In The War Of Ideas, Bush and McCain Wield A Wet Noodle»

In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, Commentary’s Gabriel Schoenfeld warned of a “growing pro-Obama/anti-McCain axis,”* an Ecumenical Legion of Doom that, in Schoenfeld’s telling, includes Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, the leaders of Hamas, Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmedinajad, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il:

The obvious possibility…is that one or more of these players might do everything in its power to hurt Mr. McCain and help Mr. Obama. Dramatic action keyed to our internal politics is, after all, already a page in some of our adversaries’ playbooks.

Today, Alex Koppelman notes that Schoenfeld’s argument manages to ignore everything that we have learned about the way that groups like Al Qaeda use media:

Schoenfeld…reached back to the 2004 presidential election, writing, “In 2004, Osama bin Laden’s television appearance only a weekend before the presidential election may have been a naked attempt to influence the outcome by reminding voters that he was still at large and President Bush’s policy had failed.”

Conspicuously absent from Schoenfeld’s argument that these various groups would want Obama as president and would take some action to help him, and from his discussion of the 2004 bin Laden videotape, is one very important point: The CIA believed that bin Laden wanted the tape to help President Bush, not his Democratic opponent, Sen. John Kerry.

Indeed, it’s important to recognize what a propaganda bonanza the neoconservative “war on terror” has been for Osama bin Laden, as well as for extremists, Islamic and otherwise, throughout the world. (The only thing that Kim Jong-Il, Ahmadinejad, Putin, and Hugo Chavez really have in common is the extent to which Bush’s arrogant unilateralism has helped justify the further consolidation of their political power.) The attacks of 9/11 made bin Laden a major figure in Arab media and culture; the decision by Bush and the neocons to cast him as the sinister leader of a global Islamofascist movement made him a legend. Simply put, Bush’s policy response to 9/11 has done more to promote bin Laden’s ideology than a hundred 9/11s. John McCain’s insistence on treating “Islamic extremism” as the “the transcendental challenge” indicates that he simply doesn’t grasp this.

*Why do neocons love that word, “axis” so much? Partly because the World War II allusion allows them to indulge their Churchill fetish. But mostly because it enables them to create the impression of an enemy “alliance” where there is no real evidence of any such thing, in order to conflate various extremist groups with differing, and often conflicting, goals and ideologies into a single Islamofascist Frankenstein’s monster, which they can then use to scare the simple villagers who read their magazines into voting for their preferred candidates.

There’s no denying that there are real threats out there in the world. The problem is that conservatives by and large have demonstrated over the past seven years that they are incapable of actually tackling the 21st century threats. They are stuck in a World War II mindset that is irrelevant to today’s challenges – after spending nearly a trillion dollars and grinding down our military, terrorist attacks have increased, the Al Qaeda threat remains real and present, and the positions of autocrats from Pyongyang to Moscow to Riyadh has gotten stronger.

O’Hanlon Delivers A Message Tehran Would Love»

Our guest blogger is Peter Juul, a national security consultant at the Center for American Progress Action Fund.

Michael O’Hanlon has yet another op-ed in the Washington Times today arguing that Iran is “seeking to establish itself as the region’s hegemon,” primarily by “stoking violence in Iraq.” Iranian involvement in Iraq has thus become another rationale for O’Hanlon’s open-ended policy of “strategic patience” in Iraq. To prevent Iran from becoming a regional hegemon, the argument goes, “all [the United States] can do is be patient, keep fighting in Iraq… and keep trying to prove we are the reasonable ones.”

O’Hanlon chides proponents of engagement with Iran as failing to “understand the real nature of the situation we face.” As usual, though, it’s O’Hanlon who doesn’t understand the real nature of the situation the United States faces in Iraq and the region more broadly.

As the New York Times reported today, the United States and Iran increasingly find themselves on common ground in Iraq as a result of the open-ended commitment of U.S. forces favored by O’Hanlon and the Bush administration. Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, gave strong support to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s offensive against Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Basra: “The idea of the government in Basra was to fight outlaws. This was the right of the government and the responsibility of the government. And in my opinion the government was able to achieve a positive result in Basra.”

The Iranian ambassador’s words could have come out of the mouth of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In an unannounced visit to Baghdad yesterday, she praised Maliki’s “very good decision by the Iraqis to not let Basra continue to be under the control of criminals and militias.” Read the rest of this entry »

Rice: ‘Badr Has Decided To Be An Organization, Not A Militia’»

During a press conference in which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice mocked Iraq Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr for issuing threats from Iran (unlike Rice’s bosses, who bravely issue threats from the trenches of Washington, DC), Secretary Rice and Ambassador Crocker were asked about distinctions between a militia like the Badr Organization, the militia wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Here’s what was said:

QUESTION: What is the distinction that all of you make between groups like the Badr Organization, which his for all intents a militia and in the past has been involved in events here that have been troublesome, even in 2005, 2006, not at the same level as the Jaish al-Mahdi, but clearly involved? So what’s the distinction you make between the Badr Organization? Why are they now different to the Jaish al-Mahdi?

AMBASSADOR CROCKER: The Badr organization made the choice a while back that they were going to step away from a militia identity and move into politics. That’s why it’s the Badr Organization. It used to be the Badr Brigades. They have opted to be, again, part of mainstream politics here. That’s the choice that’s now in front of the Sadr movement.

QUESTION: When would you say that they really changed to that? Because in 2005, there was the Jadriya bunker incident which was clearly linked to the –

SECRETARY RICE: We’re three years past that. And –

QUESTION: So when was the transition? In 2007, there was a case of a member of the Badr Organization threatening Hussein Kamal when he was here –

SECRETARY RICE: Look, I don’t think you can say that there won ‘t be an individual here or there who may break this — that decision to move in that direction. But Badr as an organization has decided to be an organization, not to be a militia.

Okay, glad we got that cleared up. The Badr are no longer considered a “militia” because they have decided to redefine themselves as “not a militia,” and the U.S. is apparently satisfied with this. Now, if only Muqtada al-Sadr would cease his opposition to the U.S. occupation of Iraq and get on board with the U.S.’s plans to use his country as a base from which to project power throughout the Middle East, he would be amazed at how fast the U.S. would be willing to redefine his militia in a similar fashion.

The truth is that, despite this transparent attempt to redefine these militias in a way that reflects “progress” in Iraq, they remain militias. Badr and Da’wa militiamen have been incorporated into the “Iraqi army” in Baghdad and southern Iraq, just as units of the Kurdish peshmerga have been incorporated into the “Iraqi army” in Kurdistan, but despite the new uniforms, these fighters remain loyal to, and continue to commit violence on behalf of, the political factions with which they originated. This is what is known as “success” in Surgeland.

McClatchy News Service Baghdad bureau chief Leila Fadel was interviewed on Bill Moyers’ program last Friday, and explained how silly these word games are.

Watch it:

Transcript below: Read the rest of this entry »

WaPo Editors Express Their Concern About Iran By Supporting An Iraq Policy That Strengthens Iran»

Our guest blogger is Peter Juul, a national security consultant at the Center for American Progress Action Fund.

The Washington Post published an editorial yesterday arguing that Iran is engaging in a region-wide proxy war against the United States and its Middle Eastern allies.

The editorial swallowed hook, line, and sinker the Bush administration’s argument that the United States and the Iraqi government are fighting a proxy war against Iranian-backed militants linked however vicariously to Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army:

Threaded through the reports of progress in Iraq by Gen. David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker last week was the story of a larger failure: the inability of the United States and its allies to contain the growing aggressiveness of Iran. Since Gen. Petraeus and Mr. Crocker last reported to Congress seven months ago, Iranian-backed militias and “special groups” in Iraq have evolved from a shadow force into the largest remaining threat to U.S. forces and the Iraqi government. It was Iranian-supplied rockets that slammed into the Green Zone in recent days and Iranian-trained militants who stiffened the resistance to Iraqi government forces trying to gain control over the southern city of Basra.

This is an inaccurate description of the political situation in Iraq. Iran has ties to every major Shi’a party in Iraq – including the very parties the administration has chosen to ally with. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the biggest player in Iraq’s governing coalition, was founded in Iran, and its militia has been incorporated into Iraq’s security forces. As General Petraeus recently told CNN journalist Michael Ware, deep Iranian influence in the highest levels of the Iraqi government is “a reality.”

The fighting between the Iraqi government and Sadr’s Mahdi Army isn’t a proxy war between the United States and Iran, it’s a struggle for power between two Iranian clients. President Bush’s policy has essentially committed American blood and treasure to serve the interests of Iran’s proxies in the Iraqi government.

Despite these facts, the Washington Post editorial board continues to support “prolonged commitment” of American troops to Iraq. It has chastised progressive presidential candidates for refusing to “concede that the ‘surge’ of U.S. troops has worked.” However, the Post editorial board has failed to consider that an open-ended military commitment to the Iraqi government serves Iranian interests far more than American interests. Tehran gets the United States to protect its own clients in the Iraqi government, all while keeping American troops tied down and unable to threaten Iran.

Now the Post tells its readers the United States needs to counter Iran’s “growing menace” in the region. But the very Iraq policy the Post advocates in fact strengthens Iran’s regional position, enabling it to press its interests in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iraq.

Crocker: ‘Iran Has A Dialogue With Everyone In the Iraqi Shia Community’»

Several of the Senators questioned the recent events in Basra, but thus far only Sen. Jack Reed (D-RI) has challenged the administration’s attempt to frame the Basra fighting as simply a conflict between “the Iraqi government and Iranian-backed militias.” Here is Senator Reed’s exchange with Ambassador Ryan Crocker:

SEN. REED: Mr. Ambassador, is the Mahdi Army…the only Shi’a organization that is receiving assistance, cooperation, has significant contacts on a routine basis with the Iranians? […] Would that include the ISCI element, the Badr Brigade?

AMB. CROCKER: I’d put that in the second category. Iran has a dialogue with, again –

SEN. REED: Everyone in the Shi’a community.

AMB. CROCKER: — everyone. That’s right. And –

SEN. REED: And it’s a mutual dialogue.

AMB. CROCKER: And not just the Shi’a community. What has happened with the Supreme Council and Badr is that they’ve basically gotten out of the overt militia business. It’s now the Badr organization. And many of its elements did integrate with the Iraqi security forces.

SEN. REED: Thank you. My time’s — (inaudible).

It’s clear that Crocker knew what Reed was getting at, and tried to avoid addressing Reed’s important point: Iran has strong and longstanding ties to the U.S.’s current favorite Shia faction, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Given how alarmed many conservatives are over Iran’s role in Iraq, you would think that concerns over the extent of Iran’s relationship with the Mahdi Army would be secondary to concerns over the fact that the United States and Iran currently share a primary ally in the Iraqi government. And that that ally happens to be an organization founded in Iran, under the auspices of Ayatollah Khomeini.

As for Crocker’s assertion that the Badr have “gotten out of the militia business,” what he means is that thousands of these Iranian-trained and indoctrinated militiamen have been inducted into the Iraqi security forces, and thus are no longer considered a militia. Also, they’ve changed their name. Crocker’s “second category” of militias apparently means militias who we no longer define as militias because they’ve agreed to cooperate, for now, with the American occupation.

Full transcript: Read the rest of this entry »

Neocons Preparing The Ground For Petraeus Testimony By Hyping Threat Of Iran»

A story yesterday in Britain’s Sunday Times suggested that General David Petraeus “is expected to tell Congress [that] Iranian forces were involved in the recent battle for Basra” when he testifies before Congress this week.

Right, but the question Congress should ask is: On which side?

In the Weekly Standard last week, Fred and Kimberly Kagan, two of the architects of the surge, described the Basra battle as a security operation launched by “the legitimate Government of Iraq and its legally-constituted security forces [against] illegal, foreign-backed, insurgent and criminal militias serving leaders who openly call for the defeat and humiliation of the United States and its allies in Iraq and throughout the region.” By the latter, the Kagans presumably mean Muqtada al-Sadr, whom the Kagans consistently have sought to present as a tool of Iran. In doing this, the Kagans and other conservative pundits have seriously misunderstood and misrepresented the relationships between Iran and the various Shia factions in Iraq.

There is little actual doubt about who is Iran’s primary proxy in Iraq: The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), formerly the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI was founded in the early 1980s by exiled Iraqi clerical activists in Iran, with the blessing and support of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) created and trained SCIRI’s armed wing, the Badr Corps (now known as the Badr Organization), for the express purpose of eventually serving as an arm of Iran’s Quds Force in Iraq. SCIRI was among the Iraqi exile parties with whom the U.S. worked in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, but maintained close ties to Iran. ISCI continues to receive Iranian funds, and many members of the Badr militia reportedly still receive pensions from the IRGC. Thousands of these Iranian-trained and indoctrinated militiamen have been incorporated into the Iraqi police and army.

Sadr, on the other hand, is seen by the Iranians as an annoyance. This does not mean, however, that Iran has not sought to build ties to his movement. Though initially surprised by the strength of Sadr’s movement, (which they rightly regarded as a hindrance to their quick, easy, SCIRI-facilitated dominance of Iraq), Iran quickly grasped — unlike the U.S. — that Sadr’s political appeal was genuine, and has sought to manage it, rather than simply deny or suppress it, as the U.S. has done.

In reality, Iran maintains ties with all of the major Shia actors in Iraq, and, as the main beneficiary of the Iraq invasion, stands to gain however the current political struggle is resolved. Because of ISCI’s acceptance (for the moment) of U.S. goals in Iraq, credulous American analysts have ignored overwhelming evidence of ISCI’s continuing ties to Iran in order to portray them as friendly to U.S. interests. Senators should beware ideologically-motivated attempts to portray the current power struggle in Iraq as simply “the Iraqi government versus Iranian-supported bad guys.”