Russia Blundering in Latin America

There’s something of a vogue in certain circles in the United States for expressing admiration for the competence and strategic acumen of Vladimir Putin, if not for his goals and methods. But I have to agree with Robert Farley that Russia’s post-Georgia strategic moves — sending warships to Venezuela, making aid offers to Bolivia, etc. — don’t make a great deal of sense. Soviet mucking around in Latin America never accomplished much of anything for the USSR, but it was at least in keeping with the broader strategic logic of the Cold War. The current situation is totally different. Russia basically got what it wanted out of the war with Georgia. But it did harm its relationship with the United States and to some extent with Europe. The smart play would have been to consolidate gains in the Caucuses by making nice with the West, and making Americans and Europeans wonder how much we really care about Georgia. Picking new fights just increases the chances that we’ll decide to help rearm the Georgians in a robust way.

Meanwhile, Putin has no real way of harming US interests in the hemisphere because the US-Venezuela tensions aren’t really about anything other than domestic political posturing. At worst, Venezuela threatens to undermine US efforts to combat Colombian drug trafficking — it’s just not that big a deal. Russia’s quest for strategic supremacy in the Caucuses, by contrast, is about real territory and pipelines. Similarly, the nature of the Russia-Ukraine-NATO has crucial implications for the viability of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. It makes a ton of sense for Russia to take firm measures in its “near abroad” to try to make sure it gets its way, but by the same token they ought to be aware that the consequences of tit-for-tat mucking around cut strongly against them.