Give Up Your Nuclear Weapons Program Or Else We’ll Damage Your Nuclear Weapons Program!

I understand the argument that the United States should give up on diplomacy with Iran and then follow that up with a hysterical overreaction and an unprovoked military assault. I disagree with it, but I understand what it’s proponents are saying. But when I read this kind of thing from Jeffrey Herf in The New Republic, I’m really baffled:

This brings us to the one policy option that Tehran truly fears–and thus the only one that gives these negotiations any realistic chance of success: a credible threat of military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities by the United States, perhaps joined by Britain and France, or Israel. If the Iranian leadership believed that such an attack was a real possibility, it, or some parts of it, might be persuaded to change course.

The idea that the threat of a bombing raid that would partially damage the Iranian nuclear program would inspire the Iranian government to voluntarily give up the nuclear program makes no sense whatsoever. Suppose I wanted Herf to give me $10. I figured maybe I could offer him various incentives in exchange for the $10. But it turns out that Herf is irrational or whatever and hell-bent on holding on to his $10. Reaching into his pocket and stealing $7 might have some merit as a response. But threatening to steal $7 in hopes of persuading him to give me $10 would be ridiculous.

I assume Herf actually understands this and just wants to see the United States launch an illegal preventive military attack on Iran. But he thinks that conclusion is likely to be unpalatable to his audience. So the idea that the credible threat of an attack is likely to produce a diplomatic win serves as basically the sugary coating to make the warmongering go down more sweetly.