The latest report from the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog shows that Iran continues to process nuclear fuel, it is making sure to keep its total amount low enough to not cross Israel’s so-called “red-line.”

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, since its last report Iran has continued to disregard demands that it halt enrichment of uranium at its nuclear facilities, instead processing another 689 kilograms of the nuclear fuel to the 5 percent level. Of greater concern to the international community is the uranium Iran has processed to 20 percent, compromising an additional 44 kilograms since February.

Iran’s known enriched uranium stockpile is not currently usable in a nuclear weapon — for that it would need to be enriched to 90 percent level, making it highly-enriched. However, the technology required to produce 90 percent enriched uranium is a small step from that required to reach the 20 percent threshold. Approximately 250 kilograms of 90 percent uranium is required to create one nuclear weapon, and Tehran seems to have been careful not to reach 250 kilograms worth of 20 percent enriched uranium in its stockpile.

To keep it below that level, Iran has continued its efforts to convert some of its 20 percent stockpile into uranium gas, which are then used in constructing fuel plates. These plates are extremely difficult to process further, making them effectively out of the running for being considered part of any possible weaponization. In the latest IAEA update, Iran reported converting 58 kilograms worth of 20 percent enriched uranium into uranium oxide between the end of September and May. Thus, the IAEA reported 182 kilograms of declared material still in the form of uranium hexafloride.

The report also indicates that Iran continues its efforts to install new centrifuges into its facilities, with nearly 700 installed since the start of the year.

There are also troubling portions of the report dealing with the Agency’s concerns over the Parchin military base. To date, the IAEA has been denied access to the facility, which is suspected to have been involved with earlier regime efforts to design a trigger for a nuclear weapon. Since first requesting access, it appears a cover-up of the facility’s work has been taking place:

55. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has conducted further spreading, levelling and compacting of material over most of the site, a significant proportion of which it has also asphalted. There have also been indications of activity within the chamber building.

56. As previously reported, Iran has stated that the allegation of nuclear activities at the Parchin site is “baseless” and that “the recent activities claimed to be conducted in the vicinity of the location of interest to the Agency, has nothing to do with specified location by the Agency”. Iran’s explanation for the soil displacement by trucks is that it was “due to constructing the Parchin new road”.

Iran’s lack of cooperation over Parchin proved a stumbling block in Iran’s ongoing talks with the U.N. over its nuclear program. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano warned back in December that the site could soon be cleared of any evidence that could have been uncovered. The IAEA, which has been issuing quarterly reports on Iran’s nuclear activities since 2003, still concludes though that none of Iran’s declared nuclear material has been diverted towards producing a nuclear weapon.

Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies also still believe that Iran has not made a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon at this time. This has not precluded Congress from beginning to pursue a slew of new action against Iran in recent weeks, with bills in both the House and Senate to increase sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Several experts have questioned the wisdom of ratcheting up sanctions on Iran without end, given the still ongoing pursuit of a diplomatic solution to the stand-off.

A new report out on Monday concludes that the Obama administration should be prepared to contain a nuclear-armed Iran, rather than ignoring such a possibility in favor of its current strategy of prevention.

The Center for New American Security (CNAS) report — titled “If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran” [PDF] — doesn’t advocate the Obama administration leaving its current policy of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. It does, however, question the logic of not preparing for such an eventuality. “In the absence of a well thought-out strategy for the ‘day after’ Iran gets the bomb, strategic improvisation could produce policy responses that are ineffective or even counterproductive,” the report argues.

In response, authors Colin Kahl, Raj Pattani and Jacob Stokes develop a set of eleven policies they believe should be put into place should prevention efforts — up to and including the use of force — fail. In such an event, the White House should pursue five “key components” to achieve those goals:

• Deterrence: attempt to prevent Iranian nuclear use and aggression through credible threats of retaliation;
• Defense: deny Iran the ability to benefit from its nuclear weapons and to protect U.S. partners and allies from aggression;
• Disruption: shape a regional environment resistant to Iranian influence and to thwart and diminish Iran’s destabilizing activities;
• De-escalation: prevent Iran-related crises from spiraling to nuclear war; and
• Denuclearization: constrain Iran’s nuclear weapons program and limit broader damage to the nonproliferation regime

Having such a plan in place is necessary, the authors argue, given the possibility that even a military strike on Iran — which the Obama administration says remains on the table as a last resort to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran — may not cause Tehran to waver. “Even an operationally effective strike would not, in and of itself, permanently end Iran’s program,” Kahl, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, said in an interview with Al-Monitor. “A strike might substantially degrade Iran’s near-term capability to produce nuclear weapons, but it would almost certainly increase Tehran’s motivation to eventually acquire nuclear weapons to deter future attacks.”

Kahl’s statement tracks with previous reports’ conclusions regarding the use of force against Iran. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Federation of American Scientists report issued last month warned that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be “bombed away.” While Tehran still has not decided to pursue nuclear weapons, according to intelligence from the United States and Israel, U.S. and Israeli officials alike fear that a strike on Iran’s nuclear program could in fact spur them onward to produce a nuclear weapon.

Unfortunately, “containment” has all too often become synonymous with “capitulation” in the current discourse about Iran’s nuclear program, as seen during Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s confirmation hearings. However, even the conservative American Enterprise Institute came to the conclusion that the Obama administration should at least consider the possibility of containment. In a 2011 article, the authors noted that containment, while likely difficult, may wind up being the “least-bad choice” on Iran.

North Korea’s government on Friday firmly suggested that the diplomats present at embassies in Pyongyang consider taking their leave, in yet another escalation of their war of words. Across the border in South Korea, the question of whether or not their own nuclear arsenal is required to meet Northern aggression has taken on a new impetus in the last weeks.

Secretary of State John Kerry on Thursday announced a new overseas trip that would take him the Korean peninsula, primarily to deal with the heightened tensions in East Asia. South Korea’s semi-official Yonhap news agency is also reporting that formal talks to revise a U.S.-Republic of Korea bilateral nuclear accord would take place soon after Kerry’s visit.

South Korea is one of twenty-four other countries engaged with the U.S. in what are known as 123 Agreements — so-called because they are established under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The U.S. is also in the process of negotiating 123 Agreements with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam.

Under the terms of the 123 Agreement — which was last renegotiated in 1974 — South Korea currently operates 23 civilian nuclear reactors at four sites across the country. But under the 1974 agreement, South Korea was barred from reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel, due to fears of it being diverted towards a nuclear weapons program. That provision is what’s currently spurring South Korea’s push to open new talks over the agreement.

The argument over reprocessing, however, is being looked at under a new light, given the turning tide among South Koreans over whether their country requires nuclear weapons to serve as a deterrent against the North — which at present possesses enough nuclear fuel for at least 10 plutonium-based nuclear bombs. Two recent opinion polls taken in South Korea showed two-thirds of those surveyed supported the idea of developing nuclear weapons to defend against a North Korean attack. Conservative politicians in South Korea are beginning to latch onto this idea as well:

“We, the Korean people, have been duped by North Korea for the last 20 to 30 years and it is now time for South Koreans to face the reality and do something that we need to do,” said Chung Mong-joon, a lawmaker in the governing Saenuri (New Frontier) Party and a former presidential conservative candidate. “The nuclear deterrence can be the only answer. We have to have nuclear capability.”

At present, the Republic of Korea falls under what’s known as the U.S.’ “nuclear umbrella,” a pledge to use its own nuclear weapons in the protection of South Korea in exchange for them not developing their own. That pledge was likely the deciding factor in the launch of B-2 stealth bombers over South Korea last week, a show of force meant to both reassure South Korea and warn Pyongyang. South Korea’s determination to allow for reprocessing, however, have some concerned that Seoul is no longer completely certain of the U.S. ability to keep them safe. At the same time, a new poll out by Gallup found that 55 percent of Americans said the U.S. should defend South Korea if the North attacks.

However, experts say that not only is it a bad idea for the South Koreans to push for nuclear weapons, but they’re also unlikely to go in that direction. It “would deeply undermine the security situation on the peninsula and the leadership in Seoul understands this,” Arms Control Association Executive Director Daryl Kimball told ThinkProgress. “Talk about South Korean nuclear weapons only makes the situation worse and would further goad the North.”

“Developing a nuclear weapon would be disastrous to the world’s 13th largest economy that is heavily dependent of international trade,” said James Lewis, spokesman for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in a statement released this week. “There would be no smartphones, fashion or superstars like Psy. South Korea can either have Psy or a nuke — they will likely pick Psy.”

North Korea has ratcheted up tensions on the Korean peninsula another notch, this time barring South Korean workers from accessing an industrial complex shared between the two countries.

Beginning on Wednesday, North Korea announced, the Kaesong industrial complex would no longer be allowing in workers from the South, nor shipments of goods, effectively shutting down the one remaining open entry point between the two countries. Seoul has indicated that its 850 citizens working at the complex’s factories at the time of the announcement will be allowed return, but few have done so yet:

The BBC’s Lucy Williamson, at the border, says many have decided not to return immediately because they fear they will not be allowed back in.

One South Korean worker who returned from the complex said some of his colleagues had been held up because they had no transport.

“Other people couldn’t return because they were supposed to be taken home on trucks scheduled to carry supplies into North Korea, but the trucks couldn’t get into the North,” said the worker.

South Korea has demanded that the access point be reopened immediately, and warned of retaliation in the event that South Koreans are harmed. More than 100 South Korean industries have production facilities at the Kaesong complex, which combined pay over $90 million in North Korean salaries every year.

Opened in 2004 as a gesture of goodwill between the states, the Kaesong complex is one of the few legal methods remaining for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — as the reclusive communist regime is formally known — to acquire hard currency. This isn’t the first time the complex has been closed; it was briefly shutdown in 2009, as a protest over joint United States-South Korea military exercise, but there’s no indication as to how long this closure may last. Meanwhile, the Demilitarized Zone — the 2.5 mile wide stretch of land between the two countries — is still being patrolled so far, ruling out any immediate threat of renewed fighting between the two countries.

The move from North Korea is the latest in a long string of moves that has observers of the situation on edge. While no new military movements have been detected on the part of North Korea, its rhetoric has made predicting the North’s next action difficult. On Tuesday, North Korea announced that it intended to restart its shuttered nuclear facilities, which are capable of producing plutonium and enriched uranium.

General U.S. James Thurman — commander of the U.S. forces in Korea and head of the United Nations Command there — spoke with ABC News about the continuing escalations on Tuesday in a rare interview. Asked whether he felt that North Korea’s rhetoric was just empty threats, Gen. Thurman replied, “No, I don’t think that they are. We’ve got to take every threat seriously.” In response to provocations from the North, the U.S. has positioned two warships capable of downing ballistic missiles off the Korean coast.

(Photo: Trucks re-enter South Korea from the North. Credit: European Pressphoto Agency)

Tensions on the Korean peninsula are nothing new — historically, North Korea frequently rattles its saber for one reason for another. But the recent escalation in tensions between the North and South have experts worried that this time might be different, that the threat of the United States being drawn into a devastating war with the nuclear-armed North is real in a way that it might not normally be. At the very least, it’s worth paying special attention this time around.

The escalation of tensions began in mid-February, when North Korea conducted its third-ever nuclear test. While the North’s ability to strike the United States is limited at best, the Obama administration interpreted the test as a violation of international law, and pushed through stricter, though still porous, sanctions on North Korean elites.

North Korea responded in turn by threatening to nullify the armistice that ended the original Korean War, reverting the North and South to a legal state of war. Two days ago, it shut off the last remaining line of communication between the two Korean militaries, warning that “Not words but only arms will work on the U.S. and the South Korean puppet forces.”

Thursday night, the United States responded in kind, conducting a bombing drill with two B-2 bombers over South Korea. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel described the thinking behind the move: “The North Koreans have to understand that what they’re doing is very dangerous.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un got the message Friday morning. He ordered his country’s missile arsenal be readied to strike South Korea and the United States if necessary. While North Korean Unha-3 missiles could theoretically reach the West Coast, it’s not clear the missiles actually work. Moreover, North Korea lacks the technology to arm the missiles with nuclear warheads and to deliver them accurately even if they can get them in proper working order. (One expert has noted that “there is little to no chance that [North Korea] could successfully land a missile on Guam, Hawaii or anywhere else outside the Korean Peninsula that U.S. forces may be stationed.”)

So how is this different from the last 60-odd years of North Korean provocations? Many think it isn’t. Writing in the National Interest, Rajon Menon says the current Northern provocations are an example of the Hermit Kingdom’s “measured madness,” an attempt to wring more concessions out of an overcompensating international community.

But North Korea experts Victor Cha and David Kang disagree. They argue that Kim Jong Un’s inexperience (he’s only been running the country since December 2011), together with the South’s new President and more aggressive military stance, means there’s a greater risk (not certainty by any stretch, but risk) of escalation this time around:

So why worry? Two reasons. First, North Korea has a penchant for testing new South Korean presidents. A new one was just inaugurated in February, and since 1992, the North has welcomed these five new leaders by disturbing the peace. Whether in the form of missile launches, submarine incursions, or naval clashes, these North Korean provocations were met by each newly elected South Korean president with patience rather than pique. The difference today is that South Korea is no longer turning the other cheek…for half a century, neither side believed that the benefits of starting a major war outweighed the costs. The worry is that the new North Korean leader might not hold to the same logic, given his youth and inexperience.

Read more

Members of Congress have been intensifying their Iran-war rhetoric in recent days. For example, Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) are planning to introduce a resolution that urges the United States government to support Israel — militarily, economically and diplomatically — should the Jewish state be “compelled to take military action” against Iran.

While it appears that Congress, still struggling to shake the neocons’ influence, tends to favor a more militaristic approach toward the Islamic Republic, the Obama administration has focused on a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis, while pledging to take no options off the table and also warning about what war with Iran would look like.

But given now the Graham-Menendez resolution, what do the Israelis think about war with Iran? It’s no secret the current Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu is the most vocal about pushing a military option with Iran, but over the past two years, numerous former and current high-level members of Israel’s security establishment have pushed back. Below is a compilation of those statements:

Read more

In his State of the Union address last night, President Barack Obama referred to the need to reduce the force structure of our strategic military systems by cutting the number of deployed nuclear weapons. Press reports over the last year have indicated that military and civilian leaders have settled on a plan to reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons by one-third, to between 1,000 and 1,100, down from 1,700. President Obama should push for such a reduction, which would follow the practice of his predecessors and improve our national security. As the Center for American Progress has argued for the last decade, this move makes sense both strategically and fiscally, and is long overdue.

When President George W. Bush entered the White House in 2001, he moved to cut our stockpile of nuclear weapons—which at that time numbered about 6,000 to the lowest-possible number consistent with our national security. The president offered to make these cuts unilaterally, but Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted the reductions codified in a treaty that would limit deployed nuclear weapons to less than 1,500 warheads for each country. In 2002, under pressure from Russia, President Bush agreed to a legally binding accord the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT—which stated that both sides will limit their arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed nuclear weapons each.

Subsequently, in 2010 President Obama negotiated a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, with Russia that calls for reducing each country’s number of deployed nuclear weapons to 1,550 by 2018, but places no limits on the total number of warheads, which now number 5,000. This was an impressive and welcome achievement. But analyses by the Air War College, Gen. James Cartwright, the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commander of U.S. Strategic Command; and Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) all argue that these numbers of deployed and reserve nuclear weapons and warheads are far more than the United States needs for the purpose of deterrence in the 21st century.

Analysts at the Air War College argue that the United States can achieve deterrence with a total nuclear force (deployed and reserve) of 300 weapons, while Gen. Cartwright believes a total of 800 (400 deployed and 400 in reserve) would be sufficient.

These reductions would result in substantial savings. The United States currently spends about $55 billion a year to maintain its triad of nuclear-capable bombers, land-based ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Moreover, if the United States wants to refurbish, repair, and modernize its existing nuclear arsenal in its current size, we will have to spend about $600 billion over the next decade. Adapting the Cartwright plan would save approximately $120 billion. Depending on the specifics of its implementation, even President Obama’s more moderate target could save tens of billions over the next decade. Additionally, reducing our nuclear footprint will reduce long-term maintenance costs and reduce the risks of theft or mishandling of nuclear material.

Given the pressure that all government expenditures will face over the next decade due to our fiscal problems, maintaining our current oversized nuclear arsenal is unnecessary, unaffordable, and unwise. The savings from reducing our nuclear arsenal can be used for either more pressing national security priorities or to pay down the national debt. This is why the Center for American Progress has advocated for reductions to our nuclear spending for nearly a decade and why we fully support President Obama’s planned reductions.

Lawrence Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.

News that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — also known as North Korea — has tested its third nuclear weapon has given Republicans a new angle to trot out old attacks on the Obama administration’s security priorities.

The attacks come from a multitude of directions, but all share the common thread of being firmly opposed to some part of the Obama administration agenda:

“North Korea just responded to POTUS principle of ‘national security by kumbaya.’”

The Weekly Standard and former Rep. Allen West (R-FL) chose to focus on the U.S. response to the test, highlighting their disdain for international cooperation and what they unfairly deem Obama’s weakness in the face of international challenges:

North Korea just responded to POTUS principle of “national security by kumbaya.”

— Allen West (@AllenWest) February 12, 2013

Such right-wing attacks on Obama fail to include what they propose as a proper policy towards North Korea. Scoffing at the U.N. Security Council is easy, as proved by House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA), but cooperation from China — a key member of the Council — will be necessary for any solution on the Korean peninsula. The North Korean government has likewise proved unresponsive to the combination of carrots and sticks by the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations alike.

“U.S. security cannot…afford even more cuts to U.S. defense capabilities”

Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Rep. Buck McKeon used the North Korean test as an opportunity to reissue his fears about the pending cuts to the military budget, saying in a statement, “U.S. security cannot, in the face of the president’s sequester and $500 billion in reductions to the DoD budget so far, afford even more cuts to U.S. defense capabilities, such as our nuclear deterrent.”

Nuclear deterrent is based around the idea that other countries know that any attack on the United States would be met with a nuclear counter-strike. Sequestration’s cuts to the military budget — while clearly better if targeted rather across the board — would still leave the U.S. with the largest military budget in the world, as well as the largest nuclear stockpile.

“Will POTUS propose US nuclear weapon cuts the day after North Korea conducts another nuke test?”

President Obama is expected to use tonight’s State of the Union address to restart discussion of reducing the U.S. nuclear stockpile in his second term. With that in mind, Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX), the Senate Majority Whip and a long-time opponent of nuclear disarmament, took to Twitter:

Will POTUS propose US nuclear weapon cuts the day after North Korea conducts another nuke test? fb.me/XYXZTDOX

— JohnCornyn (@JohnCornyn) February 12, 2013

The United States in 2010 possessed approximately 5,113 nuclear warheads, with only Russia close to matching that number. In contrast, North Korea currently possesses enough plutonium for between two to four more bombs at the most and is under sanction preventing import of new nuclear material. While today’s test shows some improvement over previous tests’ yields, it is unlikely that Korean nuclear technology has been miniaturized enough to fit atop a ballistic missile. Any cuts to the nuclear weapons in the U.S. would do little to upset so large an imbalance.