that, in addition to being especially resistant to torture because of their religious commitment, Al Qaeda detainees actually require the application of torture in order to the help them fulfill their religious obligation to resist.

Pivoting off of a statement from Abu Zubaydah in the released CIA memos (“Brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they believe they have reached the limit of their ability to withhold it in the face of psychological and physical hardships”), former Bush administration speechwriter Marc Thiessen rationalized in the Washington Post that “the job of the interrogator is to safely help the terrorist do his duty to Allah, so he then feels liberated to speak freely.”

In Thiessen’s world, not only does torture help protect America, it helps our enemies to be better Muslims.

Cliff May picked up this argument today in NRO’s The Corner, writing that “Islamists [sic] believe their religion forbids them to cooperate with infidels — until they have reached the limit of their ability to endure the hardships the infidel is inflicting on them.”

In other words: Imagine an al-Qaeda member who would like to give his interrogators information, who does not want continue fighting, who would prefer not to see more innocent people slaughtered. He would need his interrogators to press him hard so he can feel that he has met his religious obligations — only then could he cooperate.

But just try to get anyone in the “anti-torture” camp to seriously debate any of this.

I think the reason why May is having trouble getting anyone in the anti-torture camp to seriously debate this is because it’s not a very serious argument. It’s pretty safe to say that a member of Al Qaeda “who does not want continue fighting and who would prefer not to see more innocent people slaughtered” has effectively given up his membership in Al Qaeda. The idea that such a person — having already abandoned the key tenets of Al Qaeda’s jihad — would then continue to hold out simply in order to be able to check the “resist torture” box is extraordinarily weak stuff. But then, so is the argument for torture.

The idea that Al Qaeda detainees pose some special interrogation challenge by virtue of their religious belief is likewise pretty weak. All detainees operate under a certain code governing what information they may and may not reveal (American servicemen are famously only allowed to reveal their name, rank, and serial number when captured) and I haven’t seen any evidence that Al Qaeda members are any more or less resistant to interrogation simply on the basis of their faith. And certainly not to the extent that would justify the United States’ violating its prohibition on torture.

Our guest blogger is David Sullivan, Research Associate with Enough, The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.

Enough’s latest strategy paper, “A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals,” proposes a new strategy to sever the links between the trade in valuable minerals essential to everyday electronics products such as cell phones and the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, home to the worst sexual violence in the world.

In eastern Congo, the same armed groups that reap enormous profits from the mineral trade regularly commit conscience-shocking atrocities as they jockey to control the region’s most valuable mines. The four most profitable ones produce the metals tin, tantalum and tungsten — the 3T’s — and gold, which together generate as much as $183 million annually for armed groups. Without alternative sources of income, these miners and their families remain virtually enslaved to these groups and the conflict minerals trade.

The international community has spent billions of dollars on elections and peacekeeping in Congo but has largely ignored the primary economic driver of the conflict. The Congolese government lacks the capacity and political will to combat corruption and legitimize their mineral wealth. Congo’s neighbors — including Rwanda and Uganda — have often encouraged continued instability in Congo because they also profit from the illicit trade. A renewed cooperative approach between Congo and its neighbors to establish legitimate trading mechanisms could offer the best prospects of a long-term solution.

The complexities surrounding this conflict prove that there is no silver bullet solution. However, if the international community and regional actors work in conjunction with the private sector to align their efforts around the common goal of a revitalized legitimate mineral trade in eastern Congo, long-term efforts could have a major impact in resolving the conflict. There are four main components to a new strategy for such efforts:

1. Shining a light on the supply chain. Push electronics companies— the principal end-users of the 3T’s and gold—to change the way they practice business by working together with their suppliers to create a tracing system paired with credible monitoring of the system by independent third parties. This would provide a critical step towards demanding greater accountability for corporate behavior and transparency. With 80 percent of consumer electronics companies trading on U.S. stock markets, U.S.-based activists have some of the most powerful opportunities for leverage on this part of the supply chain.

2. Identifying and securing strategic mines. The United Nations should collaborate with the Congolese government identify key mining sites under the control of armed groups. Properly integrated Congolese security forces, supported by U.N. peacekeepers, should secure these sites and transit routes. This approach must be grounded in a more comprehensive and coherent effort to advance broad security sector reform in Congo.

3. Reforming governance. The international community should work hand in hand with the Congolese government to exercise control over mining and commerce in eastern Congo. With Congo sorely in need of international funds, there is an opportunity to press for not just commitments but demonstrable reforms to the regulation of mining, commerce, and taxation.

4. Supporting livelihoods and economic opportunities for miners. Impoverished Congolese miners and their families are dependent upon their meager incomes and have few viable economic alternatives. Efforts to end the trade in conflict minerals absolutely must be accompanied by international support for livelihoods and economic opportunities in eastern Congo.

Congo’s conflict minerals problem is complex, but the roadmap to a solution exists. Efforts will not succeed, however, unless individual consumers in the United States and around the world step up and demand a change. Calling or emailing top electronics manufacturers and telling them to ensure that their products are conflict-free will help to create the conditions necessary to end the war in Congo. You can also ensure that your voice is heard by endorsing our Conflict Minerals Pledge.