I haven’t done a Libya post in a while, but here’s somthing:
UK’s William Hague says Britain will send military advisers to Libya to help rebels.
One thing that happened at the beginning of the debate over military intervention in Libya is that critics tended to point out that there was a hefty degree of hypocrisy wafting about the enterprise. Proponents countered that the mere existence of hypocrisy doesn’t prove anything. And, indeed, it doesn’t.
But when you’re assessing the actions of political leaders it’s important to think about issues of credibility. We were told this was a humanitarian intervention, but it swiftly became clear that it was in fact a political operation designed to produce rebel victory in a civil war. We were told this was a “no-fly zone” but it swiftly became clear that it was in fact a tactical air support operation designed to produce rebel victory in a civil war. And of course while policymakers certainly have the right to be optimistic about the ability of air power to produce favored outcomes on the ground there are no guarantees in this sphere. Once you’re committed to rebel victory in the Libyan civil war, you’re sort of committed. If air power isn’t enough, maybe you send in the advisors? Maybe the CIA puts boots on the ground. Maybe in strict humanitarian terms prolonging the conflict proves counterproductive (just ask Misrata) and maybe you return to the fact that there seemed to be something fish about this operation from the beginning.