In their case for ever-more-severe measures against Iran, Washington hawks incessantly push the notion that sanctions aren’t “working,” with the obvious upshot being a need for more aggressive action against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. It’s something neoconservative pundits and other hawks hammer home on a nearly daily basis and a point that resonates with moderate analysts.

Constantly hitting on this theme, however, belies the complexity of various types of sanctions levied against Iran and their respective effectiveness. A new report from a UN experts panel appears to shed a little light on the misleading talking point.

According to the AP, which acquired a copy of the still-unreleased report, the eight-member expert panel convened to assess international sanctions concluded that:

sanctions have made it harder, costlier and riskier for Iran to acquire items needed for its banned nuclear and missile activities. [...]

“Overall, the panel has found that sanctions are constraining Iran’s procurement of items related to prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile activity and thus slowing development of these programs,” the panel said.

The panel did note several caveats. Despite increased difficulties that have slowed its progress, Iran continues to use fronts to attempt and sometimes to acquire materials and equipment for its nuclear program. Furthermore, the panel acknowledges that sanctions are “not yet having an impact on the decision calculus of its leadership with respect to halting uranium enrichment.”

Nonetheless, contrast the UN expert panel’s nuanced position with a late-March post titled “Are sanctions really ‘working’?” by the Washington Post’s neoconservative blogger Jennifer Rubin, who supports a military strike on Iran:

The administration consistently points to the international and unilateral Iran sanctions as proof of its effectiveness in thwarting the regime’s nuclear program. But the program hasn’t slowed and now we learn how ineffective, on its own terms, the sanctions legislation may be.

The UN panel casts doubts on Rubin’s unequivocal statement that “the program hasn’t slowed.” She conflates the international nuclear sanctions with the U.S.’s coordinated energy sanctions, extensively quoting the Foundation for Defense of Democracies‘ Mark Dubowitz, who focuses on broad-based energy sanctions designed to punish the Iranian economy and not the international sanctions specifically aimed at thwarting nuclear progress.

David Albright, a physicist and former nuclear inspector now with ISIS, told ThinkProgress that “sanctions have multiple purposes and one of them is making it harder for Iran to proceed on a technical level and industrial level, and that’s working better.” He added that the international sanctions buy time: “It’s going to be a lot longer before they can get to the point where they can decide to build a nuclear weapon.”

Reza Marashi, the research director of the National Iranian American Council and a former State Department official, also told ThinkProgress: “What the UN sanctions allow the U.S. to do is take our national security strategy and get international agreement around it. When Turkey says we will adhere to the UN sanctions to the letter of the law, that is working.” Read more

Top U.S. officials have made clear in recent months that if the Iraqis ask, American troops will remain in Iraq past the withdrawal deadline at the end of the year. While Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen said late last month that the Iraqis had to decide “within weeks” for logistical purposes, the Washington Post reported this weekend that Mullen’s demand “will not be met,” thus “complicating plans for the U.S. military withdrawal.”

U.S. and Iraqi officials and citizens alike have given a wide variety of reasons why American troops should or should not leave Iraq on schedule. While those arguing for a continued U.S. presence usually cite some security fear that is either baseless, unverifiable or impossible to quantify, one complication is this whole debate is very real: Moktada al-Sadr. Sadr, whose base of support is wide both in Parliament and among ordinary Iraqis, has made it very clear that he wants the U.S. military to leave Iraq on time. “If the Americans don’t leave Iraq on time, we will increase the resistance and restart the activities of the Mahdi Army,” Sadr said in a statement last month. And it doesn’t seem like he’ll have any trouble mobilizing his supporters:

The most fervent opposition can be found in Sadr City, the Shiite slum in Baghdad that represents the heart of Mr. Sadr’s constituency. On a recent Friday before prayers began, Najim Abbas, a young house painter, echoed what many there say when asked about Mr. Sadr’s threat to reconstitute his militia.

“Whatever he says, we will do,” Mr. Abbas said. “We will keep on resisting until the last days of our lives.”

But the certitude of the Sadr-effect should the U.S. military stay in Iraq past 2011 is not measured in simply security terms. As CAP’s Larry Korb noted recently in an op-ed arguing for the Obama administration to leave Iraq on time, Sadr’s political clout could have dire consequences for the entire government:

If US troops remain, violence against Americans may increase and Maliki’s government will likely collapse. Muqtada Al-Sadr, whose support was critical to Maliki’s success in forming a government even though he finished second in the elections, will likely withdraw his support from Maliki if he renegotiates the agreement, thus creating political chaos. In addition, he has promised to reconstitute his Mahdi Army militia, which could be joined by other Shi’ite extremist groups in attacking Americans.

Last week, Sadr announced plans for a peaceful rally to take place May 23 in Baghadad to show his movement’s strength in calling for a U.S. withdrawal.