

**PENDING**

HC-7, 8, 9

**A. MODIFIED**

AMENDMENT NO. 3017 Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding Iran.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—110th Cong., 1st Sess.

**H. R. 1585**

*WA modified*

**AMENDMENT No. 3017**

To: **By** Ryl - Others  
**To:** Amend. No. 2011

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AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. LIEBERMAN

*and for*  
*Mr Graham*  
*Mr Coleman*  
*Mr Alexander*  
*Mr Ensign*  
*Mr Corker*  
~~*Mr Blumenthal*~~  
*Mr Thune*

Viz:

- 1 At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:
- 2 **SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.**
- 3 (a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following
- 4 findings:
- 5 (1) General David Petraeus, commander of the
- 6 Multi-National Force Iraq, stated in testimony be-
- 7 fore a joint session of the Committee on Armed
- 8 Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
- 9 the House of Representatives on September 10,

1       2007, that “[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coa-  
2       lition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use  
3       of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force,  
4       seeks to turn the Shi’a militia extremists into a  
5       Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight  
6       a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition  
7       forces in Iraq”.

8           (2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States  
9       Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a  
10      joint session of the Committee on Armed Services  
11      and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House  
12      of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that  
13      “Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming  
14      to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively  
15      undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the  
16      enemies of the Iraqi state”.

17           (3) The most recent National Intelligence Esti-  
18      mate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that  
19      “Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal sup-  
20      port for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, par-  
21      ticularly the JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi], since at least  
22      the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed pene-  
23      trator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically”.

24           (4) The Report of the Independent Commission  
25      on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on Sep-

1       tember 6, 2007, states that “[t]he Commission con-  
2       cludes that the evidence of Iran’s increasing activism  
3       in the southeastern part of the country, including  
4       Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. . . It is an  
5       accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons  
6       being used to ‘defeat’ our armor protection comes  
7       across the border from Iran with relative impunity”.

8           (5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of  
9       the Independent Commission on the Security Forces  
10      of Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on  
11      Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007,  
12      that “[w]e judge that the goings-on across the Ira-  
13      nian border in particular are of extreme severity and  
14      have the potential of at least delaying our efforts in-  
15      side the country. Many of the arms and weapons  
16      that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from  
17      across the Iranian border”.

18           (6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support  
19      for extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that  
20      “[w]e know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen.  
21      Qassem] Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods  
22      Force. . . We believe that he works directly for the  
23      supreme leader of the country”.

24           (7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of  
25      Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the

1 United States presence in Iraq, that “[t]he political  
2 power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we  
3 will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of  
4 course we are prepared to fill the gap”.

5 (8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress,  
6 with respect to President Ahmedinejad’s statement,  
7 on September 11, 2007, that “[t]he Iranian involve-  
8 ment in Iraq—its support for extremist militias,  
9 training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provi-  
10 sion of munitions that are used against our force as  
11 well as the Iraqis—are all, in my view, a pretty clear  
12 demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he  
13 says, and is already trying to implement it to the  
14 best of his ability”.

15 (9) General Petraeus stated on September 12,  
16 2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of  
17 Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces  
18 of the United States in Iraq, that “[t]he evidence is  
19 very, very clear. We captured it when we captured  
20 Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy com-  
21 mander, and others, and it’s in black and white...  
22 We interrogated these individuals. We have on  
23 tape... Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you  
24 have done what you have done without Iranian sup-  
25 port, he literally throws up his hands and laughs

1       and says, of course not... So they told us about the  
2       amounts of money that they have received. They told  
3       us about the training that they received. They told  
4       us about the ammunition and sophisticated weap-  
5       onry and all of that that they received”.

6           (10) General Petraeus further stated on Sep-  
7       tember 14, 2007, that “[w]hat we have got is evi-  
8       dence. This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off  
9       computers that we captured, documents and so  
10      forth... In one case, a 22-page document that lays  
11      out the planning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct,  
12      and aftermath of the operation conducted that re-  
13      sulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala  
14      back in January”.

15          (11) The Department of Defense report to Con-  
16      gress entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in  
17      Iraq” and released on September 18, 2007, con-  
18      sistent with section 9010 of Public Law 109-289,  
19      states that “[t]here has been no decrease in Iranian  
20      training and funding of illegal Shi’a militias in Iraq  
21      that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civil-  
22      ians... Tehran’s support for these groups is one of  
23      the greatest impediments to progress on reconcili-  
24      ation”.

1           (12) The Department of Defense report further  
2 states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi'a ex-  
3 tremist groups in Iraq, that "[m]ost of the explo-  
4 sives and ammunition used by these groups are pro-  
5 vided by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard  
6 Corps-Qods Force... For the period of June  
7 through the end of August, [explosively formed pene-  
8 trator] events are projected to rise by 39 percent  
9 over the period of March through May".

10           (13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has  
11 held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq secu-  
12 rity with representatives of the Government of the  
13 Islamic Republic of Iran.

14           (14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Con-  
15 gress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these  
16 talks, stating that "I laid out the concerns we had  
17 over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq's se-  
18 curity, but found no readiness on Iranians' side at  
19 all to engage seriously on these issues. The impres-  
20 sion I came with after a couple rounds is that the  
21 Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of  
22 discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the  
23 U.S. as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rath-  
24 er than actually doing serious business...Right now,

1 I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on  
2 the Iranian side".

3 (15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Con-  
4 gress on September 11, 2007, stating that "[w]e  
5 have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest  
6 that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in  
7 support of extremist elements that are going after  
8 our forces as well as the Iraqis".

9 (b) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-  
10 ate—

11 (1) that the manner in which the United States  
12 transitions and structures its military presence in  
13 Iraq will have critical long-term consequences for the  
14 future of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in  
15 particular with regard to the capability of the Gov-  
16 ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pose a  
17 threat to the security of the region, the prospects for  
18 democracy for the people of the region, and the  
19 health of the global economy;

20 (2) that it is a ~~major~~ <sup>critical</sup> national interest of the  
21 United States to prevent the Government of the Is-  
22 lamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi'a militia ex-  
23 tremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that  
24 could serve its interests inside Iraq, including by

1       overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting institutions  
2       of the legitimate Government of Iraq;

3           (3) that it should be the policy of the United  
4       States to ~~combat, contain, and roll back~~ <sup>Stop inside Iraq</sup> the violent  
5       activities and destabilizing influence ~~inside Iraq~~ of  
6       the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its  
7       foreign facilitators such as Lebanese Hezbollah, and  
8       its indigenous Iraqi proxies;

9           (4) to support the prudent and calibrated use  
10       of all instruments of United States national power  
11       in Iraq, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence,  
12       and military instruments, in support of the policy  
13       ~~determined in paragraph (3)~~ with respect to the Gov-  
14       ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its  
15       proxies;

16           (5) that the United States should designate ~~Iran's~~ <sup>Iran's</sup>  
17       Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign  
18       terrorist organization under section 219 of the Im-  
19       migration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic  
20       Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially  
21       Designated Global Terrorists, as established under  
22       the International Emergency Economic Powers Act  
23       and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and

24           (6) that the Department of the Treasury should  
25       act with all possible expediency to complete the list-

1 ing of those entities targeted under United Nations  
2 Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopt-  
3 ed unanimously on December 23, 2006 and March  
4 24, 2007, respectively.

insert prior to section (6) the following:  
(16) Ambassador Crocker further testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, with respect to talks with Iran, that "I think that it's an option that we want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds did not produce anything. I don't think that we should either, therefore, be in a big hurry to have another round, nor do I think we should say we're not going to talk anymore... I do believe it's important to keep the option for further discussions on the table."

(17) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on September 16, 2007 that "I think that the administration believes at this point that continuing to try and deal with the Iranian threat, the Iranian challenge, through diplomatic and economic means is by far the preferable approach. That's the one we are using. We always say all options are on the table, but clearly, the diplomatic and economic approach is the one that we are pursuing."