Russian Cooperation on Iran

Ross Douthat offers some sound criticism of what he rightly terms Max Boot’s “unrealpolitik” with regard to Russia. I wanted, however, to take on one specific argument Boot advances that Ross kind of glossed over, namely the question of Russia and the Iranian nuclear program. Boot says that on Iran “Russia has been more hindrance than help. It has helped Iran to develop its nuclear program and it has been selling Iran high-tech surface-to-air missiles. Russia has gone along grudgingly with weak sanctions at the UN but, along with China, it has blocked more robust action.”

This business of tallying up Russian actions and trying to decide whether they are, on balance, more help or hindrance is the wrong way to think about it. The right way to think about it is to consider the range of options available to Russia. At one margin, Russia could do everything it is Boot would like Russia to do. At another extreme, Russia could send Iran a gift basket full of working nuclear weapons — or maybe a bunch of the guys who build Russia’s nuclear weapons could head to Teheran suitcases full of blueprint and fissile material. In the real world, Russia is clearly positioned between those extremes. And over time, Russia’s posture has shifted. In the future, Russia’s posture could shift further in either direction. Thus, when we think about our relationship with Russia, it behooves us to consider the implications of our actions for Russia’s attitude toward the Iranian nuclear program. This remains true whether or not you think Russia has been “on balance” on the right side of the issue.