Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) has long demanded a national conversation about President Obama’s claimed power to kill American citizens. On Wednesday, he took a big step towards starting one, using a rare “talking filibuster” to hold up the nomination of John Brennan to head the CIA and deliver an extended critique of the targeted killing of Americans on American soil.

Brennan played a critical role in the development and codification of the Obama Administration’s targeted killing program, so his nomination has become a flashpoint for Paul and others worried about the scope of the powers claimed in it. Publicly released documents, particularly the infamous CIA white paper outlining the legal thinking behind the strike on American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, have not provided specific guidance on the territorial limits of the Presidential power to kill citizens. A more recent document, submitted to Congress by Attorney General Eric Holder, suggested that under “extraordinary” circumstances, such as Pearl Harbor or 9/11, the president could kill an American citizen on American soil. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Wednesday, Holder specifically admitted that killing an American in the United States would be inappropriate and unconstitutional if the individual did not pose an imminent threat.

Throughout his filibuster, Paul repeatedly said that he would be willing to move to a vote on Brennan’s nomination if the Obama administration translated Holder’s reply into a written response and stated that it did not believe that the executive branch could target and kill Americans on American soil in most instances.

Paul acknowledged that it was unlikely that Obama would launch a drone strike against someone sleeping in their bed, but demanded clarification of what criteria the administration had for conducting targeted killing. While he initially questioned the principles behind so-called “signature strikes” against suspected terrorists not currently fighting,” Paul later shifted his focus to whether tactics used overseas could be transferred to American citizens within the U.S.
Read more

Though the official results have yet to be announced, provisional results of Kenya’s presidential election leave the United States in a difficult position, forced to decide how to plan for a possible Kenyan president who has been indicted for crimes against humanity.

Still at question is whether the elections will be decided in this first round or require a run-off vote, along with whether the calm currently seen will continue after the results are announced. So far, violence has been scattered and low-level, with most of it either unrelated to the elections or proving isolated incidents rather than trends. However, the fighting that killed 1,200 people only truly began after the 2007 election results were announced, suggesting that Kenya may not be out of the woods yet.

The atrocities of 2007 cast a shadow on the current vote not just because of the risk of their recurrence, but because of the candidates themselves. As of Wednesday, provisional results have Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta as the top vote-getter and possibly managing to avoid a runoff. Kenyatta, along with his running mate William Ruto, has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, stemming from their alleged role in the post-electoral killings five years ago.

The two have been cooperating with the ICC, but have been using the implication of Western meddling to stir up support for their campaign, with one voter calling the court a “tool of Western countries to manipulate undeveloped countries.” The beginning of Kenyatta and Ruto’s trial was originally scheduled to begin in April — right as a run-off vote would take place — but has been delayed until July in a victory for the two.

The United States has over the past year been unwavering in its backing of the democratic process in Kenya, offering both logistical assistance and moral support. But the chance of a Kenyatta presidency leaves the U.S. in a tough spot. Kenya is one of the U.S.’ strongest partners on counter-terrorism operations in East Africa, including in the fight against Islamist groups in Somalia such as al Shabaab. It also remains an economic hub in the region, making the choice between promoting international justice and national interests a challenge.

Aaron Hall, the Associate Director of Research at the Enough Project, believes that a Kenyatta victory could compromise U.S. ties with Kenya and complicate the credibility of the ICC. “While the U.S. should respect the democratic process and the will of the Kenyan people to elect their leaders, the election of Kenyatta and Ruto might cause the U.S. and many other western nations to diminish contact with the new Administration,” Hall said, calling it a possible critical blow to both countries.

That diminished contact may not last for very long, however, nor cut any lasting ties. Dr. Jennifer Brass, an assistant professor of African politics at Indiana University, says that the Obama administration would likely not vocally engage with Kenyatta and Ruto until the ICC trials are resolved, but would refrain from imposing sanctions on Kenya. “It’s not in the United States’ interest to sanction or ban people indicted [by the International Criminal Court] who are complying with the ICC,” Brass said in an interview with ThinkProgress.

Discussion of the election’s results is still sensitive for the U.S. government. A press official in the Department of Defense directed inquiries about any potential changes in the relationship with Kenya to the State Department, saying that any change in course would necessarily be a change in policy. State in turn denied a request for an interview on the subject. Deputy State Departmant Spokesperson Patrick Ventrell did, however, send out a statement on the elections, distinctly refusing to offer anything other than praise for the election process thus far. “We encourage all Kenyans to come together and move forward peacefully to realize the full promise and benefits of the new constitution,” Ventrell wrote.

The closest a U.S. official has come to tipping their hand on what a Kenyatta win would mean for U.S.-Kenya relations was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson on a press call in February, saying “it is also important to note that choices have consequences.” Exactly what those consequences may entail, however, is still being closely held.

As the 10th anniversary of President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq approaches, the body charged with overseeing Iraq’s reconstruction has issued its final report, capping a tale of spending far too much money for very little results.

Appointed in Oct. 2004, over a year into War in Iraq, the Special Inspector-General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) was charged with being a watchdog over the use of funds provided for rebuilding the Iraqi state after the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Those reconstruction and stabilization efforts wound up costing nearly $60 billion — or about $15 million per day — with up to $10 billion of that amount wasted, according to SIGIR Stuart Bowen.

The examples provided of fraud and abuse of the system are staggering both in number and nature. Among the most telling boondoggles is an $108 million waste-water treatment facility in Fallujah, Iraq that will be completed eight years over schedule. Once finished in 2014, it will only service 9,000 homes and require an additional $87 million from Iraq to provide service to the rest of the buildings in the city.

In terms of outright abuse, Iraqis and Americans alike were culprits, with one former Iraqi Defense Minister’s squandering $1.3 billion. Earmarked to provide for an Iraqi “quick reaction force,” the money was instead spent on various bribes, kickbacks, and purchasing useless equipment. Likewise, former U.S. Army Major John Cockerham was sentenced to 17.5 years in prison for siphoning off millions of dollars from reconstruction projects by accepting bribes from various contractors.

The majority of Bowen’s lessons learned provided to Congress deal extensively with the completely unprepared way in which the United States chose to rebuild Iraq. Bowen gives seven ways to better perform rebuilding operations in the future:

1. Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute, and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during stabilization and reconstruction operations.

2. Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and focus first on small programs and projects.

3. Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project selection, securing commitments to share costs (possibly through loans) and agreements to sustain completed projects after their transfer.

4. Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information management systems that all SRO participants use.

5. Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operation’s inception.

6. Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Team program, that produced successes when used judiciously.

7. Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, and have backup plans ready to go.

Many of those suggestions belie the cavalier attitude struck by Republicans at the beginning of the war in 2003, despite a near complete lack of planning by the Bush administration to provide for rebuilding Iraq. “Each day it gets better,” then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in May 2003 of the reconstruction efforts. Rumsfeld also insisted that “the bulk of the funds for Iraq’s reconstruction will come from Iraqis” in October of that year. $60 billion later, Iraq has proved to be nowhere near the “cakewalk” predicted by George W. Bush adviser Kenneth Adelman predicted in 2002.