The latest report from the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog shows that Iran continues to process nuclear fuel, it is making sure to keep its total amount low enough to not cross Israel’s so-called “red-line.”

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, since its last report Iran has continued to disregard demands that it halt enrichment of uranium at its nuclear facilities, instead processing another 689 kilograms of the nuclear fuel to the 5 percent level. Of greater concern to the international community is the uranium Iran has processed to 20 percent, compromising an additional 44 kilograms since February.

Iran’s known enriched uranium stockpile is not currently usable in a nuclear weapon — for that it would need to be enriched to 90 percent level, making it highly-enriched. However, the technology required to produce 90 percent enriched uranium is a small step from that required to reach the 20 percent threshold. Approximately 250 kilograms of 90 percent uranium is required to create one nuclear weapon, and Tehran seems to have been careful not to reach 250 kilograms worth of 20 percent enriched uranium in its stockpile.

To keep it below that level, Iran has continued its efforts to convert some of its 20 percent stockpile into uranium gas, which are then used in constructing fuel plates. These plates are extremely difficult to process further, making them effectively out of the running for being considered part of any possible weaponization. In the latest IAEA update, Iran reported converting 58 kilograms worth of 20 percent enriched uranium into uranium oxide between the end of September and May. Thus, the IAEA reported 182 kilograms of declared material still in the form of uranium hexafloride.

The report also indicates that Iran continues its efforts to install new centrifuges into its facilities, with nearly 700 installed since the start of the year.

There are also troubling portions of the report dealing with the Agency’s concerns over the Parchin military base. To date, the IAEA has been denied access to the facility, which is suspected to have been involved with earlier regime efforts to design a trigger for a nuclear weapon. Since first requesting access, it appears a cover-up of the facility’s work has been taking place:

55. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has conducted further spreading, levelling and compacting of material over most of the site, a significant proportion of which it has also asphalted. There have also been indications of activity within the chamber building.

56. As previously reported, Iran has stated that the allegation of nuclear activities at the Parchin site is “baseless” and that “the recent activities claimed to be conducted in the vicinity of the location of interest to the Agency, has nothing to do with specified location by the Agency”. Iran’s explanation for the soil displacement by trucks is that it was “due to constructing the Parchin new road”.

Iran’s lack of cooperation over Parchin proved a stumbling block in Iran’s ongoing talks with the U.N. over its nuclear program. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano warned back in December that the site could soon be cleared of any evidence that could have been uncovered. The IAEA, which has been issuing quarterly reports on Iran’s nuclear activities since 2003, still concludes though that none of Iran’s declared nuclear material has been diverted towards producing a nuclear weapon.

Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies also still believe that Iran has not made a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon at this time. This has not precluded Congress from beginning to pursue a slew of new action against Iran in recent weeks, with bills in both the House and Senate to increase sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Several experts have questioned the wisdom of ratcheting up sanctions on Iran without end, given the still ongoing pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the stand-off.

An editorial in today’s Washington Post gives Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu credit for the Iranian government’s decision to stop short of accumulating enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon.

Back in September 2012, Netanyahu made a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in which he used a cartoon bomb to illustrate Iran’s nuclear progress, using a red magic marker to draw a line beyond which he believed Iran should not be allowed to progress.

According to the Post’s editors, Netanyahu’s “explicit setting of a ‘red line’ for the Iranian nuclear program… appears to have accomplished what neither negotiations nor sanctions have yielded: concrete Iranian action to limit its enrichment”:

A host of commentators both in the United States and Israel scoffed at what they called Mr. Netanyahu’s “cartoonish” picture of a bomb and the line he drew across it. The prime minister said Iran could not be allowed to accumulate enough 20 percent enriched uranium to produce a bomb with further processing, adding that at the rate its centrifuges were spinning, Tehran would cross that line by the middle of 2013.

Iran, too, dismissed what its U.N. ambassador called “an unfounded and imaginary graph.” But then a funny thing happened: The regime began diverting some of its stockpile to the manufacture of fuel plates for a research reactor. According to the most recent report of international inspectors, in February, it had converted 40 percent of its 20 percent uranium to fuel assemblies or the oxide form needed to produce them. As a result, Iran has remained distinctly below the Israeli red line, and it probably postponed the earliest moment when it could cross that line by several months.

The flaw in this argument: According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran began diverting its stockpile to the manufacture of fuel plates in late 2011, nearly a year before Netanyahu’s speech.

Back in June 2012, IAEA inspectors “verified that Iran converted about 33 percent of its 20 percent-enriched uranium stockpile, according to two senior international officials. Iran used about 49 kilograms (108 pounds) of the 145 kilogram stockpile to make fuel in the form of metal plates for the Tehran Research Reactor.”

This was again confirmed in the IAEA’s August 2012 report, which stated that, “Between the start of conversion activities on 17 December 2011 and 12 August 2012, Iran has fed into the process 71.25 kg” of its stockpile 20 percent enriched uranium. The Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann called this “One of the most significant and underreported developments in the August 30 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

Underreported, perhaps. But you’d expect the editors of one of the U.S.’s leading newspapers to be aware of it.

North Korea’s government on Friday firmly suggested that the diplomats present at embassies in Pyongyang consider taking their leave, in yet another escalation of their war of words. Across the border in South Korea, the question of whether or not their own nuclear arsenal is required to meet Northern aggression has taken on a new impetus in the last weeks.

Secretary of State John Kerry on Thursday announced a new overseas trip that would take him the Korean peninsula, primarily to deal with the heightened tensions in East Asia. South Korea’s semi-official Yonhap news agency is also reporting that formal talks to revise a U.S.-Republic of Korea bilateral nuclear accord would take place soon after Kerry’s visit.

South Korea is one of twenty-four other countries engaged with the U.S. in what are known as 123 Agreements — so-called because they are established under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The U.S. is also in the process of negotiating 123 Agreements with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam.

Under the terms of the 123 Agreement — which was last renegotiated in 1974 — South Korea currently operates 23 civilian nuclear reactors at four sites across the country. But under the 1974 agreement, South Korea was barred from reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel, due to fears of it being diverted towards a nuclear weapons program. That provision is what’s currently spurring South Korea’s push to open new talks over the agreement.

The argument over reprocessing, however, is being looked at under a new light, given the turning tide among South Koreans over whether their country requires nuclear weapons to serve as a deterrent against the North — which at present possesses enough nuclear fuel for at least 10 plutonium-based nuclear bombs. Two recent opinion polls taken in South Korea showed two-thirds of those surveyed supported the idea of developing nuclear weapons to defend against a North Korean attack. Conservative politicians in South Korea are beginning to latch onto this idea as well:

“We, the Korean people, have been duped by North Korea for the last 20 to 30 years and it is now time for South Koreans to face the reality and do something that we need to do,” said Chung Mong-joon, a lawmaker in the governing Saenuri (New Frontier) Party and a former presidential conservative candidate. “The nuclear deterrence can be the only answer. We have to have nuclear capability.”

At present, the Republic of Korea falls under what’s known as the U.S.’ “nuclear umbrella,” a pledge to use its own nuclear weapons in the protection of South Korea in exchange for them not developing their own. That pledge was likely the deciding factor in the launch of B-2 stealth bombers over South Korea last week, a show of force meant to both reassure South Korea and warn Pyongyang. South Korea’s determination to allow for reprocessing, however, have some concerned that Seoul is no longer completely certain of the U.S. ability to keep them safe. At the same time, a new poll out by Gallup found that 55 percent of Americans said the U.S. should defend South Korea if the North attacks.

However, experts say that not only is it a bad idea for the South Koreans to push for nuclear weapons, but they’re also unlikely to go in that direction. It “would deeply undermine the security situation on the peninsula and the leadership in Seoul understands this,” Arms Control Association Executive Director Daryl Kimball told ThinkProgress. “Talk about South Korean nuclear weapons only makes the situation worse and would further goad the North.”

“Developing a nuclear weapon would be disastrous to the world’s 13th largest economy that is heavily dependent of international trade,” said James Lewis, spokesman for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in a statement released this week. “There would be no smartphones, fashion or superstars like Psy. South Korea can either have Psy or a nuke — they will likely pick Psy.”

A new report released on Thursday by a Washington, D.C. think tank says that an agreement with Iran over its disputed nuclear program should include a provision to allow the Islamic Republic to keep civilian aspects of its program in exchange for a “complete lifting” of nuclear-related sanctions.

The report, titled “Time to Move from Tactics to Strategy on Iran” by the Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force, also recommends more technological, academic and cultural exchanges between Iranians and Americans and to introduce measures to “facilitate trade in food, medicine, and medical supplies.”

At an event at the Atlantic Council on Thursday, Barbara Slavin, the report’s principle author, said that Iranians not only blame their own government for the effects of international sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program, but they also “blame the United States as well.”

“And I worry very much that we are losing the goodwill of the Iranian people,” Slavin added.

On enrichment, the report, which comes as Iran and the five permanent U.N. Security Council members and Germany (P5+1) come together for new talks, says that “the Obama administration should lay out a step-by-step reciprocal and proportionate plan that ends with graduated relief of sanctions on oil, and eventually on the Iranian Central Bank, in return for verifiable curbs on Iranian uranium enrichment and stocks of enriched uranium, and assurances that Iran does not have undeclared nuclear materials and facilities.”

But while some have argued that Iran should not be allowed to enrich uranium at all, the Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force, which includes former CIA and NSA Director MIchael Hayden, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright, and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, implies that a deal with Iran should include allowing it to enrich uranium for civilian purposes, or below 5 percent purity (90 percent is needed for a weapon):

A complete end to nuclear- related sanctions, however, will require a verifiable end to Iranian enrichment beyond 5 percent U-235 and a reasonable understanding of how much low- enriched uranium Iran actually needs for a peaceful nuclear program

That assessment echoes one made recently by two Israeli experts, who said that an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 over the former’s nuclear program should include a provision allowing Iran to enrich low-grade uranium for civilian use. “It is clear,” said Israeli Brig. Gen. (ret) Shlomo Brom last October, “that such an agreement would not be possible without letting Iran having low level of enrichment.”

But the Atlantic Council Iran Task Force report also recommends that some sanctions, mainly ones that hurt ordinary Iranians, be lifted now as a sign of goodwill and to boost “people-to-people” ties. The Task Force says the Treasury Department should designate “a small number of US and private Iranian financial institutions as channels for payment for humanitarian, educational, and public diplomacy-related transactions.” Such a move, said Task Force head and former Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart Eizenstat at the Atlantic Council event today, would “make it hard” for the Iranian regime to blame the U.S. for the tough times Iranians currently face.

The report comes on the heels of another new expert report on Iran from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Federation of American Scientists says that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be “bombed away” and that diplomacy was the only way to keep it peaceful. “Given the country’s indigenous knowledge and expertise, the only long-term solution for assuring that Iran’s nuclear program remains purely peaceful is to find a mutually agreeable diplomatic solution,” the report said.

With all the saber-rattling from North Korea and the at times equally loud responses from the South and the United States, there’s a conspicuous voice missing in the din — Japan.

Since North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un turned up the heat, going as far as declaring that a “state of war” exists on the Korean peninsula once more, the U.S. and South Korea have responded in kind. South Korean President Park Geun-hye on Monday gave the military the leeway to respond directly to any attack without “any political consideration.” The United States, for its part, flew B-2 stealth bombers over South Korea in a show of force meant to the show North Korea that it could strike without warning and has F-22 stealth fighters on stand-by to participate in a training exercise with South Korea.

China has expressed its displeasure with North Korea in the months since its third nuclear test, even as Beijing continues to back its fellow communist state. Even Russia has taken the opportunity to voice its opinion of the heated words coming from Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington. So of the members of the Six-Party Talks, why is Japan the only one staying quiet about the DPRK’s bellicose rhetoric?

Given the proximity of Japan to the Koreas, and the DPRK’s history of threats against the Japanese people and U.S. bases in Japan, it’s surprising that Japan has yet to speak out during the last several weeks, particularly considering Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s reputation for hawkish behavior towards North Korea and in general.

Part of Abe’s campaign platform was editing Japan’s post-World War II constitution to allow a broader definition of “self-defense” than is currently allowed. Abe has most definitely acted on those policies once taking office, including launching a series of military exercises designed to simulate a Chinese invasion of Japan, though it never directly referenced China. Military spending is up, as well, but what’s still missing has been an active role for Japan during the crisis on the Korean peninsula.

So what’s the reason behind Abe’s seemingly counter-intuitive lack of public statements in recent weeks? Dr. Sheila Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, spoke with ThinkProgress on the matter, saying that the silence from Tokyo is the wise choice. In Smith’s view, the Abe government understands that the focus of Pyongyang’s rhetoric is on South Korea, with its statements designed for consumption in Washington and Seoul. Smith also believes that Tokyo is reassured by the United States’ security pledges and doesn’t see an advantage in inserting itself into the current crisis.

Smith may be right, given the lack of direct threats toward Tokyo from Pyongyang lately. Also playing into Japan’s decision may be that it does not view Pyongyang as likely to take action. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney told journalists at the daily briefing that there are no signs of troop movement from North Korea to match its rhetoric. Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN), Ranking Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on Monday also said that he believes that “nothing is going to happen.” Despite that, military preparations from the U.S. are ongoing. On Monday, the Pentagon announced that the U.S.S. John S. McCain, an anti-missile destroyer, was being moved to the coast of Korea, with the the U.S.S. Decatur following on Tuesday.

Vice President Joe Biden stressed diplomacy with Iran before the 2013 AIPAC Policy Conference while defending President Obama’s resolve in confronting Iran’s nuclear program.

Referring to reported difficulties in the working relationship between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Biden countered that all U.S. Presidents have had points of divergence with Israel’s leaders. “We’ve always disagreed on tactics,” Biden said. “But we’ve always agreed on the strategic imperative that Israel be able to defend itself.”

Turning to Iran’s nuclear program, Biden sought to make clear to the gathering President Obama’s willingness to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. “Big nations can’t bluff [about using force]. And Presidents of the United States cannot and do not bluff. President Barack Obama is not bluffing,” Biden confirmed. “We’re not looking for war,” Biden continued, before repeating an oft-delivered line, telling the crowd that “all options, including military force” remain on the table.

As Biden explained to the audience, however, despite that resolve, the United States is ready and willing to negotiate peacefully. “Our strong preference, the world’s preference is for a diplomatic solution,” Biden said. He also echoed recent comments from Secretary of State John Kerry that the window for making a deal with Iran is closing, but there is still time and space to find a solution. Biden emphasized that diplomacy had to be fully exhausted before any military option could be exercised:

BIDEN: And I want to make clear to you something. God forbid, if the need to act occurs it is critically important for the whole world to know we did everything in our power, we did everything that reasonably could have be expected to avoid any confrontation. That matters. Because, God forbid, if we have to act, its important that the rest of the world is with us. We have a united international community.

Watch Biden’s comments on diplomacy here:

As part of the bid to find a diplomatic solution, a coalition of international powers — including Russia and China — concluded a round of positive talks with Iran last week, with technical meetings set to take place in March. Multiple current and former Israeli and U.S. officials have warned of the fallout of a premature attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, including a rupturing of the international community’s unity on the Iranian nuclear issue.

Members of Congress have been intensifying their Iran-war rhetoric in recent days. For example, Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) are planning to introduce a resolution that urges the United States government to support Israel — militarily, economically and diplomatically — should the Jewish state be “compelled to take military action” against Iran.

While it appears that Congress, still struggling to shake the neocons’ influence, tends to favor a more militaristic approach toward the Islamic Republic, the Obama administration has focused on a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis, while pledging to take no options off the table and also warning about what war with Iran would look like.

But given now the Graham-Menendez resolution, what do the Israelis think about war with Iran? It’s no secret the current Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu is the most vocal about pushing a military option with Iran, but over the past two years, numerous former and current high-level members of Israel’s security establishment have pushed back. Below is a compilation of those statements:

Read more

Two of the diplomats held during the 444-day Iranian Hostage Crisis are speaking out in favor of stronger diplomatic overtures between the United States and Iran.

Former Ambassador Bruce Laigen and former Ambassador John Limbert were among the dozens of U.S. citizens held captive in Tehran from 1979-81, the former serving as Chief of Mission, the latter as a Political Officer in the U.S. Embassy. The two spoke at a press conference Monday, capitalizing on the film Argo‘s Best Picture win Sunday night at the Academy Awards to highlight the need for U.S. diplomacy with Iran moving forward.

“Rather than learning from the lessons of history, the U.S. and Iran continue to be held hostage to it,” Laingen said in his prepared remarks, laying out a theme that would be continued throughout the press conference. Both men also made clear that the mutual interests of the U.S. and Iran are too many to not have continuing dialogue between the states. “The Islamic Republic [of Iran], like it or not, is what it is and we do have things to talk about, even if we do not necessarily talk to them as friends,” Limbert said.

The need for diplomacy with Iran stretches beyond issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, according to the former diplomats, with Laigen in particular noting difficulties that come in negotiating absent steady communication:

LAIGEN: It’s difficult because you’re not there, that’s one of the problems. We — Americans are not in Tehran. What the hell, we should be. We should be there representing the United States of America. We should a relationship of have some kind. We have zilch. And that’s not a very good basis on which to have any kind of diplomatic exchange.

The latest round in discussions between Iran and the P5+1 — the United States, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, China, France, and Germany — over Tehran’s nuclear program are set to begin in Kazakhstan on Tuesday. Asked about their expectations for the meetings, the two were muted in their predictions. Laigen confidently asserted that the talks would end with a follow-up meeting next month. “As long as the two sides simply refuse to see the world how the other side sees the world, I don’t know where you’re going to make progress,” Limbert said.

Limbert, in response to a question, took on the concept of the “general feeling” that Iran is aiming to build a nuclear weapon, noting the lack of evidence that tends to come from those making the claim. Limbert characterized the argument from those making the claim by saying, “We know [that Iran is working towards a nuclear weapon] because they are bad people and they do bad things. So when they say their program is entirely peaceful, it must be exactly the opposite.” U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials both currently believe that Iran has not decided to pursue a nuclear weapon.

Limbert also downplayed the threat of Iranian influence in the Middle East, saying he “[doesn't] lose a lot of sleep” over the idea. Noting that Iran is “not in a good place politically and diplomatically,” Limbert pointed out that Iran’s lack of allies in the region makes it difficult for anything resembling a spread of the Iranian revolution to occur. “The threat of Iranian hegemony has been overblown by parties who seek to benefit by continuing the chest-beating,” he concluded.

The Obama administration, by contrast, has said that Iran with a nuclear weapon is a threat to the region and has pledged to use all available tools, including military action, to prevent the Islamic Republican from building one.

A new report released on Thursday by the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that the growth of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium has continued apace ahead of renewed negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

Since the release of the last report by the IAEA’s Governor-General in November 2012, Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to a 20 percent level by about 43 kilograms. While Iran has restarted its conversion of some of that stockpile into uranium oxide gas and other forms that are difficult to further enrich to fuel medical research at the Tehran Research Reactor, the associated reduction didn’t counter new enrichment enough to show a decrease in overall levels.

The concern surrounding Iran’s uranium stockpile is not that it’s currently usable in a nuclear weapon — for that it would need to be enriched to 90 percent level, making it highly-enriched. However, the technology required to produce 90 percent enriched uranium is a small step from that required to reach the 20 percent threshold. Approximately 250 kilograms of 90 percent uranium is required to create one nuclear weapon, an amount that Iran has been careful not to reach.

Compounding misgivings about Iran’s nuclear program, however, is the news that its heavy-water reactor based in Arak is slated to become operational in early 2014. Unfortunately, the new reactor has the potential to produce plutonium as a by-product of its usage, which would only add to suspicions about the nature of Iran’s program. Plutonium can still be used in civilian reactors, but lower amounts are necessary to produce simpler — but lower-yield — nuclear weapons than those that utilize uranium. Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies still believe, however, that Iran has not made a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon at this time.

Adding to the unfortunate news contained in the IAEA report, Iran today announced that it has begun installing more advanced centrifuges in its main enrichment facility Nanatz. The Iranian government had previously informed the IAEA of its plans to do so weeks ago, but started the actual work of getting the equipment into place today. However, today’s IAEA report does indicate that the exact same number of centrifuges remain operational at Natanz as in November, despite an increase in the number fully installed.

All of this heightens the pressure upon negotiators from the P5+1 — the United States, United Kingdom, China, France, Russian Federation, and Germany — ahead of their restarted talks with Iran next week in Kazakhstan. Reuters has reported that the group will present Iran with a new package of “substantial and serious” offers to Iran during the negotiations, including eased sanctions on gold and other precious metals.

Iranian development of a nuclear weapon would not necessarily cause its arch-rival Saudi Arabia to pursue its own, contrary to conventional wisdom, says a new report out today from the Center for New American Security.

Titled “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next? [PDF]” the report was drafted by former Obama Pentagon official Colin Kahl, along with Melissa Dalton and Matthew Irvine. Going against the conventional narrative, the researchers determine that the risk of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East following an Iranian nuclear test, while “greater than zero,” is unlikely.

Two of the main regional powers — Egypt and Turkey — would be unlikely to seek nuclear weapons due to lack of a threat from Iran on the part of the former and the guarantee of NATO’s nuclear umbrella on the part of the latter. This leaves the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the most likely country in the Middle East to try to obtain nuclear weapons should Iran ever choose to build nuclear weapons. Saudi nuke acquisition, according to conventional wisdom, could either be in the form of a reformatting its native civilian nuclear research program to support military aims or a deal with Pakistan to provide a nuclear guarantee against Iran.

Either of those scenarios is far less likely than most would imagine, according to the report. Instead, as shown in the chart below, the authors believe that it’s far more probable that the Kingdom would rely on scaling up its conventional defenses against Iran or relying on a United States’ nuclear guarantee:

In reaching their conclusion, the researchers weighed the possible disincentives Saudi Arabia would face in opting to develop its own nuclear arsenal, including the risk of economic sanctions and a blow to the Saudis’ reputation globally. Possible security risks that follow along with the possession of nuclear weapons would also be a concern the Saudi government, as well as the odds that such weapons could lead to a split with the U.S. — a result that would far outweigh the benefits of owning nuclear weapons.

The “Pakistani option” — Saudi Arabia coming into possession of ready-make nuclear weapons from Pakistan — is likewise dismissed by the report. While Pakistan and Saudi Arabia maintain strong military ties, and the Pakistani Embassy in Riyadh once said “each Pakistani considers (the) security of Saudi Arabia as his personal matter,” Pakistan would be unlikely to provide nuclear weapons to advance any objective not related to countering India. As noted by CNAS, the nuclear club has not grown substantially since China tested weapons fifty years ago, and has in fact seen more states give up nuclear weapons than acquire them.

Iran still has not decided to pursue nuclear weapons, according to intelligence from the United States and Israel. And despite what the CNAS report views as the low chances of a nuclear arms race should Iran acquire a weapon, it also stresses that the United States’ policy should remain one of preventing Iran from doing so, with military force if necessary.