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Stories tagged with “Great Depression

Economy

VIEWPOINT: The Radical Economic Experiment That’s Quietly Keeping The Economy Afloat

It hasn’t really made the front pages, but the United States recently began carrying out a massive and nearly unprecedented economic experiment, and 2013 looks to be the year when the results come in. The question is straightforward: When the economy is in a deep slump, and the government makes things worse by cutting spending, how much can monetary policy do to help? The answer could reshape the way we argue about economic policy, with profound implications for progressives’ economic priorities — and big opportunities, if they can seize them.

First, a quick refresher. Just like blood carries nutrients to the cells of the body, enabling them to function, the flow of money through an economy enables people to keep buying, selling, and earning incomes. Keeping the supply of money in line with the economy’s changing needs is the job of the Federal Reserve, and normally it does so by adjusting interest rates. Raising them sucks money out of the economy and reins in inflation. Cutting them pumps money into the economy, boosting wages and job growth. And most of the time, most economists agree this is the primary tool for guiding the economy out of its periodic slumps.

But with the 2008 crash the United States entered largely uncharted economic waters, and that agreement blew apart. That’s because the Great Recession was so deep that cutting interest rates all the way to zero still wasn’t enough to boost the economy into a recovery. Economists call it the “zero lower bound.” And while it’s a wall that modern western economies don’t hit often, 2013 will be the fifth year running the United States has been up against it.

So far, progressives have tended to side with economists like Paul Krugman and bloggers like Mike Konczal. They argue that monetary policy is severely weakened at the zero lower bound, when government must take over the job of pumping money into the economy by borrowing and spending. They point out that economic growth was a measly 2.5 percent for 2013’s first quarter, and market data suggests the Fed has failed to convince anyone it’s willing to let inflation get unusually high before it hits the brakes. This despite multiple rounds of “quantitative easing,” an attempt by the Fed to get around the zero lower bound by purchasing huge numbers of financial instruments, thus injecting money into the economy

But economists like David Beckworth and Scott Sumner countered that the economy’s 2.5 percent growth rate stuck around despite blows from multiple rounds of spending cuts, the European crisis, and worries about China. In fact, as Beckworth pointed out, government spending began shrinking by the start of 2010 — yet the economy just kept puttering along at 2.5 percent.

Other points in Beckworth and Sumner’s favor: Before sequestration, the latest round of across-the-board spending cuts, began, the group Macroeconomic Advisors projected growth for the first quarter below 2.5 percent if sequestration didn’t happen. Then the May 3 jobs report, which came out after Konczal’s piece, was so good it was almost shocking. Matt Yglesias and Ryan Avent, two other fans of monetary policy’s salutary effects, pointed to other data sources that suggest the Fed actually has been able to raise long-term inflation expectations.

So this looks like at least a preliminary win for team monetary policy. Granted, the evidence is also very preliminary. Getting economic data in real time is tough, and the full force of sequestration still hasn’t hit. So at a minimum, we won’t have a better idea until at least the second half of this year. But there’s a real possibility monetary policy has put a floor under economic growth — despite the government’s demented insistence on spending cuts and sequestration — and might even be able to do more if the Fed gets more ambitious.

So what if QE3 continues apace, sequestration remains in effect, and economic growth just keeps chugging along around 2.5 percent? What should our take-away be?

Well, Beckworth and Sumner tend to be fans of austerity and small government, for obvious reasons: if fiscal drag can always be offset by monetary policy, why not cut away? But this logic can be turned on its head, because recessions drive up spending and drive down revenues, even when policy itself remains unchanged. Far more than the real-but-modest imbalance between tax and spending left by the Bush presidency, the 2008 crash is what drove the federal government deep into the red. Employment and incomes dropped, so tax receipts dried up. But more people became impoverished and unemployed, thus qualifying for safety net programs, meaning spending automatically increased. Conversely, nothing balances a budget like economic growth. If monetary policy really has the power to guide us back out of even the steepest recession, then that is the way to reduce deficits, not austerity.

Progressives need to make monetary policy something politicians have to answer for. The Fed’s policy is set by the 12 voting members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), seven of whom are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. This process, and the views on monetary policy of the people who are appointed by it, deserves every bit as much scrutiny from activists, organizations, and politicians as Supreme Court nominations. Republicans and Tea Partiers have relentlessly warn of runaway inflation and denounced quantitative easing, even in the midst of the slump. But outside a rarified group of bloggers, there’s been no serious pushback from the left, or even any real sense that monetary policy is understood as a specific issue worth getting mad about.

Unfortunately, the other five voting members are not vetted by democratically elected officials, and are instead drawn from the Fed’s district banks. That means they come from a social and professional milieu likely to bias them in favor of the worldview of the financial industry, business owners, and the wealthy. Those groups all have vested interests in minimizing inflation while ignoring job growth.

Still, the Fed’s recent announcement — that quantitative easing will be open-ended, with an eye to getting unemployment below 6.5 percent, and allowing inflation to go as high as 2.5 percent — was step in the right direction. But the inflation threshold is too low. Arguably, 4 percent would better balance stable prices with the need for job growth. The Fed is also limiting its purchases to the same amount every month: $85 billion. It’s hinted it might start varying that based on how it reads the economy’s needs, and progressives should pressure it to do so. As Beckworth put it, buying the same amount every month is like putting the same amount of pressure on the gas pedal, no matter what sort of terrain you’re driving over.

Finally, we need a wholesale reform of the way the Fed does business, making the institution more accountable to the needs of everyday working Americans. The simplest way, as Matt Yglesias recommended, would be to cut the five un-appointed members out of the FOMC’s decision-making process. That, or find some other way to bring the entire board under direct accountability to elected officials.

The Fed’s mandate could use a touch up as well. Right now, it merely instructs that inflation be kept down, and employment be kept up. All the Fed’s actual targets are of its own devising, and it can change them as it sees fit. It’s not obvious when economic trends are above or below where the Fed wants them to be, or how it intends to move in response. So Fed watchers pour over its pronouncements in a recurring act of glorified tea leaf reading, parsing the statements for clues of intent or disagreement amongst the FOMC members.

The process is so absurdly vague that, as Konczal noted, the bursts of news from the FOMC’s internal divisions undermine the Fed’s ability to credibly promise sustained monetary stimulus. In the vacuum of certainty, economic players often assume the Fed will put the brakes on the economy as soon as inflation begins to tick up. (There’s that bias in favor of the wealthy again.) The Fed’s targets and its obligation to hit them should be explicitly given to it by law. That could be an explicit inflation target, or a nominal gross domestic product target — which combines the level of inflation and GDP growth — as Sumner and Beckworth have suggested.

Zooming back out to the big picture, the fact is that the political forces pushing for fiscal austerity are the same ones pushing for monetary austerity. Movement in progressives’ favor on one issue is likely to bleed into the other. So while Krugman was wrong to dismiss the case for monetary policy as quickly as he did, his final conclusion was right: we should be throwing every policy tool we’ve got at the economic slump.

It’s just that up until now, progressives haven’t been giving monetary policy the respect it deserves. 2013 is the year they should start.

Yglesias

Michelle Bachmann Embraces Ignorance, Reverse Causation

180px-smoot_and_hawley_standing_together_april_11_1929

Raising trade barriers as a response to an economic downturn isn’t a very smart idea. That said, I’ve rarely if ever seen a serious economic historian attribute the Great Depression primarily to the Smoot-Hawley tariff. The timing doesn’t add up right, and the United States just isn’t a particular trade-dependent country. Milton Friedman, for example, is a pretty hard-core right-winger but that’s not what he thinks. Naturally, since this explanation lacks intellectually respectability it’s commonly heard from conservative pundits and politicians. Michelle Bachman, however, gives it a special partisan twist arguing that “FDR applied just the opposite formula, the Hoot-Smalley Act which was a tremendous burden on tariff barriers” and that this is what caused the Great Depression.

TPM’s Eric Kleefeld has a feeble effort at a rebuttal:

Here’s what really happened: When Franklin Roosevelt took office, unemployment was already about 25%. And the tariff referred to here was actually the Smoot-Hawley bill, co-authored by Republicans Sen. Reed Smoot of Utah and Rep. Willis Hawley of Oregon, and signed into law by President Herbert Hoover.

Kleefeld needs to read Michael Dummett on reverse causation. It’s true that Bachmann is making an unfortunate error about the names of Messrs. Smoot and Hawley. But her contention is simply that Roosevelt, though he took office in March 1933, was actually able to cause events in the past precipitating the very years-long Depression that led to his election. It’s a bit confusing, yes. And somewhat metaphysically controversial. But not at all something she deserves to be mocked for.

[no, not really—she should be mocked]

Yglesias

New Deal Lessons for Today

If you have a real job, you probably don’t have time for this, but yesterday I watched the webcast of a subcommittee hearing on the lessons of the New Deal for today’s crisis featuring Christina Romer, Brad DeLong, Lee Ohanian, James Galbraith, and Allan Winkler and found it very interesting.

Yglesias

New Deal Lessons for AIG

Eric Rauchway offers some some slices of New Deal history that seem relevant to the current debate over AIG. First, Jesse Jones, head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, from his memoir Fifty Billion Dollars (which was a ton in the thirties!):

The RFC acquired voting control of Maryland Casualty in April, 1934, when we first bought preferred stock in the Company. At that time we sent Silliman Evans to Baltimore to take the presidency of the company and Edward G. Lowry, Jr., of our legal department, to be its vice president and special counsel, each being elected as director. Mr. Evans later became chairman of the board…. When we got into the company, the situation was so much worse than had been represented that we felt it necessary to replace the management.

And this from James Olson’s book Saving Capitalism:

For political reasons, Jesse Jones often toyed with the salaries of corporate management, especially if they were, in his mind, “over-paid” Wall Streeters. Jones and Roosevelt knew that RFC loans always had the potential of political trouble—stirring up liberal Democrats and progressive Republicans who were blaming businessmen for getting the country into such an economic mess. Salary reductions were one way of showing that RFC, even while it was pouring billions into private business, was not enriching corporate management. Amendments to the RFC Act in 1933 required Jones to certify the appropriateness of the salaries paid by every corporation accepting loans and investment money. Jones devised a declining scale of salary reductions. Corporate management receiving annual salaries of $150,000 or more would be cut to $60,000, $100,000 or more to $50,000, and other reductions accordingly.

The RFC doesn’t get a ton of discussion today, but I think there’s plenty of evidence that its activities were more important to the 1933-36 growth spurt than was that era’s rather modest fiscal expansion. Basically the idea was to set up a public agency that could make the loans that the banking system couldn’t or wouldn’t do. Today’s TALF, run as a Fed/Treasury partnership, is designed to serve a similar function but works quite differently and has mechanisms in place designed to make it less political—and, not coincidentally, more business-friendly.

Yglesias

What If We Hadn’t Done the Bailouts

Populists on the left and opportunists on the right have taken to condemning the series of “bailouts” the government has undertaken since the fall of Lehman Brothers. And certainly I think these situations have been mishandled in a number of respects. And beyond that, I think these situations are inherently problematic in a variety of ways. But there’s a strong case to be made that the policy response to the recession has made things better than they might otherwise have been. When I say something like that, people tend to pester me in response for specifics: What, exactly, would have happened if we’d just let AIG and Citi and Bank of America and others collapse? The problem is that it’s impossible to say, in detail, what would have happened.

Kevin Drum, however, makes the excellent point that we can illustrate this in part with reference to Justin Fox’s chart of today’s job losses versus the Great Depression:

recession_depression_1.gif

Consider, after all, that our response to the Depression appears to have been 180 degrees wrong. We literally did almost everything possible to make it worse: we tightened the money supply, balanced the budget, raised interest rates, passed protectionist legislation, and allowed banks to fail by the hundreds. It escalated a panic into a Depression. And this time around? Just the opposite: interest rates are close to zero, we’re running an enormous budget deficit, protectionism has largely been kept at bay, money is being pumped into the economy prodigiously, and with the notable exception of Lehman Brothers banks are being saved right and left. These actions have reduced a panic to a severe recession. If we had taken the same policy actions that Hoover and Mellon took in the 30s, does anyone doubt that the results would have been another Great Depression? I don’t. We may still be doing a lot of dumb things, but we’re an awful lot smarter than we were 80 years ago.

Kevin’s right. The right-wing advocates of no bailout and “spending freeze” are, in essence, calling for a return to the Hoover-Mellon policies that had disastrous results in the past. The nature of those results is spelled out in the chart. What people are living through today is no walk in the park, but it’s vastly better than the alternative. Meanwhile, the left-populist alternative of no bailouts and massive stimulus wouldn’t have been quite as bad because some proportion of the masses of the unemployed could have been employed in public sector jobs. To get stimulus on that scale, however, would have required an extremely high percentage of pure makework and essentially wasted funds.

What we’re seeing today is policy that’s basically on the right track, with errors on the margin. What we saw in the past was policy that was pointed in the complete wrong direction, married to good ideas like public relief on the margin. Unfortunately, as you can see on the chart there’s a ton of room between “not as bad as the Great Depression” and “worse than all the other post-war recessions.” And if we stay stuck in that territory for a long time, as I fear we might, there’s a real chance that voters will conclude in 2010 and 2012 that “bailouts and stimulus don’t work” and we’ll respond to continuing economic weakness with Hooverite policies that push us off the cliff.

Yglesias

Current Job Losses: Not as Bad as the Great Depression

The current recession is “the worst since the Great Depression” but it’s still a good deal better than the Great Depression. Justin Fox has a chart that makes the point:

recession_depression_1.gif

The data’s not directly comparable because farm employment was a bigger deal back then, but this is about as close to an apples-to-apples comparison as you can find and the apples of the 1930s were much, much, much worse than our apples.

Yglesias

Technological Progress in the 1930s

secondhand_japanese_isuzu_refrigerator_truck_1.jpg

Via Tyler Cowen, economic historian Alexander Field makes the case that the 1930s was the decade in which we saw the most technological progress:

Because of the Depression’s place in both the popular and academic imagination, and the repeated and justifiable emphasis on output that was not produced, income that was not earned, and expenditure that did not take place, it will seem startling to propose the following hypothesis: the years 1929–1941 were, in the aggregate, the most technologically progressive of any comparable period in U.S. economic history. The hypothesis entails two primary claims: that during this period businesses and government contractors implemented or adopted on a more widespread basis a wide range of new technologies and practices, resulting in the highest rate of measured peacetime peak-to-peak multifactor productivity growth in the century, and secondly, that the Depression years produced advances that replenished and expanded the larder of unexploited or only partially exploited techniques, thus providing the basis for much of the labor and multifactor productivity improvement of the 1950’s and 1960’s.

I think a phrase like “the most technologically progressive” period is hard to define properly. But there’s no disputing the fact that there was substantial technological innovation during the Depression (refrigerated trucking as we know it, to cite just one example, arose during this period) and a ton of productivity growth. You can tell about the productivity increased by the fact that GDP had fully recovered to its 1929 peak by 1936, was clearly higher in 1937, remained above ’29 levels throughout the 1938 trough, and then was higher still in 1939 and 1940 even though the unemployment situation remained bad for much of this period, and absolutely terrible during the ’37-’38 recession-within-a-depression:

depression_1.PNG

I assume that part of the story here is that the Roosevelt administration implemented labor market policies that had the effect of pushing real wages up in what they thought was an anti-deflation measure, rather than letting them fall in a way that would have encouraged more employment. This should have given employers and workers incentives to try very hard to make labor-hours as productive as possible.

Yglesias

McConnell: Spending Can’t Work Except When It Can

0_62_mcconnell_mitch_1.jpg

Mitch McConnell studies history and reaches the conclusion that we should hope for a German campaign of world conquest:

“But one of the good things about reading history is you learn a good deal. And, we know for sure that the big spending programs of the New Deal did not work. In 1940, unemployment was still 15%. And, it’s widely agreed among economists, that what got us out of the doldrums that we were in during the Depression was the beginning of World War II.”

To be precise, the historical record shows that throughout FDR’s first term, the country was on a path to recovery—albeit from a very low point. Then there was a recession-within-a-depression associated with efforts to return to McConnell-style policies of fiscal restraint. By 1940, things were much better than they had been in 1932. But still, as he says, not very good. Thus far we don’t have a very solid case against stimulus spending. And now things get worse. The conclusion McConnell wants is that “big spending programs” couldn’t help fight the Depression. But World War II was, among other things, a huge spending program. At the moment, however, we’re fortunate not to be in a position where there’s a powerful wehrmacht that needs fighting. So we can try to direct our recovery-oriented spending at useful civilian projects that will improve the country’s infrastructure or health or education rather than on tanks and bombs.

Yglesias

Depression Chart

Apropos of Paul Krugman’s demolition of George Will’s argument about the Great Depression, Brad DeLong offers a chart:

20081117_ef7d74m2gnw9citedndea81xqh_1.jpg

There you have it. This is far from saying that every detail of the New Deal regulatory agenda was the right thing to do then or would be the right thing to do now. But the monetary expansion associated with the New Deal helped the economy, and the attempted return to orthodoxy hurt.

Yglesias

Strong Fundamentals

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Eric Rauchway reflects on Herbert Hoover’s October 25, 1929 proclamation that “The fundamental business of the country, that is the production and distribution of commodities, is on a sound and prosperous basis.”

Hoover worked to get businessmen to respond to the crisis by herding them into conferences and urging them to cooperate. He backed immigration restriction and a cut in the capital-gains tax. He quarreled with the unemployment figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. None of it worked, and yet Hoover insisted on the soundness of fundamentals, blaming the continuing crisis on whiners: “The income of a large part of our people is not reduced by the depression,” he said, “but is affected by unnecessary fears and pessimism.” He urged his fellow countrymen to count on “the magnificent working of the Federal Reserve system and the inherently sound condition of the banks.”

But the banks were not inherently sound; they depended on the unsound foundation of 1920s lending. After the crash, the president said the fundamentals were strong, but American consumers said, in effect, well, we’ll see, and their credit-driven buying slowed. Purchases of consumer durables in 1930 were about 20 percent lower than they were in 1929. Less purchasing meant less selling and more layoffs, which meant still less purchasing and soon more defaulting. The banks began to fail. Meanwhile, the “magnificent working of the Federal Reserve” did not stop the bank failures, which increased to sickening levels as Hoover’s term ground on and the reality of the Depression became undeniable.

Now of course to actually get down to the depths of the Depression required some policy blunders that I think it’s extremely unlikely anyone in the contemporary United States will undertake. But there is an undeniable commonality to the off-the-shelf conservative policy prescriptions here.

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