As a parenthetical to a long post on Russia’s possibly shifting Iran policy, Michael Crowley argues:
(It’s not likely that Russia, which hasn’t publicly explained the delay, wants to make an Israeli air strike any easier–Moscow doesn’t welcome the strategic and economic instability such an attack would bring; more likely, the Kremlin understands that shipping the missiles would be a destabilizing move that could prompt a quick Israeli strike before Tehran has time to put the batteries into position.)
I dunno . . . wouldn’t Russia be the primary beneficiary of the strategic and economic instability on Israeli attack on Iran would bring? Recall the Arab oil boycott in the 1970s—this essentially acted as a bailout for the Soviet economy, giving the energy-rich USSR access to enough hard currency to boost the availability of consumer goods. I’m generally an optimist about the possibilities for international cooperation, but the fact of the matter is that Russia, a declining great power with a shrinking population and an economy oriented around the export of fossil fuels and weapons, is an unlikely voice for stability.
Conversely, in an Israeli attack on Iran it’s the United States that’s bearing the lion’s share of the downside risk. If such an attack triggered the kind of instability that sends oil prices skyrocketing we, the most oil-dependent nation on earth, will bear the largest share of the pain. But beyond the specific case of the United States, you could easily imagine a spike in oil prices throwing the whole developed world into an economic tailspin.
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