Fox News is reporting that the Obama administration plans to withdraw all but about 3,000 of the more than 40,000 U.S. troops currently in Iraq, a move that is consistent with President Barack Obama’s repeated promises to end the war in Iraq. Sources told Fox that the number of troops begrudgingly approved by the military — 10,000 troops — would be cut even further, likely allowing the U.S. to carry out mostly training missions.

The reported decision comes after months of fruitless back-and-forth with the Iraqi government on an agreement to allow American troops to stay. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) negotiated by the outgoing Bush administration in 2008 pledged to the Iraqis that the U.S. would withdraw all of its troops by the end of 2011. Without a new SOFA, all U.S. troops might still have to exit Iraq, potentially rendering the U.S. decision moot.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki’s most recent public statement on the issue — that the U.S. troop pullout would be “on schedule” — didn’t mention the possibility that U.S. trainers could stay behind. But Maliki has mentioned the notion before. Some Iraqi lawmakers said U.S. diplomatic cables recently revealed by Wikileaks describing U.S. involvement in the shooting deaths of Iraqi civilians made negotiations to keep troops there more difficult.

While Iraqi groups like the firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada Al Sadr’s followers want the U.S. out, others, like some Kurdish groups, want the security assurances that come with a robust U.S. presence.

The Fox report comes on the heels of a Wall Street Journal article this morning highlighting American attempts to covertly counter growing Iranian influence in Iraq, where Shia links run deep. U.S. officials have repeatedly linked Iranian arms to attacks on U.S. troops. The Journal report said the impending drawdown “compound(ed) the urgency” of covert programs. Using U.S. troops to counter Iranian influence, though, could be a never-ending mission.

While no Americans died in Iraq last month, a first since the start of the war, the U.S. faced a steep rise in casualties in recent months, with some analysts suggesting the attacks could be a result of the public pressure the U.S. was exerting for a new SOFA.

Obama, though, remained undeterred by various conservative criticisms that the U.S. should stay in Iraq to support Maliki against Sadr, or that withdrawing could open the door to a re-invigorated insurgency and Iraq “could go to hell.”

Those fears are not shared by U.S. diplomatic and military spokespersons. In July, a State Department spokesman in Baghdad said the U.S. was “confident that Iraqi security forces’ capacity will continue to grow.” Last month, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Buchanan said that Iraqi security forces could handle the insurgency when the U.S. withdraws.

Two American troops were killed in northern Iraq yesterday while “conducting operations.” The New York Times reports that the military “did not elaborate, but that terminology is usually meant to indicate the deaths were caused by enemy attack.” And earlier this month, an Iranian-backed Shiite militia group attacked and killed six U.S. soldiers. Now, total U.S. combat deaths in Iraq in June has reached 11, the most since May 2009. But despite the fact that Americans are still dying combat related deaths in Iraq, President Obama announced last year that the U.S ended hostilities in Iraq and said as recently as last week in his speech that America’s combat mission there was already over:

Yet tonight, we take comfort in knowing that the tide of war is receding. Fewer of our sons and daughters are serving in harm’s way. We have ended our combat mission in Iraq, with 100,000 American troops already out of that country.

This simply isn’t the reality that troops on the ground are facing. Putting the number of recent U.S. combat deaths in Iraq aside, militants there are still attacking U.S. forces there with continuing regularity even though the Americans are relegated to their bases and cannot conduct combat operations without permission from the Iraqis. U.S. forces are facing “an increasingly dangerous environment in southern Iraq,” the AP reported last month, “where Shiite militias trying to claim they are driving out the U.S. occupiers have stepped up attacks against bases and troops.”

Indeed, the Irainian-backed group Kataib Hezbollah, which claimed responsibility for the attack earlier this month, said its attacks on U.S. troops were aimed at stopping the “occupation interference” in Iraq’s affairs and forcing the U.S. to abide by the withdrawal deadline. And while it’s unclear how much Muqtada al-Sadr’s supporters are participating in attacks on U.S. forces, he has pledged to unleash his Mehdi Army if the Americans stay past 2011.

One analyst has also said that he has seen an increase in the use of armor piercing IEDs called explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs. “The increase in attacks shows that Iranian-backed cells enjoy greater freedom of movement than they have in the past,” said Michael Knights, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

At the same time, top U.S. officials like incoming Defense Secretary Leon Panetta have said that if the Iraqis ask, the U.S. will keep an unspecified number of troops (some have estimated around 10,000) past the Dec. 31 total withdrawal deadline. Some have cited increased sectarian tentions as one reason for the Americans to stay, but as journalist Mark Kukis noted recently, a prolonged American presence there will only exacerbate the problem:

Secular, nonsectarian Sunni militants, men who consider themselves Iraqi nationalists for resisting a foreign military presence, drift into the company of Iraq’s al-Qaeda contingent when seeking help to lash out at U.S. forces. This drift in effect bolsters al-Qaeda radicals, allowing them to pursue more easily sectarian violence against Shi’ites. Increased sectarian aggression on the part of al-Qaeda produces a violent response from Shi’ite militias such as the Mahdi Army and the Iraqi government, whose security forces are quick to indulge in brutal crackdowns against Sunni communities where militants are thought to be active.

Whether sectarian tensions in Iraq will rise to level of the civil war days of 2006 and 2007 if the Americans leave is uncertain but unlikely. However, there is one certainty if U.S. troops withdraw on time: After Dec. 31, 2011, Iraqi militants will no longer launch attacks on and kill American soldiers.

Last month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen said the U.S. military would stay in Iraq if the Iraqi government asked it to. (President Obama has yet to publicly weigh in on this issue.) This news naturally got the neocons excited, who have since crawled out of the woodwork to rally for a continued U.S. presence. While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has stated repeatedly that he opposes any plan for U.S. forces to stay past the Dec. 31, 2011 withdrawal deadline, he recently has softened his tone.

But the main question is what Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr will do. Sadr has been adamant that the U.S. leave on time, warning for months that he will unleash his Mahdi Army on American forces if they stay. But Sadr himself recently signaled he has softened his stance as well. “Luckily,” war hawk Max Boot wrote yesterday, “momentum seems to be building to keep U.S. forces in Iraq past 2011.” Yet news that tens of thousands of Sadr loyalists marched in Baghdad today to voice opposition to U.S. forces staying in Iraq appears to have halted that momentum. And Sadr’s followers don’t seem to be messing around:

– “I applied to the call of Sadr to participate against American occupiers,” said Salah Emarah, 35, who traveled from his home in Basra to march in the parade. “This is a peaceful demonstration against American occupiers. Sadr asked us to remain peaceful. At the end of the year, according to Iraq, the occupiers will leave. If they don’t, we will wait for orders.”

– “All the people in Sadr City are waiting for orders from Muqtada Sadr,” said Muhammad Fuad, a 28-year-old carpenter watching the parade. “And we have people all over Iraq — northern, southern.”

– “I came here on the orders of Moqtada al-Sadr to help kick out the occupiers from our country,” said Alaa Hussein, 21, a student taking part. “If the government keeps American troops here we will consider them an illegitimate government.”

– “We will not accept even one American soldier staying,” said Adnan al-Mussawi, one of the demonstrators. “Occupation has not benefited us at all, it is our religious duty to kick out every American soldier.”

Even though Sadr may have “hinted” that he would accept U.S. troops past 2011, he recently told BBC Arabic, “As long as they stay in Iraq, we will resist them.”

Referring to the fact that Sadr’s block in Parliament wants the U.S. to leave, this week Gates said it’s debatable “how much of that is the Sadrists and how much of that is the Iranians behind the Sadrists.” The New York Times noted that Gates “had never before cited Iran as a factor in the Obama administration’s thinking.” It’s important to point out however, that, as CAP’s Matt Duss previously noted, one shouldn’t confuse “backing” with “control” when talking about Iran’s relationship to Sadr: “A number of analysts have made the mistake of treating Sadr simply as an instrument of Iran, when in fact his movement is deeply nationalistic.”

Moreover, if countering Iranian influence is now the standard for consideration of the U.S. military staying in Iraq past 2011, then American forces would probably stay in Iraq forever. Iran’s clout in Iraq is extensive; it’s not just with Sadr’s group, and the Americans are largely responsible for it. CAP’s Larry Korb recently wrote, “Iran does not have to invade Iraq to have influence there. It was the Iranians who got Al-Sadr to support Maliki. And Maliki has repaid them by supporting their positions on Bahrain, Lebanon, and Hamas.” And as one Iraqi told Duss, “America has baked Iraq like a cake,” he said. “And given it to Iran to eat.”

Photo credit: The Washington Post

Top U.S. officials have made clear in recent months that if the Iraqis ask, American troops will remain in Iraq past the withdrawal deadline at the end of the year. While Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen said late last month that the Iraqis had to decide “within weeks” for logistical purposes, the Washington Post reported this weekend that Mullen’s demand “will not be met,” thus “complicating plans for the U.S. military withdrawal.”

U.S. and Iraqi officials and citizens alike have given a wide variety of reasons why American troops should or should not leave Iraq on schedule. While those arguing for a continued U.S. presence usually cite some security fear that is either baseless, unverifiable or impossible to quantify, one complication is this whole debate is very real: Moktada al-Sadr. Sadr, whose base of support is wide both in Parliament and among ordinary Iraqis, has made it very clear that he wants the U.S. military to leave Iraq on time. “If the Americans don’t leave Iraq on time, we will increase the resistance and restart the activities of the Mahdi Army,” Sadr said in a statement last month. And it doesn’t seem like he’ll have any trouble mobilizing his supporters:

The most fervent opposition can be found in Sadr City, the Shiite slum in Baghdad that represents the heart of Mr. Sadr’s constituency. On a recent Friday before prayers began, Najim Abbas, a young house painter, echoed what many there say when asked about Mr. Sadr’s threat to reconstitute his militia.

“Whatever he says, we will do,” Mr. Abbas said. “We will keep on resisting until the last days of our lives.”

But the certitude of the Sadr-effect should the U.S. military stay in Iraq past 2011 is not measured in simply security terms. As CAP’s Larry Korb noted recently in an op-ed arguing for the Obama administration to leave Iraq on time, Sadr’s political clout could have dire consequences for the entire government:

If US troops remain, violence against Americans may increase and Maliki’s government will likely collapse. Muqtada Al-Sadr, whose support was critical to Maliki’s success in forming a government even though he finished second in the elections, will likely withdraw his support from Maliki if he renegotiates the agreement, thus creating political chaos. In addition, he has promised to reconstitute his Mahdi Army militia, which could be joined by other Shi’ite extremist groups in attacking Americans.

Last week, Sadr announced plans for a peaceful rally to take place May 23 in Baghadad to show his movement’s strength in calling for a U.S. withdrawal.

In the wake of the passage of the status of forces agreement “Agreement on Complete U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” our neoconservative friends are again revealing themselves as deeply confused about Iran’s actual relationship with various actors in the new Iraq.

Charles Krauthammer:

A self-sustaining, democratic and pro-American Iraq is within our reach.

[This] would constitute a major defeat for Tehran, the putative winner of the Iraq war, according to the smart set. Iran’s client, Moqtada al-Sadr, still hiding in Iran, was visibly marginalized in parliament — after being militarily humiliated in Basra and Baghdad by the new Iraqi security forces. Moreover, the major religious Shiite parties were the ones that negotiated, promoted and assured passage of the strategic alliance with the United States, against the most determined Iranian opposition.

Eli Lake:

What the [status of forces agreement] does…is establish the political legitimacy of American troops in Iraq for the next three years and provides a framework beyond that. It is perhaps for this reason that the remnants of Moqtada Al Sadr’s organization have protested the agreement, as have more and more of the hard-line clerics in Iran.

Bill Roggio:

How quickly the narrative on Sadr has changed. Today, the Washington Post describes a weakened Sadr, with a near-toothless political movement, struggling to find its path after suffering a stinging defeat after the passage of the Status of Forces agreement between the United States and Iraq.

While it’s clearly true Sadr’s movement has been weakened, Roggio’s presents this as primarily the result of cunning U.S. military strategy. There’s no acknowledgment of Iran’s role — apart from mentioning “Sadr’s Iranian-backed Mahdi Army” — in brokering the cease-fires between Maliki and Sadr, nor of the extent to which Sadr’s marginalization is the result of Maliki’s co-opting Sadr’s demand for a hard date for U.S. withdrawal.

There’s really very little excuse any more for the “U.S. and Iraqi forces versus Iranian-backed militias” frame. Iran’s close relationship with all the leading Iraqi Shia political trends is well known. An October report from West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) offers a pretty comprehensive analysis of Iran’s strategy in Iraq (pdf): Read more