(Credit: CNN)

The new Census voter turnout data were released on Wednesday and are full of interesting findings that underscore the extent of the demographic challenge for the GOP. They also show that the exit polls weren’t exaggerating the impact of ongoing demographic change on the electorate, despite the skepticism or perhaps hopes of some

To begin with, these new data confirm what years of exit polling has been telling us about the diversification of the US electorate. According to the Census data, the share of minority voters increased by 2.6 percentage points between 2008 and 2012, very similar to the exit polls, which showed a 2.3 point increase. The two surveys also told the same story between 2004 and 2008, when the Census showed a 2.9 point increase in the minority vote and the exits indicated a 2.8 point increase.

The Census data also confirm that black turnout was higher than white turnout in 2012 (66.2 percent for blacks vs. 64.1 percent for whites), the first time the Census data have shown this result. It is certainly an open question whether blacks will continue to turn out at a rate that matches or exceeds white turnout, but it is worth noting that there has been a steadily rising trend of higher black turnout since the 1996 election, which of course considerably precedes Obama’s arrival on the scene.

While blacks have closed the turnout gap with whites, the same was not true of Hispanics and Asians, who continued to lag about 16 points behind whites.  Even with these relatively low turnout rates, these two groups (especially Hispanics) have been steadily increasing their share of voters over time, and will continue to do so in the future, thanks to their increasing share of the eligible voter population.

The current turnout gap between these two groups and whites is a double-edged sword for the GOP. On the one hand, it helps blunt the already substantial ongoing impact of demographic change on Republican electoral fortunes. On the other, it constitutes a potential tranche of votes which, if tapped by successful mobilization efforts, could make their situation much worse than it already it. The fact that Asian and Hispanic turnout haven’t accelerated yet should be cold comfort for them. Not so long ago, many commentators doubted whether black turnout could ever match, much less exceed, white turnout. But now it has happened.

Finally, these data should put to bed the idea that “missing white voters,” and not rising diversity, fueled the Democrats’ 2012 victory. The Census data estimate that there were 2 million fewer white voters in 2012 than 2008. If these missing voters had all shown up, and assuming these missing whites would have voted as other whites did, who supported Romney by about 20 points, he would have netted around 400,000 votes. Not quite enough: he lost to Obama by 5 million votes!

Looked at another way, if white turnout had not declined at all in 2012 and had instead matched black turnout levels, there would have been an additional 3 million white voters, which would have netted Romney 600,000 votes. Still not enough!  In fact, Romney would have needed an additional 25 million white voters in the electorate to net the 5 million votes he needed just to tie Obama. To say this is implausible considerably understates the case.

Time for Republicans to wake up and smell the coffee. Diversity is here, it’s growing in every election and no amount of wishful thinking will make it go away.

What will America look like in 2050? As regular TP Ideas readers know, that America then will be even more diverse than America now is assured. But the pace at which the United States is hurtling toward this future, even in historically lily-white states, might surprise you.

Our best guess as to America’s demographic future comes from the Census Bureau’s population projections, which provide estimates of our race-ethnic distribution by five year intervals up to 2050.  According to these projections, around the year 2043 non-Hispanic whites will become a minority of our population and by 2050 they will be only 47 percent with minorities a solid 53 percent majority.  Hispanics will be 28 percent of the population, blacks will be 13 percent, Asians will be 7 percent, Native Americans and Pacific Islanders will be 1 percent and multiracial individuals will be another 4 percent.

Of course this change will not be equal across states. Different states will start and wind up in very different places in terms of their level of diversity. Unfortunately, while we have good information on where various states are right now, we lack good projections of where individual states are likely to be as the decades unfold to 2050. This is because the Census Bureau has not done state level projections for race and ethnicity since 1995 and those projections, besides being outdated, only went through 2025.

The best we can do therefore is to look at the state level data released from the 2010 Census, compare those data to data from the  2000 Census and extrapolate forward to future decades.  Such straight line estimates have to be treated very cautiously, especially the farther we get from the present day, but they can at least give us a rough feel way for the way diversity might evolve at the state level.

Right now, only four states (California, Hawaii, New Mexico and Texas) and the District of Columbia are majority-minority.  But that will change fairly rapidly if 2000-2010 rates of change persist this decade and beyond.  In this decade, we would expect Nevada (46 percent minority in 2010), Maryland (45 percent minority), Georgia (44 percent) and possibly Florida (42 percent) to pass that threshhold.  In the 2020’s, Arizona, New Jersey and possibly Delaware and New York should follow suit.  And by 2050, we may also see majority-minority populations in Connecticut, Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington state and possibly even Alaska.

That’s just the roster of possible majority-minority states. It’s important to emphasize how widespread the transformation of the country is likely to be, as diversity spreads deeply into seemingly unlikely states. We can see this by estimating the 2050 minority share in states by using two simple methods. The first applies the 2000-2010 growth rates of the white and minority populations (respectively) to the next four decades.  The second applies the 2000-2010 minority shift in population share to the same time period.  Both figures are likely on the high side and necessarily speculative, as emphasized above, but it’s worth noting that the overall US shift in minority share predicted by the second method is fairly close to the figure from the Census projections.

Kansas is predicted to have 50 percent minority in 2050 by the first method while the second method predicts a somewhat more modest, but still eye-catching 42 percent share. Utah is predicted to have 49 percent minorities by the first method and 39 percent by the second. Pennsylvania is projected to be 47 percent minority by the first method and 39 percent by the second. And states like Ohio and Michigan, as slow-changing as they are, could still be around a third minority by 2050.

These state level changes will be manifested most vividly in the large metropolitan areas where most Americans live. The largest 100 metro areas in the United States, with populations ranging from 514,000 (Modesto, CA) to almost 19 million (New York), include about two-thirds of the US population according to the 2010 Census. Between 1990 and 2010, the combined white share of these metros’ population declined from 71 to 57 percent while minorities rose from 29 to 43 percent. Of that 14 point increase in minority share, 9 points came from Hispanic growth.

These changes drove the number of majority minority large metros from 5 in 1990 to 22 in 2010, including such important areas as San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Houston, Miami, New York and Washington. If trends observed in the last couple of decades continue, most large metros should be majority minority by 2050.  The list of new majority minority metros is likely to include Atlanta, Baltimore, Charlotte, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Jacksonville, Milwaukee, Orlando, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Raleigh, Sacramento, Seattle, Tampa and Tuscon. Overall, the minority percentage across large metros should be pushing 70 percent.

As these data show, in the next 37 years, diversity is likely to spread far beyond the traditional “melting pot” states and metros to every corner of the country.  Diversity will increasingly be not just a catch phrase but a lived reality for the overwhelming majority of Americans. The sooner everyone, including conservatives, accepts this, the better off we’ll be.

Nothing is more important to the future of American politics than the minority vote.  Here’s a primer on what to expect from these voters for the rest of the decade.

One thing that’s certain about the future of the minority vote is its continued growth, which has averaged about half a percentage point a year or two points over a Presidential cycle.  Given the latest Census population projections, we would expect growth to continue at roughly that level in the future.  If it does, the share of minority voters in the 2016 election should be around 30 percent and, in the 2020 election, around 32 percent.  In the immediate future, maintaining these levels of voter growth will depend on preventing a minority turnout dropoff, particularly among blacks, and continued mobilization of new voters, particularly among Latinos and Asians.

But how certain is it that minority voters will continue to lean so heavily Democratic?  Change is always possible, but at this point those leanings look very solid. Consider black voters: besides their historic ties to the party, they are strong supporters of active government, both to combat discrimination and to provide services and opportunity.  In a mid-2012 Pew analysis, their party identification was overwhelmingly Democratic: 87 percent of black registered voters identified with or leaned toward the Democrats, compared to just 8 percent who identified with or leaned towards the Republicans, a yawning 79 point gap.

Hispanics also have historic ties to the Democrats, if not quite so strong as those among blacks.  But they are as strong or stronger in their support for active government, the safety net and generous provision of services.  And the issue of immigration looms large, with Democrats viewed overwhelmingly as the party most favorable to immigrants.  In the same Pew analysis, party identification among Hispanic registered voters was 61 percent Democratic to 29 percent Republican, a 32 point pro-Democratic gap.

Asians, perhaps surprisingly, are now almost as Democratic-oriented as Hispanics, showing strong support for Democratic stands on active government and immigration.  In a detailed 2012 Pew study of Asian-Americans, Asians’ party identification favored Democrats by 50-28, a 22 point margin.  In addition, self-identified liberals (31 percent) outnumber self-identified conservatives (24 percent) among this group, a gap that’s more significant that it seems given that conservatives typically outweigh liberals by a substantial margin in the general population.

Republicans have tried to argue that today’s GOP has considerable appeal to minorities and that, if they can just get their message out, Democratic support will be substantially eroded over time.  Of course, that’s also what they said after the 2004 election, when Bush received 40 percent of the Hispanic vote.  Bush’s dawn turned out to be false — Democratic dominance today is clear and overwhelming.

Consider the various approaches Republicans have taken to getting their message out, particularly to Hispanics whom they believe (correctly) are a much better target for conversion than blacks.  A longtime favorite has been the idea that Hispanics are socially conservative and can be induced to vote for the GOP by emphasizing “values” issues like abortion or gay marriage.  This has not been effective so far and there are no indications it will succeed in the future.  Hispanics, it turns out, are actually much less likely than whites to vote on the basis of cultural issues.  In addition, Hispanics overall are not nearly as socially conservative as many believe.  On the specific issue of gay marriage, for example, surveys have repeatedly shown that Hispanics are no more conservative on this issue than whites are.  And younger Hispanics are typically more progressive than their older counterparts on social issues, so generational replacement will make the tomorrow’s Hispanic population less socially conservative than today’s.

Another favored approach is to cast GOP economic policy in terms Republicans believe would resonate among minority constituencies. Republicans have argued for years that Latinos should be naturally attracted to their tax and regulatory policies because of the high number of small-business owners among them. They’ve also noted that, while there are differences among various groups, Asians on the whole have the highest average educational level and median household income of any racial or ethnic group in the United States, including whites.

Latino and Asian self-interest and material aspirations, on this approach, suggest that they should hate taxes and despise big government. But most Latinos and Asians do not despise government or desire more libertarian economic policies, as confirmed repeatedly by a wide variety of survey data.

These findings suggest that there is really only one way for the GOP to effectively compete for minority voters: the party must, quite simply, become less conservative.  They will have to jettison their bitter hostility to active government, spending on social services and immigration reform and develop their own approach in these areas that minorities might find appealing. It is a way that, so far, Republicans have rejected. But if they continue down this path, it seems likely that Democrats will continue to get 75-80 percent, leaning toward the high side of that range, of the minority vote.

There are two keys to achieving real political dominance for the Obama coalition.  First, the Obama coalition must be mobilized beyond Presidential elections.  That means between elections in the struggle to achieve legislative victories and in Congressional elections, where turnout patterns must align more closely with Presidential elections.  Second, the Obama coalition must be widened to take in a larger share of the white working class.  Otherwise, the hostility of these voters will undercut public support for the President’s agenda, as well as remaining a lurking threat in every election, particularly Congressional ones.

Both of these objectives will be seriously compromised if strong growth does not return to the American economy and soon.  Take white working class voters.  These voters are primarily looking for material improvements in their lives, improvements that are not possible without strong economic growth and the jobs, tight labor markets and rising incomes such growth would bring.  In a low growth environment, these voters will remain exceptionally pessimistic and inclined to blame Democrats and government for their lack of upward mobility.

Even more serious, core groups of the Obama coalition will be weakened by continued slow growth.  Obama was well-supported by these groups in 2012, but a sluggish economic environment, where unemployment continues pushing 8 percent will try these voters’ patience.  How much enthusiasm will Hispanics, blacks, youth, single women, etc., whose unemployment rates are considerably above the national average, continue to have for a party that cannot do more to improve economic conditions?  Attrition in support will be inevitable in such a scenario and the opportunity to consolidate a dominant coalition will be lost.

So the stakes in the battle for more and faster growth are high.  But you would not guess that from the issues preoccupying Washington.  Instead, in the very same week when we received a dreadful jobs report—just 88,000 jobs were added to the economy—President Obama has made yet another attempt to revive a Grand Bargain with Republicans by outlining a budget plan that replaces the automatic sequestered spending cuts with other spending cuts while also raising $580 billion in revenue and making cuts to Social Security and Medicare.

Whatever the other merits of this proposal may be, it will do nothing for economic growth and, in fact, will continue the ongoing pattern of spending cuts that are undermining our recovery and thereby the future prospects of the Obama coalition.  Grand Bargains are no substitute for growth and both consumers and voters know the difference.

It’s time for one of our annual political rituals — CPAC, the American Conservative Union’s conference, begins this Wednesday. A who’s who of conservative leaders go to recite movement-friendly shibboleths, while liberal journalists generally record the panoply of crazy that inevitably seeps into the proceedings.

But 2013 is looking to be something more than spectacle. As conservatives reckon with the party’s declining electoral clout, CPAC is shaping up to become the forum in which the under-the-radar intra-conservative sniping blows up. CPAC declined to invite popular governors Chris Christie and Bob McDonnell on grounds that they were insufficiently conservative, an absurd charge that infuriated less dogmatic Republicans. The exclusion of gay group GOProud kicked off a similar dustup. It’s no civil war yet, but there certainly have been some civil skirmishes.

There’s a temptation for progressives to bask in the heat generated by the GOP’s self-immolation. The reformist camps are still weak and divided, and so long as the party keeps people like Sarah Palin and Donald Trump as members in good standing, the hyper-radicalized, anti-intellectual Republican mainstream will cater to an increasingly small part of the American electorate. It’s a recipe for inevitable progressive triumph, right?

Wrong. Progressives should want the Republican reformers to succeed in creating a party that’s both more substantively tethered to reality and, as a consequence, more electorally viable. The current Republican party is a serious threat given the structure of American politics even if it’s in long-term decline, and the benefits of it collapsing down the line are uncertain at best.

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