(Credit: AP)

The International Crisis Group (ICG) on Tuesday published a new report “Drones: Myths And Reality In Pakistan,” examining the ongoing war against militant groups located in Pakistan. The report calls on both the United States and Pakistan to come clean about the ongoing use of drones against suspected terrorists, saying that more than strikes are needed to end Pakistan’s ongoing problem with militants.

Since 2004, according to the ICG, at least 350 U.S. drone strikes have taken place on Pakistani soil, within the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Complicating operations against militant groups based in the area, the vast majority of Pakistan’s laws simply do not apply to the FATA, with the region instead following its own set of tribal laws and codes. Given the lack of control Islamabad exerts, the FATA has long been a haven for armed groups, including those who strike across the border in Afghanistan, including Mullah Omar’s Taliban and the Haqqani Network, as well as the Pakistani Taliban, which strikes against Pakistan itself.

One of the major issues ICG raises regarding drone strikes in the area is the lack of firm intelligence about precisely who is being targeted. In place of firm data, the U.S. often utilizes what are known as “signature strikes” or “personality strikes.” Groups of men between 16-55 who meet a certain profile are often considered legitimate targets, based on “pattern of life” data including where they’ve traveled while under surveillance and whether or not they were in the vicinity of known targets when the strike occurred.

As the report details, Pakistan and U.S. are locked in delicate dance over the actual use of drones within Pakistan, each concealing the full truth from the public. The U.S. still won’t officially confirm that the CIA-run targeted killing program within Pakistan even exists. The IGC says Pakistan often displays behavior that “borders on the schizophrenic” when it comes to the drone program. The Pakistani government often claims to have no forewarning about the use of drones and publicly denounces many of the strikes, even with ample evidence that they provide permission for the operations to occur, especially when carried out against its enemies.

ICG suggests both Washington and Islamabad become more transparent about the relationship the two have on drone strikes, while shifting their policies away from relying solely on military options, and instead taking a more comprehensive approach to combating militancy:

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Former DNI Dennis Blair

Speaking on a Council on Foreign Relations conference call with scholar Michael Zenko — who recently published a report on reforming drones’ use — Blair said that drones should be thought of as “long-range snipers, in the military sense.” Despite his support, he recognized the limitations. “I’m not as much a believer that drones are ‘wonder weapons’ as other people,” Blair made clear.

More concerning to both Zenko and Blair was the way in which the use of unmanned aerial vehicles — the technical name for drones — goes unexplained to the public and that the justification for their role in targeted killing is tightly held. That combination negatively impacts the U.S. mission in the countries it is trying to impact, Zenko argued. “Drones are the face of U.S. foreign policy” in Pakistan and Yemen, he said. “We allow the Taliban, and the Pakistani [intelligence agency], to tell the story of how our drones are being used.”

The majority of criticism of the Obama administration’s drone program from Zenko and Blair centered on the targeted killing component. On Sunday, the Washington Post reported that a new “playbook” is being developed to codify the ways in which targeted killings are decided upon and conducted:

Among the subjects covered in the playbook are the process for adding names to kill lists, the legal principles that govern when U.S. citizens can be targeted overseas and the sequence of approvals required when the CIA or U.S. military conducts drone strikes outside war zones.

U.S. officials said the effort to draft the playbook was nearly derailed late last year by disagreements among the State Department, the CIA and the Pentagon on the criteria for lethal strikes and other issues. Granting the CIA a temporary exemption for its Pakistan operations was described as a compromise that allowed officials to move forward with other parts of the playbook.

While Zenko and Blair both welcomed the playbook concept in theory, they both had their reservations about the scope of the document. “A classified ‘playbook’ does not reassure the American people, who I think are the primary ones that need to be convinced that their government is doing the right thing,” said Blair. Zenko in turn called a playbook that did not cover Pakistan at all “useless,” as 85 percent of targeted killings in non-battlefield areas have taken place in Pakistan.

Asked about the split between drone programs operated by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, Blair said that he strongly believes a great majority of the use of drones should be used by military forces. At present, the Defense Department operates armed drones openly, using them for strikes in areas such as Yemen. These strikes are included in reports to Congress under the War Powers Act, leaving a paper trail for their use.

The CIA run program in Pakistan falls under aims to be covert, with the entire program classified. This distinction, Blair said, allows Pakistan to have the best of all worlds on the program, allowing the United States to take care of shared militant threats while vehemently denouncing the United States.

What Blair’s looking for isn’t greater review of the program, though. There’s plenty of that, he said, as there are internal review methods within the Executive Branch, as well as reports to Congress from both Defense and the CIA regarding the programs. What’s needed instead is more transparency and investigation into the programs. The goal, according to Blair: “Remove not the secrecy, but the mystery of these things.” Blair’s thinking coincides with several major newspapers who are suing for greater transparency, as well as former Pentagon lawyer Jeh Johnson.

Outgoing Defense Secretary Leon Panetta can see a world in which the use of drones is no longer a staple in the United States’ counterterrorism toolkit, according to an interview with ABC News.

In a wide-ranging interview with ABC’s Martha Raddatz, Panetta spoke on topics including Afghanistan, Syria, and the current crisis in Mali. When asked about whether he believes American civilians should know more about the use of drones by the Central Intelligence Agency, Panetta demurred. “I wish frankly that Americans you know, could really see what I’ve seen as director of the C.I.A. and now as Secretary of Defense in terms of our use of operations to go after those that have attacked our country,” Panetta said.

Panetta went on to defend the use of drones in going after Al Qaeda, while also leaving an opening for their eventual retirement as a cornerstone of that strategy:

PANETTA: And a key part of that has obviously been the use of the operations involving the drones that target those that are in the leadership in Al Qaeda. And that’s a reality. We’ve decimated their leadership as a result of those operations. So you know, my view of it is, you know, it’s not something that we’re going to have to continue to use forever. But it’s a very effective tool, it’s a very effective weapon at going after those who are enemies of the United States of America.

Watch the interview here:

Panetta’s statements echo those made by outgoing Pentagon lawyer Jeh Johnson, who has previously said that the so-called war on terror “shouldn’t be regarded as a perpetual war without any sort of end.” While Johnson’s comments earlier this month were based on a speech delivered in November at Oxford, they were expanded upon only after he left office. Panetta’s interview may come while he is heading for the exit, but he remains in charge of the Pentagon for the time being.

For now, though, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles — as drones are formally known — continues unabated, with a surge of strikes within Pakistan so far in 2013. Those numbers have not been acknlowedged by the U.S. government, however, as the CIA’s program remains classified. The secrecy surrounding the program was shown in Panetta’s notable lack of a response during the interview to Raddatz’s question, the continuation of a policy that lead to several major newspapers calling for more transparency. Even unarmed drones aren’t without their own controversy, exemplified in reaction to the announcement last week a fleet of surveillance drones are being sold to Afghanistan for use after the US ends its combat mission in 2014.

Under a new military doctrine, Pakistan has now officially recognized that “homegrown militancy” is the top threat that the country faces, replacing neighboring India for the first time.

For decades, it has been an unofficial policy of Pakistan to cultivate ties with militant groups for use as proxies in battles against external enemies. These groups could be used in either direction across Pakistan’s border, to the west towards Afghanistan or to the east towards India. Among these, the Haqqani Network remains the perpetrator of some of the most deadliest attacks within Afghanistan, with Pakistan viewing the organization as a hedge towards retaining influence in the state as the United States prepares for a drawdown and eventual exit.

Likewise, the deadly coordinated Mumbai attacks of 2008, in which gunmen killed over 164 in a single day in India’s largest city, was conducted by terrorists on the order of and with assistance from Pakistan. In recent years, however, Pakistan has found itself plagued by similar terrorist organizations, including the Pakistani Taliban, which is recently responsible for shooting a young girl named Malala Yousafzai. For the Pakistani Army — which often exercises control of the state either through periodic coups or the so-called “deep state” — to label militants as the primary threat that the state faces is a momentous shift.

Despite this, the army attempted to play down the importance of the change in policy:

“Army prepares for all forms of threats. Sub-conventional threat is a reality and is a part of a threat matrix faced by our country. But it doesn’t mean that the conventional threat has receded,” Maj-Gen Asim Saleem Bajwa, the director general of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) told The Express Tribune.

According to the BBC, the new Army Doctrine talks about unidentified militant groups and their role to create unrest in the country. It also mentions that Pakistani militants have found refuge across the Durand Line in Afghanistan.

Since the partition of 1947, Pakistani leaders have believed that India posed the country’s greatest existential threat. The perceived threat was exacerbated by tensions over control of territory in the state of Kashmir, which was the cause of three of the four wars that the states have fought. While the new doctrine does not negate the premise that India is a threat, its downgrading could be the key to a lasting upgrade in relations between the two.

In the same way, tensions between the United States and Pakistan have often been the result of the latter’s ties to groups operating in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan. The radio silence between the two during the raid that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden was due to the belief within the United States that someone within Pakistan’s military with ties to militants would leak details of the attack. As a result, the raid caused a deep chill in U.S.-Pakistani relations.